Pessimistic explanatory style and response to illness

Previous studies have shown that a pessimistic explanatory style is a risk factor for illness, but the factors linking explanatory style and illness are unknown. One's characteristic response to poor health may mediate this relationship. Perhaps pessimistic individuals act helplessly in the face of their symptoms, thereby exacerbating disease. In the present study, we investigated this possibility by asking 96 young adults to complete measures of explanatory style, habitual response to illness, and ways of coping during their most recent episode of illness. Subjects who explain bad events pessimistically (with internal, stable, and global causes) reported more frequent illnesses during the past year and rated their overall health more poorly than those who habitually favor external, unstable, and specific explanations. When ill, the pessimistic subjects were less likely than their optimistic counterparts to take active steps to combat their illness. Our results suggest that one pathway leading from pessimistic explanatory style to poor health is mundane: passivity in the face of disease.     

Is the match/mismatch model based on a statistical artefact?

In the match/mismatch model, recently formulated by Rachman and coworkers, it is stated that incorrectly predicted aversive experiences are generally followed by an immediate adjustment of the predictions concerning aversiveness of the next experience. This model can be considered to reflect a psychological process of the formation of expectations. In the present article it is argued that a simple H0 model, assuming that predictions are completely randomly generated by the subject, may account for the same effects. This H0 model is used in a stringent test of empirical data to determine if there are any effects of the discrepancy between prediction and experience on next prediction that exceed the effects explained by the H0 model. Although the H0 model produces effects very similar to the empirically observed effects, there is clear support for the hypothesized influence of the discrepancy between prediction and experience. Therefore, the model appears to reflect 'real' psychological processes and not chance findings.     

How wide is the widening scope of psychoanalysis and how solid is its structural model? Some concerns and observations

The author advances the thesis that in the past 35 years there has been a relatively silent but nonetheless significant movement within the mainstream of American psychoanalysis toward a more "modest" position. This movement has been stimulated from different sources, sometimes with diverse goals and different programs. One determinant was the reaction to the post-World War II euphoria in regard to psychoanalysis and its possible therapeutic powers. Another element has been the ongoing consolidation of our knowledge and understanding of the ego-psychological, structural-model approach to analytic theory and technique, an approach which emphasizes both intrapsychic conflict and compromise formations. A consequence of this more modest position has been a greater appreciation of the limitations of psychoanalysis as well as the significance of those limitations. This more realistic appraisal of psychoanalysis may not have encouraged the widening scope of the indications for analysis, but the enhanced understanding of its limitations offers the promise of more effective psychoanalytic work in areas that have not been considered ideal for the so-called "traditional" analysis. It is suggested that more sophisticated approaches in the analysis of resistance and character, of "conflict" (in distinction to "diagnoses"), together with a more applicable understanding of the psychoanalytic process, can all contribute to a deepening, if not necessarily widening, of our psychoanalytic endeavors.     

Unconscious fantasy: developmental and self-psychological considerations

The authors view unconscious fantasy from the perspective of self psychology as a significant addition and emendation of the classical framework. A selective review of the pertinent literature is presented, followed by clinical material illustrating the contribution of self-psychological concepts to the understanding of unconscious fantasy formation.     

Additive latency effects of selective and nonselective restricted priming types

The purpose of this investigation was to examine further the contention of Alain et al. (1988) that a third priming type exists, called nonselective restricted (NSR) and controlled by response probability, which is distinct from those types influenced by foreperiod duration (nonselective general priming) and prediction probability (selective priming). In a four-choice reaction time (RT) task, prediction probability (.5, .7, & .9, indicating the likelihood of a particular response) and response probability (.5, .9, denoting the likelihood that a response would be needed at all) exerted significant but noninteractive effects on RTs for prepared responses (most probable), suggesting that each of these probabilities influence different priming types (Sternberg, 1969; selective and NSR, respectively). This was further indicated by the fact that prediction probability, but not response probability, significantly altered RTs for the unprepared (lesser probable) responses. Finally, the hypothesized nonselective character of NSR priming (i.e., all outputs controlled by response probability are equally affected by its value changes) was supported when responses were equiprobable, and, while the null effect of response probability just mentioned seemingly argued against this property when selective priming took place, the interpretation provided herein negated this opposition.     

Idioms and mental imagery: the metaphorical motivation for idiomatic meaning

We conducted three experiments to investigate the mental images associated with idiomatic phrases in English. Our hypothesis was that people should have strong conventional images for many idioms and that the regularity in people's knowledge of their images for idioms is due to the conceptual metaphors motivating the figurative meanings of idioms. In the first study, subjects were asked to form and describe their mental images for different idiomatic expressions. Subjects were then asked a series of detailed questions about their images regarding the causes and effects of different events within their images. We found high consistency in subjects' images of idioms with similar figurative meanings despite differences in their surface forms (e.g., spill the beans and let the cat out of the bag). Subjects' responses to detailed questions about their images also showed a high degree of similarity in their answers. Further examination of subjects' imagery protocols supports the idea that the conventional images and knowledge associated with idioms are constrained by the conceptual metaphors (e.g., the MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE ENTITIES) which motivate the figurative meanings of idioms. The results of two control studies showed that the conventional images associated with idioms are not solely based on their figurative meanings (Experiment 2) and that the images associated with literal phrases (e.g., spill the peas) were quite varied and unlikely to be constrained by conceptual metaphor (Experiment 3). These findings support the view that idioms are not "dead" metaphors with their meanings being arbitrarily determined. Rather, the meanings of many idioms are motivated by speakers' tacit knowledge of the conceptual metaphors underlying the meanings of these figurative phrases.     

Towards a theory of algorithm-determined cognitive test construction

A rationale for, and data from, a trial of a theory of item generation by algorithms whose origins are cognitive models of task performance are presented. Since Spearman (1904), intelligence has been operationally defined and assessed in human subjects by administering identical test items whose content and order have been fixed only after empirical iterations. In our approach, intelligence is ostensively defined by theoretically determined algorithms used for item construction and presentation. Knowledge of what cognitive factors limit human performance makes it possible to vary within tightly specified parameters those features of the tasks that contribute to difficulty, which we call radicals, to let those components of the tasks that do not contribute to difficulty vary randomly, and to counterbalance aspects of answer production that might induce biases of response. Empirical data are based on the generation of five different short tests demanding only functional literacy as a prerequisite for their execution. Four parallel forms of each test were administered to young male Army recruits whose scores were collated with their Army Entrance Test results, which were not previously known to us. Results show that the parallel, algorithm-generated item sets are statistically invariant, which item generation theory demands; and that the individual tests differentially predict Army Entrance Test scores. We conclude that IQ test performances are parsimoniously explained by individual differences in encoding, comparison and reconstructive memory processes.     

Numerical abstraction by human infants

Across several experiments, 6- to 8-month-old human infants were found to detect numerical correspondences between sets of entities presented in different sensory modalities and bearing no natural relation to one another. At the basis of this ability, we argue, is a sensitivity to numerosity, an abstract property of collections of objects and events. Our findings provide evidence that the emergence of the earliest numerical abilities does not depend upon the development of language or complex actions, or upon cultural experience with number.     

Analysis of transference in Gestalt group psychotherapy

In Gestalt therapy, transference is viewed as a contact boundary disturbance which impairs the patient's ability to accurately perceive the present therapy situation. The boundary disturbances in Gestalt therapy most closely related to the analytic notion of transference are projection, introjection, and confluence. In Gestalt group psychotherapy, group members interfere with the process of need identification and satisfaction by distorting their contact with each other through projecting, introjecting, and being confluent. The Gestalt group therapist uses interventions directed to individuals and to the group to increase participants' awareness of these boundary disturbances and of the present contact opportunities available to them when these disturbances are resolved. In formulating interventions, the leader is mindful of the function of boundary disturbances to the group-as-a-whole as well as to individuals.     

Performance of criminal psychopaths on selected neuropsychological tests

Screening batteries of standard neuropsychological tests were administered to 2 different samples (Ns = 90 and 167) of male prison inmates. Scores on the revised Psychopathy Checklist were used to divide inmates in each sample into high, moderate, and low psychopathy groups. There were no group differences in test performance in either of the samples, even when the effects of self-reported psychopathology and substance abuse were taken into account. The overall prevalence of both test-specific and global neuropsychological impairment was low and did not vary significantly across the 3 groups. The results provide no support for traditional brain-damage explanations of psychopathy.