Executive function outcomes of children with traumatic brain injury sustained before three years

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a common cause of disability in childhood. While the outcomes of TBI sustained in school years has been heavily researched, very little is known about the impact of TBI in infants and young children. The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of TBI on executive function (EF) in children who sustained a TBI before 3 years of age. A group of 55 children, 19 with a mild TBI, 16 children with a moderate-severe TBI, and 20 uninjured comparison children participated. The EF of children aged 3 to 6 years were compared using child-based measures of attentional control and information processing. Parents completed questionnaires rating their child's EF. Severity groups differed on the child-based EF measure of attentional control with children with TBI performing below the control group. There were no significant group differences for information processing or parent-rated EF. It appears that children who sustain a TBI before the age of 3 years display impairments in some areas of attentional control 3–4 years postinjury. The findings fit with the existing EF literature for older children.     

The Implications of Childhood Bacterial Meningitis for Language Development

Bacterial meningitis is a life threatening infection of the central nervous system. This illness is most prevalent early in life when the healthy child is rapidly acquiring language. This study investigated whether children with a history of bacterial meningitis were at risk for language difficulties post illness. Thirty post-meningitic children, aged between 9 years 0 months and 11 years 0 months, participated in this study. Each subject was administered a measure of non-verbal cognitive ability and a range of language tasks. These children performed poorly on applied language tasks, which tap skills used in effective discourse. These deficits occurred despite age appropriate performances on measures of linguistic/grammatical knowledge. These findings clearly illustrate that bacterial meningitis has implications for ongoing language development, which emphasises the importance of long term follow up. In developmental terms, this discrepancy between verbal knowledge and problem solving represents a dissociation between language skills which develop early in life and those which emerge later. This pattern of results suggests that bacterial meningitis may result in a delay in language development. A young age at illness was identified as an additional risk factor for adverse outcome. This study highlights the need to inform parents/guardians that post-meningitic children are at risk for experiencing language difficulties throughout childhood.     

Perceiving the sweet spot

Many sports involve aligning a hitting implement with a ball trajectory such that contact is made at the implement's center of percussion or 'sweet spot'. This spot is not visibly distinct; its perception must be haptic. Although it is functionally defined with respect to contact--it is the point of impact that produces the least vibration in the hand holding the implement--hitting success requires appreciating the location of the sweet spot prior to contact. Two experiments verified that perceivers (novices as well as expert tennis players) distinguished perception of length from perception of the position of the sweet spot simply on the basis of wielding, both for tennis rackets and for bats contrived from wooden rods with attached masses. Results conformed to previous research on dynamic touch in showing that perceiving the lengths of wielded objects, including selectively perceiving partial lengths, is constrained by inertial properties of the object.     

Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism

I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity, and show how the metaphor of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties. Perspectivism's claim that every view is only one view, applied to itself, is often supposed to preclude the perspectivist's ability to offer reasons for her epistemology. Nietzsche's arguments for perspectivism depend on “internal reasons”, which have force not only in their own perspective, but also within the standards of alternative perspectives. Internal reasons allow a perspectivist argument against dogmatism without presupposing aperspectival criteria for theory choice. Nietzsche also offers “internal” conceptions of truth and objectivity which reduce them to a matter of meeting our epistemic standards. This view has pluralistic implications, which conflict with common sense, but it is nevertheless consistent and plausible. Nietzsche's position is similar to Putnam's recent internalism, and this is due to their common Kantian heritage. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Speech imagery is not always faster than visual imagery

One approach to the study of mental imagery is to examine the performance characteristics of different forms of mental imagery when used in various tasks. To demonstrate the utility of this functional approach, the use of speech and visual imagery processes in the serial mental rehearsal of common verbal sequences le.g., letters of the alphabet and familiar object arrays (objects found in familiar rooms) was examined in the present experiments. Rehearsal rates and self-reporte were consistent with the hypothesis that mental rehearsal efficiency is a function of the compatibility of characteristics of the rehearsal materials and rehearsal mode. While verbal sequences were rehearsed faster under speech than under visual imagery conditions, object arrays were rehearsed as fast under visual as under speech imagery conditions. In addition, evidence was found that covert verbal rehearsal is faster than overt verbal rehearsal under some circumstances.     

Self-representation in social anxiety disorder: linguistic analysis of autobiographical narratives

Cognitive models of social anxiety disorder (SAD) posit aberrant beliefs about the social self as a key psychological mechanism that maintains fear of negative evaluation in social and performance situations. Consequently, a distorted self-view should be evident when recalling painful autobiographical social memories, as reflected in linguistic expression, negative self-beliefs, and emotion and avoidance. To test this hypothesis, 42 adults diagnosed with SAD and 27 non-psychiatric healthy controls (HC) composed autobiographical narratives of distinct social anxiety related situations, generated negative self-beliefs (NSB), and provided emotion and avoidance ratings. Although narratives were matched for initial emotional intensity and present vividness, linguistic analyses demonstrated that, compared to HC, SAD employed more self-referential, anxiety, and sensory words, and made fewer references to other people. There were no differences in the number of self-referential NSB identified by SAD and HC. Social anxiety symptom severity, however, was associated with greater self-referential NSB in SAD only. SAD reported greater current self-conscious emotions when recalling autobiographical social situations, and greater active avoidance of similar situations than did HC. These findings support cognitive models of SAD, and suggest that autobiographical memory of social situations in SAD may influence current and future thinking, emotion, and behavioral avoidance.     

Examinations of identity invariance in facial expression adaptation

Faces provide a wealth of information essential to social interaction, including both static features, such as identity, and dynamic features, such as emotional state. Classic models of face perception propose separate neural-processing routes for identity and facial expression (Bruce & Young, 1986), but more recent models suggest that these routes are not independent of each other (Calder & Young, 2005). Using a perceptual adaptation paradigm in the present study, we attempted to further examine the nature of the relation between the neural representations of identity and emotional expression. In Experiment 1, adaptation to the basic emotions of anger, surprise, disgust, and fear resulted in significantly biased perception away from the adapting expression. A significantly decreased aftereffect was observed when the adapting and the test faces differed in identity. With a statistical model that separated surface texture and reflectance from underlying expression geometry, Experiment 2 showed a similar decrease in adaptation when the face stimuli had identical underlying prototypical geometry but differed in the static surface features supporting identity. These results provide evidence that expression adaptation depends on perceptual features important for identity processing and thus suggest at least partly overlapping neural processing of identity and facial expression.