Prenatal maternal representations: Mothers at psychosocial risk

The aim of the study was to explore differences in the content of prenatal mental representations between a risk group (n = 84) and a low‐risk group (n = 296) of pregnant women, enrolled from maternity care centers in southwestern Finland. The method used was semantic differentials of IRMAG (Interview of Maternal Representations During Pregnancy). The risk group was defined by means of questionnaire screens that concerned chemical dependency, depression, difficulties in social environment, and low social support. The ratings on all target subjects, i.e., child, self, partner, self‐as‐mother and own mother‐as‐mother, were significantly more negative in the risk group. The representation profiles of the groups differed: especially the ratings of partner and own mother‐as‐mother were more consistently and strongly negative among the risk mothers. © 2001 Michigan Association for Infant Mental Health.     

Inhibition of return and repetition priming effects in localization and discrimination tasks.

Inhibition of return (IOR) refers to slower responding to a stimulus that is presented at the same, rather than a different location as a preceding, spatially nonpredictive, stimulus. Repetition priming refers to speeded responding to a stimulus that duplicates the visual characteristics of a stimulus that precedes it. IOR and repetition priming effects interact in nonspatial discrimination tasks but not in localization tasks; three experiments examined whether this is due to processing differences or due to response differences between tasks. Two stimuli, S1 and S2, occurred on each trial. In Experiment 1, S1 and S2 were both peripheral arrows; in Experiment 2, S1 was a central arrow and S2 was a peripheral nondirectional rectangle; in Experiment 3, S1 was a peripheral nondirectional rectangle and S2 was a peripheral arrow. S1 never required a response; S2 required a localization or a discrimination response. Despite evidence that form information was likely extracted from the arrow stimuli, the localization task revealed no repetition priming: IOR occurred regardless of shared visual identity of the S1 and S2 arrows. The discrimination task revealed IOR only when the visual identity changed from S1 to S2; otherwise, facilitation occurred. These results suggest that IOR is masked by repetition priming only when the response depends on the explicit processing of form information; repetition priming does not occur when such information is extracted automatically but is task (and response) irrelevant.     

Merah and Breivik: A Reflection of the European Identity Crisis

While the cases of Anders Behring Breivik and Mohamed Merah clearly demonstrate the impact of social networks and the role of the Internet and prison on the radicalization process, the killings in Norway and France in fact expose larger issues that exist within contemporary Europe, including profound identity crises manifesting as Islamist extremism in some quarters and far-right extremism in others. This article discusses the individual pathways towards extremism of Merah and Breivik, the interconnectivity of two extremisms and how these can be understood as mirrored manifestations of an identity crisis in Europe.¹1. A shorter version of this article was presented at the international conference on “Europe and Islam in the 21st Century,” organized by the Monash European and EU Centre, Monash University, Prato, Italy, June 20–21, 2013. I would also like to thank Associate Professor Pete Lentini, and Dr Natalie Doyle for having inspired me to continue this research that is close to my heart.     

Optimierung expositionsbasierter Therapie

Exposure is an effective approach for treating anxiety disorders, although a substantial number of individuals fail to benefit or experience a return of fear. Research results suggest that anxious individuals show deficits in the mechanisms underlying exposure therapy, such as inhibitory learning. Targeting these processes may help improve the efficacy of exposure; however, there has been little discussion of how to implement this model in clinical practice. The primary aim of this paper is to provide examples to clinicians for how to apply this model to optimize exposure therapy, in ways that distinguish it from a fear habituation approach and a belief disconfirmation approach. Optimization strategies include (1) expectancy violation, (2) deepened extinction, (3) occasional reinforced extinction, (4) removal of safety signals, (5) variability, (6) retrieval cues, (7) multiple contexts and (8) affect labeling. Case studies illustrate methods of applying these techniques with a variety of anxiety disorders.     

Who is more ethical? Cross‐cultural comparison of consumer ethics between religious and non‐religious consumers

Religion is a significant part of daily life that affects consumers' decisions and behaviors. Religious consumers are predicted to be more ethical than non‐religious consumers. Nonetheless, past research suggests mixed results. Hence, the present study has two main objectives: (1) to examine differences in moral ideologies and ethical beliefs among religious and non‐religious consumers in Indonesia and Australia and (2) to investigate the impact of moral ideologies and religiosity on consumer ethical beliefs. This is one of the first cross‐cultural studies to compare consumer moral ideology (specifically, idealism and relativism) and consumer ethical beliefs between religious and non‐religious consumers. The results show that religious consumers tend more toward idealism than relativism and have stronger ethical beliefs regarding negative consumer ethical behaviors compared with non‐religious consumers. However, for ethical beliefs regarding specific consumer behaviors, namely, recycling and software piracy/buying counterfeit, the effect of religion was overshadowed by cultural differences between the two countries. This study contributes to the debate on the impact of moral ideologies and religiosity on consumer ethical beliefs. The findings may assist managers and public policymakers in their efforts to mitigate unethical consumer activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

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