Whose Rights Count? Negotiating Practice,Policy, and Legal Dilemmas Regarding Infant–Parent Contact When Infants are in Out‐of‐Home Care

This article takes a human rights perspective with a view to articulating the infant's perspective when the infant has been subjected to abuse, neglect, or both and is reliant on the state to ensure his or her health and well‐being. When a young child is removed from parental care, important and often difficult decisions have to be made about subsequent contact between child and parent. We consider a number of dilemmas which may arise for practitioners when they are assisting child welfare decision makers in relation to contact, and acknowledge the limited empirical follow‐up studies of the impact of child welfare practice and legal decisions on infant outcomes. We draw on the significant and substantive evidence base about infant emotional and cognitive development and infant–parent attachment relationships as well as infant mental health to illuminate the infant's subjective experience in these practice dilemmas. We describe innovations in practice from various countries, which seek to shed light on the challenges often associated with contact.     

Using verbal and blind-walking distance estimates to investigate the two visual systems hypothesis

Verbal estimates of egocentric distance are usually too short at distances greater than several meters, yet blindfolded walking to previously viewed targets can be surprisingly accurate. We present evidence from three experiments for the existence of two visual pathways with differentencodings of perceived egocentric distance. We found that (1) blind-walking estimates of egocentric distance are consistently more accurate than verbal reports; (2) an indoor versus outdoor environment selectively influences verbal reports; and (3) wearing prism lenses, which displace the visual field vertically, selectively influences the blind-walking estimates. We interpret these results in terms of the two visual systems hypothesis.     

Perceptions of teachers' general and informational feedback and intrinsic motivation in physical education: two-year effects

Relative change or stability of perceived positive general feedback and perceived informational feedback and their influence on students' intrinsic motivation in physical education over two years were examined. 302 students, ages 11 to 15 years, responded to the Perception of Teacher's Feedback questionnaire. Two years later, these students filled out the questionnaire again, along with a modified version of the Sport Motivation Scale. Analysis showed that both types of perceived feedback exhibited moderate stability over the two years. Perceived positive general feedback demonstrated a significant direct effect on students' intrinsic motivation measured concurrently in physical education. Further, fixing to zero the effect of perceived positive general feedback on intrinsic motivation measured concurrently, an effect emerged over the two years.     

A European perspective on depression in the community: the DEPRES study

Depression is one of the most prevalent disorders in the general population, causing personal and social disability and impairment. Major studies assessing the diagnosis and management of depression have shown that it is often underdiagnosed and undertreated. A pan-European study aimed at assessing the extent and consequences of depression in six different countries is reported in this article. Different types of depressive profiles are analyzed and their respective management has been compared. The importance of improving diagnosis and treatment of depression is underlined. Appropriate management of depression depends on the recognition of depressive symptoms by patients, their possibility of seeking care, and the ability of the primary care physician to recognize the disorder and prescribe the appropriate medicines. Improvement in all of these fields is necessary.     

Sex and developmental differences by complexity of functions of occupational aspirations of school children across ten years

The present longitudinal study examined the complexity of workers' functions for 65 children's occupational aspirations during a 10-yr. span beginning when the children were 7 yr. old and in Grade 2. Every two years through the senior year in high school, the children were interviewed, for a total of six interviews. Sex and developmental differences in occupational aspirations were examined with respect to the focus on Data, People, or Things. Girls (n=31) selected occupational aspirations requiring greater complexity in People functions throughout the study. From G;rades 2 to 8 boys chose occupations with greater complexity of Things and girls chose occupations with greater complexity of Data. Developmentally, all children chose increasingly more complex Data occupations from Grades 2 to 12. Occupational aspirations in high school showed a decrease in the complexity of workers' functions involving People and Things. These observations would be expected from social cognitive theory and the 1981 career development theory of Gottfredson.     

Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

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Working Memory Constraints on Linear Reasoning with Spatial and Temporal Contents

The present article reports two experiments testing the use of working memory components during reasoning with temporal and spatial relations in four-term series problems. In the first experiment four groups of subjects performed reasoning tasks with temporal and with spatial contents either without (control) or with a secondary task (articulatory suppression, visuospatial suppression or central executive suppression). The second experiment tested the secondary task effects in a within-subjects design either on problems with a spatial content or on problems with a temporal content, and within each content domain either under conditions of self-paced or of fixed presentation of the premises. Both experiments found effects of all three secondary tasks on reasoning accuracy. This supports the hypothesis that the subjects construct spatial representations of the premise information with the support of visuo-spatial resources of working memory. The second experiment also showed that during premise intake, only visuo-spatial and central executive secondary tasks had an effect. The implications of the data for the working memory requirements of reasoning and for theories of linear reasoning are discussed.     

Epistemic boundedness

Fodor defines epistemic boundedness as a condition wherein there are epistemi‐cally significant constraints on the beliefs that a mind is capable of entertaining. He discusses a type of (epistemic) boundedness wherein a hypothesis cannot be entertained because it is inexpressible in terms of the mind's stock of concepts. In addition to this semantic boundedness, I describe a number of different sources of boundedness having to do with syntactic, abductive, and implementational limitations. I also discuss the similarities and differences between individual and social limitations on our epistemic possibilities.     

Infant and parental pathways to pre-school cognitive competence

In a longitudinal study, 62 parent-child dyads were seen during the second year of life and at 4 years of age. At 12 months, measures included parental sensitive responsiveness during free play, knowledge of cognitive-communicative development in infancy, and level of exploration and disinhibitedness of the infant. At 16 and at 20 months, parental responsiveness and directiveness and infant task mastery behaviour were assessed in constructive play. Quality of verbal guidance of the parent was assessed in a joint attention situation. At 48 months of age, the McCarthy Scales of Children's Abilities were administered at home, together with dyadic tasks. A path analysis revealed a model in which both verbal abilities and perceptual performance outcome measures were well predicted by the quality of parental verbal guidance in the second year. The latter measure was shown to be independent of the socioeconomic status of parents in the group, but was significantly related with knowledge of infant cognitive-communicative development. Of the measures at the outset of the second year, only socioeconomic status remained as having a direct path at pre-school age. The consistency of the model with other empirical findings underscores parental verbal scaffolding as an important shaper of cognitive development.     

A Family Socialization Model of Transdiagnostic Risk for Psychopathology in Preschool Children

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - This longitudinal study examined the presence of general (P) and specific internalizing (INT) and externalizing (EXT) psychopathology factors in a...