Who is more ethical? Cross‐cultural comparison of consumer ethics between religious and non‐religious consumers

Religion is a significant part of daily life that affects consumers' decisions and behaviors. Religious consumers are predicted to be more ethical than non‐religious consumers. Nonetheless, past research suggests mixed results. Hence, the present study has two main objectives: (1) to examine differences in moral ideologies and ethical beliefs among religious and non‐religious consumers in Indonesia and Australia and (2) to investigate the impact of moral ideologies and religiosity on consumer ethical beliefs. This is one of the first cross‐cultural studies to compare consumer moral ideology (specifically, idealism and relativism) and consumer ethical beliefs between religious and non‐religious consumers. The results show that religious consumers tend more toward idealism than relativism and have stronger ethical beliefs regarding negative consumer ethical behaviors compared with non‐religious consumers. However, for ethical beliefs regarding specific consumer behaviors, namely, recycling and software piracy/buying counterfeit, the effect of religion was overshadowed by cultural differences between the two countries. This study contributes to the debate on the impact of moral ideologies and religiosity on consumer ethical beliefs. The findings may assist managers and public policymakers in their efforts to mitigate unethical consumer activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Working Memory Constraints on Linear Reasoning with Spatial and Temporal Contents

The present article reports two experiments testing the use of working memory components during reasoning with temporal and spatial relations in four-term series problems. In the first experiment four groups of subjects performed reasoning tasks with temporal and with spatial contents either without (control) or with a secondary task (articulatory suppression, visuospatial suppression or central executive suppression). The second experiment tested the secondary task effects in a within-subjects design either on problems with a spatial content or on problems with a temporal content, and within each content domain either under conditions of self-paced or of fixed presentation of the premises. Both experiments found effects of all three secondary tasks on reasoning accuracy. This supports the hypothesis that the subjects construct spatial representations of the premise information with the support of visuo-spatial resources of working memory. The second experiment also showed that during premise intake, only visuo-spatial and central executive secondary tasks had an effect. The implications of the data for the working memory requirements of reasoning and for theories of linear reasoning are discussed.     

Infant and parental pathways to pre-school cognitive competence

In a longitudinal study, 62 parent-child dyads were seen during the second year of life and at 4 years of age. At 12 months, measures included parental sensitive responsiveness during free play, knowledge of cognitive-communicative development in infancy, and level of exploration and disinhibitedness of the infant. At 16 and at 20 months, parental responsiveness and directiveness and infant task mastery behaviour were assessed in constructive play. Quality of verbal guidance of the parent was assessed in a joint attention situation. At 48 months of age, the McCarthy Scales of Children's Abilities were administered at home, together with dyadic tasks. A path analysis revealed a model in which both verbal abilities and perceptual performance outcome measures were well predicted by the quality of parental verbal guidance in the second year. The latter measure was shown to be independent of the socioeconomic status of parents in the group, but was significantly related with knowledge of infant cognitive-communicative development. Of the measures at the outset of the second year, only socioeconomic status remained as having a direct path at pre-school age. The consistency of the model with other empirical findings underscores parental verbal scaffolding as an important shaper of cognitive development.     

A Family Socialization Model of Transdiagnostic Risk for Psychopathology in Preschool Children

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - This longitudinal study examined the presence of general (P) and specific internalizing (INT) and externalizing (EXT) psychopathology factors in a...     

Epistemic boundedness

Fodor defines epistemic boundedness as a condition wherein there are epistemi‐cally significant constraints on the beliefs that a mind is capable of entertaining. He discusses a type of (epistemic) boundedness wherein a hypothesis cannot be entertained because it is inexpressible in terms of the mind's stock of concepts. In addition to this semantic boundedness, I describe a number of different sources of boundedness having to do with syntactic, abductive, and implementational limitations. I also discuss the similarities and differences between individual and social limitations on our epistemic possibilities.     

The fixity of reasons

I consider backtracking reasoning: that is, reasoning from backtracking counterfactuals such as if Hitler had won the war, he would have invaded Russia six weeks earlier. Backtracking counterfactuals often strike us as true. Despite that, reasoning from them just as often strikes us as illegitimate. A number of diagnoses have been offered of the illegitimacy of such backtracking reasoning which invoke the fixity of the past, or the direction of causation. I argue against such diagnoses, and in favor of one that invokes a principle I call the fixity of reasons. Backtracking reasoning violates the fixity of reasons. But, the fixity of reasons is a principle that must be observed in order to engage in practical reasoning at all.     

The exact vs. approximate distinction in numerical cognition may not be exact, but only approximate: How different processes work together in multi-digit addition

Two types of calculation processes have been distinguished in the literature: approximate processes are supposed to rely heavily on the non-verbal quantity system, whereas exact processes are assumed to crucially involve the verbal system. These two calculation processes were commonly distinguished by manipulation of two factors in addition problems: the identity of the target and the distance of the distractor. However, in all previous studies, these two factors were not manipulated independently. In this fMRI study, we could disentangle the two factors by using a different (two-digit) number stimulus set. Both behavioral and neurofunctional data suggest that the cognitive processes involved could be best explained by the (independent) factors target and distractor distance. Based on these data we suggest that the exact/approximate distinction does not seem to be as generally valid as previously assumed. We conclude that this study may be a starting point for a closer examination of the experimental, procedural and strategic conditions of when the exact/approximate distinction is valid and when it is not.