Perceived past, present, and future control and adjustment to stressful life events

Perceived control is a central construct in psychology and is key to understanding individual differences in poststress outcomes (Frazier, Berman, & Steward, 2001). The goals of the current studies (using 4 samples of undergraduate students, total N = 1,421) were to examine the relations between different aspects of perceived control and poststress outcomes and to differentiate perceived control over specific events from related constructs (i.e., general control beliefs, coping strategies). To accomplish these goals, we first developed a new measure of perceived past, present, and future control over stressful life events. The data supported the content validity, factor structure, internal consistency and test-retest reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity of the new measure. Consistent with the temporal model of control (Frazier et al., 2001), these 3 forms of control had very different relations with adjustment. Present control was consistently related to lower distress levels in cross-sectional, longitudinal, and prospective analyses. Present control also predicted outcomes beyond the effects of general control beliefs and coping strategies. Past and future control had nonsignificant or positive relations with distress, although future control was associated with better outcomes (i.e., course grades) when the stressor was controllable. Thus, our measure can be used to assess the relations between perceived past, present, and future control and outcomes across a range of stressors. Because the relations between these 3 forms of control and outcomes differ markedly, measures that combine these aspects of control hinder the understanding of the important role of perceived control in adjustment to stress.     

Physical attractiveness stereotype and memory

Three experiments examined explicit and implicit memory for information that is congruent with the physical attractiveness stereotype (i.e. attractive-positive and unattractive-negative) and information that is incongruent with the physical attractiveness stereotype (i.e. attractive-negative and unattractive-positive). Measures of explicit recognition sensitivity and implicit discriminability revealed a memorial advantage for congruent compared to incongruent information, as evident from hit and false alarm rates and reaction times, respectively. Measures of explicit memory showed a recognition bias toward congruent compared to incongruent information, where participants tended to call congruent information old, independently of whether the information had been shown previously or not. This recognition bias was unrelated to reports of subjective confidence in retrieval. The present findings shed light on the cognitive mechanisms that might mediate discriminatory behavior towards physically attractive and physically unattractive individuals.     

What I Talk About When I Talk About Teaching and Learning

In this text I discuss two events in which I learned something important about life and about education in order to formulate in a precise manner two propositions for my pedagogical creed. In focus for both are the interrelatedness of theory and life. The stories are told through the lenses of Emmanuel Levinas’s and Jacques Rancière’s thinking, but the stories also are shown to be essential in my understanding of their thinking. The first story is about learning ethics as a consequence of meeting an old man on a remote island and the second story is about teaching, when a young girl in a situation of war taught me something important about political life. In a final section I discuss briefly what those theoretical/practical experiences and memories bring to my understanding of education.     

Reducing cognitive biases in probabilistic reasoning by the use of logarithm formats

Research on probability judgment has traditionally emphasized that people are susceptible to biases because they rely on “variable substitution”: the assessment of normative variables is replaced by assessment of heuristic, subjective variables. A recent proposal is that many of these biases may rather derive from constraints on cognitive integration, where the capacity-limited and sequential nature of controlled judgment promotes linear additive integration, in contrast to many integration rules of probability theory (Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009). A key implication by this theory is that it should be possible to improve peoples’ probabilistic reasoning by changing probability problems into logarithm formats that require additive rather than multiplicative integration. Three experiments demonstrate that recasting tasks in a way that allows people to arrive at the answers by additive integration decreases cognitive biases, and while people can rapidly learn to produce the correct answers in an additive formats, they have great difficulty doing so with a multiplicative format.     

Perception of line‐up suggestiveness: effects of identification outcome knowledge

Research on the hindsight bias has shown that knowledge of an event outcome makes the observed outcome appear more predictable than it does in the absence of outcome knowledge. It was hypothesised that perceptions of the suggestiveness of a line‐up would be similarly influenced by knowledge of a witness' identification decision, with a positive identification of the suspect increasing, and a negative non‐identification decreasing, perceived suggestiveness. The ratings of undergraduate students (N = 50) in Experiment 1 showed the predicted influence of positive outcome, whereas negative outcome had no demonstrable influence. In contrast, Experiment 2, conducted with police trainees (N = 126) and with the line‐up presented in the context of a criminal investigation, partially supported the predicted influence of negative, but not positive, outcome. The discrepant findings are discussed in terms of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the hindsight bias and the implications for real‐life judgements of line‐up suggestiveness. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An investigation of brain processes supporting meditation

Meditation is an ancient spiritual practice, which aims to still the fluctuations of the mind. We investigated meditation with fMRI in order to identify and characterise both the “neural switch” mechanism used in the voluntary shift from normal consciousness to meditation and the “threshold regulation mechanism” sustaining the meditative state. Thirty-one individuals with 1.5–25 years experience in meditation were scanned using a blocked on–off design with 45 s alternating epochs during the onset of respectively meditation and normal relaxation. Additionally, 21 subjects were scanned during 14.5 min of sustained meditation. The data were analysed with SPM and ICA. During the onset of meditation, activations were found bilaterally in the putamen and the supplementary motor cortex, while deactivations were found predominately in the right hemisphere, the precuneus, the posterior cingulum and the parieto–temporal area. During sustained meditation, SPM analysis revealed activation in the head of nucleus caudatus. Extensive deactivations were observed in white matter in the right hemisphere, i.e. mainly in the posterior occipito–parieto–temporal area and in the frontal lobes. ICA identified 38 components including known baseline-resting state components, one of which not only overlaps with the activated area revealed in the SPM analysis but extends further into frontal, temporal, parietal and limbic areas, and might presumably constitute a combination of frontoparietal and cinguloopercular task control systems. The identified component processes display varying degrees of correlation. We hypothesise that a proper characterisation of brain processes during meditation will require an operational definition of brain dynamics matching a stable state of mind.     

Assessing children's statements: the impact of a repeated experience on CBCA and RM ratings

This study examined the extent to which the Criteria‐based Content Analysis (CBCA) technique and the Reality Monitoring (RM) technique were affected by the number of times children had experienced or imagined an event. Children (age 10–13, N =87 ) participated in an experiment where half the sample experienced a health examination (either one or four times), and the other half imagined (either one or four times) that they took part in a health examination. One week after the final occasion, the children were interviewed. The results showed that RM was sensitive to both the authenticity of the statements (increased presence of the criteria for real events) and whether the event had been repeatedly experienced/imagined (increased presence of the criteria for the repeated actions). The CBCA did not successfully distinguish the real from the imagined. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's recall and the cognitive interview: do the positive effects hold over time?

Most studies investigating how the Cognitive Interview affects children's recall have employed short retention intervals (a week or less). In our study children (10–11 years old) saw a film picturing an extraordinary performance by a professional fakir. Half of the children were interviewed after seven days (n = 24) and the other half after six months (n = 25). At each test session, half were interviewed according to the Cognitive Interview (CI), and half according to the Structured Interview (SI). We found that: (a) the children in the CI condition recalled significantly more correct information than the children in the SI condition (both after seven days and after six months), and (b) the children interviewed after seven days recalled significantly more correct information, and less confabulations, compared to the children interviewed after six months. The results suggest that the CI can be used as an investigative tool both after short and long retention intervals. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of source and type of feedback on child witnesses' metamemory accuracy

This study investigated the effect of feedback on the accuracy (realism) of 12‐year‐old children's metacognitive judgments of their answers to questions about a film clip. Two types of judgments were investigated: confidence judgments (on each question) and frequency judgments (i.e. estimates of overall accuracy). The source of feedback, whether it was presented as provided by a teacher or a peer child, did not influence metacognitive accuracy. Four types of feedback were given depending on whether the participant's answer was correct and depending on whether the feedback confirmed or disconfirmed the child's answer. The children showed large overconfidence when they received confirmatory feedback but much less so when they received disconfirmatory feedback. The children gave frequency judgments implying that they had more correct answers than they actually had. No main gender differences were found for any of the measures. The results indicate a high degree of malleability in children's metacognitive judgments. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.