Out with the old? The role of selective attention in retaining targets in partial report

In the partial-report task, subjects are asked to report only a portion of the items presented. Selective attention chooses which objects to represent in short-term memory (STM) on the basis of their relevance. Because STM is limited in capacity, one must sometimes choose which objects are removed from memory in light of new relevant information. We tested the hypothesis that the choices among newly presented information and old information in STM involve the same process—that both are acts of selective attention. We tested this hypothesis using a two-display partial-report procedure. In this procedure, subjects had to select and retain relevant letters (targets) from two sequentially presented displays. If selection in perception and retention in STM are the same process, then irrelevant letters (distractors) in the second display, which demanded attention because of their similarity to the targets, should have decreased target report from the first display. This effect was not obtained in any of four experiments. Thus, choosing objects to keep in STM is not the same process as choosing new objects to bring into STM.     

Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.     

Indeterminacy and the principle of need

The principle of need—the idea that resources should be allocated according to need—is often invoked in priority setting in the health care sector. In this article, I argue that a reasonable principle of need must be indeterminate, and examine three different ways that this can be dealt with: appendicizing the principle with further principles, imposing determinacy, or empowering decision makers. I argue that need must be conceptualized as a composite property composed of at least two factors: health shortfall and capacity to benefit. When one examines how the different factors relate to each other, one discovers that this is sometimes indeterminate. I illustrate this indeterminacy in this article by applying the small improvement argument. If the relation between the factors are always determinate, the comparative relation changes by a small adjustment. Yet, if two needs are dissimilar but of seemingly equal magnitude, the comparative relation does not change by a small adjustment of one of the factors. I then outline arguments in favor of each of the three strategies for dealing with indeterminacy, but also point out that all strategies have significant shortcomings. More research is needed concerning how to deal with this indeterminacy, and the most promising path seems to be to scrutinize the position of the principle of need among a plurality of relevant principles for priority setting in the health care sector.     

Generalized multilevel structural equation modeling

A unifying framework for generalized multilevel structural equation modeling is introduced. The models in the framework, called generalized linear latent and mixed models (GLLAMM), combine features of generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) and structural equation models (SEM) and consist of a response model and a structural model for the latent variables. The response model generalizes GLMMs to incorporate factor structures in addition to random intercepts and coefficients. As in GLMMs, the data can have an arbitrary number of levels and can be highly unbalanced with different numbers of lower-level units in the higher-level units and missing data. A wide range of response processes can be modeled including ordered and unordered categorical responses, counts, and responses of mixed types. The structural model is similar to the structural part of a SEM except that it may include latent and observed variables varying at different levels. For example, unit-level latent variables (factors or random coefficients) can be regressed on cluster-level latent variables. Special cases of this framework are explored and data from the British Social Attitudes Survey are used for illustration. Maximum likelihood estimation and empirical Bayes latent score prediction within the GLLAMM framework can be performed using adaptive quadrature in gllamm, a freely available program running in Stata.gllamm can be downloaded from http://www.gllamm.org. The paper was written while Sophia Rabe-Hesketh was employed at and Anders Skrondal was visiting the Department of Biostatistics and Computing, Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London.     

Subjective probability intervals: how to reduce overconfidence by interval evaluation

Format dependence implies that assessment of the same subjective probability distribution produces different conclusions about over- or underconfidence depending on the assessment format. In 2 experiments, the authors demonstrate that the overconfidence bias that occurs when participants produce intervals for an uncertain quantity is almost abolished when they evaluate the probability that the same intervals include the quantity. The authors successfully apply a method for adaptive adjustment of probability intervals as a debiasing tool and discuss a tentative explanation in terms of a naive sampling model. According to this view, people report their experiences accurately, but they are naive in that they treat both sample proportion and sample dispersion as unbiased estimators, yielding small bias in probability evaluation but strong bias in interval production.     

Can attentional theory explain the inverse base rate effect? Comment on Kruschke (2001)

In J. K. Kruschke's (2001; see record 2001-18940-005) study, it is argued that attentional theory is the sole satisfactory explanation of the inverse base rate effect and that eliminative inference (P. Juslin, P. Wennerholm, & A. Winman, 2001; see record 2001-07828-016) plays no role in the phenomenon. In this comment, the authors demonstrate that, in contrast to the central tenets of attentional theory, (a) rapid attention shifts as implemented in ADIT decelerate learning in the inverse base-rate task and (b) the claim that the inverse base-rate effect is directly caused by an attentional asymmetry is refuted by data. It is proposed that a complete account of the inverse base-rate effect needs to integrate attention effects with inference rules that are flexibly used for both induction and elimination.     

Interviewing children with the cognitive interview: assessing the reliability of statements based on observed and imagined events

This paper investigated whether criteria stemming from the Reality Monitoring (RM) framework could be trusted to assess the reliability of statements obtained by the use of a cognitive interview (CI). Fifty-eight children, aged 10-11, participated. One-third watched a film about a fakir and were then interviewed according to a CI (n= 19). The remaining two-thirds made up a story about a fakir and were then interviewed according to either a CI (n= 21), or a structured interview (SI) (n= 18). The CI statements based on observed events contained more visual, affective, spatial and temporal information compared to CI statements based on imagined events. The CI statements based on imagined events did not differ from the SI statements based on imagined events. Considerable developmental work is recommended to turn the RM technique to a reliable test that could be used by practitioners.     

Basic information processing of neurotics and stables: an experimental ERP approach to personality and distractibility

The aim of the study was to investigate the effects of level of neuroticism on electrophysiological event-related potentials (ERPs) to different kinds of stimuli. The neuroticism items from the NEO-PI-R were administered to 168 female, right-handed undergraduates between 19 and 29 years of age. 20 highly neurotic and 22 highly stable persons underwent an ERP task that was designed to be a combination of an auditory P3a and a visual P3b oddball task. No significant differences in the P3a and P3b were detected. It is concluded that highly neurotic and highly stable persons do not differ in fast neurocognitive processing of neutral stimuli, and that cognitive differences between the groups may be located at another level in the sequence of information processing stages.     

Alexithymia,memory of emotion,emotional awareness,and perfectionism

The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; R. M. Bagby, J. D. A. Parker, & G. J. Taylor, 1994) is a self-assessment instrument designed to measure deficits in meta-emotional functioning (e.g., difficulties in identifying and describing emotions). Four studies were carried out to examine the association between the TAS-20 and (a) performance measures of meta-emotional functioning (memory of emotion and emotional awareness; Studies 1-2) and (b) measures of perfectionistic standards that may possibly be involved in the self-assessment of abilities-difficulties (Studies 3-4). The TAS-20 failed to correlate in the predicted direction with the performance measures but showed sizable correlations with measures of perfectionism. Moreover, perfectionism was found to predict TAS-20 scores independent of depression, anxiety, and somatic complaints. The results are discussed in terms of the TAS-20 measuring primarily certain aspects of meta-emotional self-efficacy.