"做中学"科学教育对幼儿情绪能力发展的影响

本文旨在探讨"做中学"科学教育方法对儿童情绪能力发展的影响.研究采用访谈法和问卷法,对象是幼儿家长和老师.问卷调查使用自编儿童情绪能力发展他评问卷,包括教师、对幼儿情绪不同维度的指标进行评分.实验采用2×3设计.实验组60名.问卷用spss10.0统计处理,结果表明实验组儿童情绪能力发展优于对照组参加"做中学"实验活动时间越长,情绪能力发展越好.     

Anxiety and burnout in female collegiate ice hockey and soccer athletes

The purpose of this study was to assess whether athletes who perceived their scores on trait anxiety to be debilitative to performance also experienced higher burnout scores. 84 NCAA Division I female ice hockey and soccer athletes, ages 18 to 23 years, volunteered. Participants were given a trait version of the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 with an added direction scale to collect general perceptions of anxiety. They also completed the Burnout Inventory for Athletes. A one-way multivariate analysis of variance for group anxiety yielded an overall significant effect, with the Facilitative group (n = 40) reporting a lower mean burnout score. Mean intensity of cognitive anxiety was significantly higher for the Debilitative group (n = 44), while mean self-confidence intensity was significantly higher for the Facilitative group.     

Memory belief is weak

Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds.     

Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

---

     

Book reviews

The Pravargya Brāhmana of the Taittiriya āranyaka: An Ancient Commentary on the Pravargya Ritual. Jan E. M. Houben, 1991 Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass xv + 147 pp., Rs.125

The Cavern Mystery Transmission: A Taoist Ordination Rite of AD 711. Asian Studies at Hawaii Series No. 38 Charles D. Benn, 1991 Honolulu, HI, University of Hawaii Press ix + 227 pp.

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience F. J. Varela, E. Thompson & E. Rosch, 1991 Cambridge, MA, MIT Press £22.50     

Kung‐sun lung on the point of pointing: The moral rhetoric of names

Graham compares Kung‐sun Lung's “White Horse not Horse” [Graham, A.C. (1990) Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany, SUNY Press)] loith the use of a synecdoche in English, “Sword is not Blade”. The Blade as part stands in here for the whole which is the Sword. But just as Sword as ‘hilt plus blade’ is more than blade, then via analogia, White Horse as ‘white plus horse’ is more than the part that is just ‘horse’. Graham had taken over this Part/Whole argument from Chad Hansen who argues that since Chinese does not require the word ma for ‘horse/horses’ to be used with prefixed articles or numerals, ma is a ‘mass‐noun’ similar to certain English mass‐nouns like ‘sand’ which also has no plural form unlike the count‐noun ‘horse’ [Hansen, Chad, (1983) Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press)]. Hansen then equates “White Horse is not Horse” to the Mohist argument for “Ox Horse is not Horse”. Ox‐Horse is a ‘mixed herd’ of Ox and Horse that is not (just) that part that is Horse. The same it is with the mass‐sum that is White Horse. It is like saying in English “White Sand is not Sand”. Sand being this spread of sand on the beach, it is more than just a patch of that beach that is white. But this attribution of a Part/Whole logic to Kung‐sun Lung runs up against a basic dictum stated in his thesis on ‘Pointing and Thing’. There it is noted how all things can be pointed out except thing itself because the word “thing” leaves nothing to exclude for it to be stand out. Since that thesis is derived from the law of the excluded middle where a thing is either X or not X, it is not possible for Kung‐sun Lung to subscribe to a Part/Whole logic which basically argues for a thing being both X and not X.     

Working Memory Constraints on Linear Reasoning with Spatial and Temporal Contents

The present article reports two experiments testing the use of working memory components during reasoning with temporal and spatial relations in four-term series problems. In the first experiment four groups of subjects performed reasoning tasks with temporal and with spatial contents either without (control) or with a secondary task (articulatory suppression, visuospatial suppression or central executive suppression). The second experiment tested the secondary task effects in a within-subjects design either on problems with a spatial content or on problems with a temporal content, and within each content domain either under conditions of self-paced or of fixed presentation of the premises. Both experiments found effects of all three secondary tasks on reasoning accuracy. This supports the hypothesis that the subjects construct spatial representations of the premise information with the support of visuo-spatial resources of working memory. The second experiment also showed that during premise intake, only visuo-spatial and central executive secondary tasks had an effect. The implications of the data for the working memory requirements of reasoning and for theories of linear reasoning are discussed.     

Book Reviews

Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Arabic Thought and Culture Series. DOMINIQUE URVOY, 1991. London, Routledge. 156 pp.

Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy Vol. VII. Islamic Philosophy and Theology Texts and Studies. DEBORAH L. BLACK, 1990. Leiden and New York, E. J. Brill. 290 pp.

Philosophy and Science in the Islamic World. C. A. QADIR, 1990. London, Routledge 1990. 218 pp.

Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots. ROBERT E. ALLINSON, 1989. Hong Kong and Oxford, Oxford University Press. 316 pp.

On Justice: An Essay in Jewish Philosophy. L. E. GOODMAN, 1991. New Haven, Yale University Press. 288 pp.     

Book reviews

Facets of Buddhism Shotaro Iida, 1991 Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass 166 pp., Rs. 150 hb

Li Ao: Buddhist, Taoist, or Neo‐Confucian? T. H. Barrett, 1992 London Oriental Series, Vol. 39 Oxford, Oxford University Press x + 178 pp. £20

Spirituality & Emptiness Donald W. Mitchell, 1992 New York, Paulist Press, xvi + 224 pp. $12.95     

Epistemic boundedness

Fodor defines epistemic boundedness as a condition wherein there are epistemi‐cally significant constraints on the beliefs that a mind is capable of entertaining. He discusses a type of (epistemic) boundedness wherein a hypothesis cannot be entertained because it is inexpressible in terms of the mind's stock of concepts. In addition to this semantic boundedness, I describe a number of different sources of boundedness having to do with syntactic, abductive, and implementational limitations. I also discuss the similarities and differences between individual and social limitations on our epistemic possibilities.