A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing

The ability to distinguish people from things sheds light on an important theoretical question: how is the development of social cognition related to the development of physical cognition? According to Piaget (1954), cognition is unitary and the processes used in dealing with the physical world are the same as those employed in the social world. This statement should be questioned. Although people and objects share certain fundamental properties (size, shape, etc.), only people can communicate, act independently and have feelings and intentions. Thus, people seem much more complex to deal with than things. If all cognitive development derives from the growth of a unitary system, then knowledge about animate objects should lag behind that of inanimate objects. The present paper explores this idea by examining what infants know about the attributes that distinguish people from things. It is concluded that the onset of this distinction begins early in life. Even 2-month-old infants treat people and objects differently when confounding variables of the stimuli are controlled. Rather than lagging behind, the infants' understanding of people appears precocious. The infants' recognition of the crucial distinction between the two classes suggests that a conceptual system is beginning to be formed soon after birth. This conceptual system appears different for social and non-social objects and serves as a foundation from which infants might come to understand the distinctive properties of animate and inanimate objects.     

Intrusion patterns in rapid serial visual presentation tasks with two response dimensions

A rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm using both one and two response dimensions was used to test parallel processing models of stimulus dimensions. Fifty subjects were asked to report the identity and/or color of a target uppercase word inserted in a series of lowercase words. The results produced a predominance of posttarget intrusions for color responses and a predominance of pretarget intrusions for identity responses. The requirement of a response to a second dimension impaired hit rates but did not change the pattern of intrusions. An examination of the distributions of intrusions in each response dimension as a function of the response given to the other dimension showed an unexpectedly high percentage of simultaneous hits, a moderate covariation between both responses, and the same patterns of intrusions when compared with the general distributions. While these results seem to be compatible with parallel models of processing for stimulus dimensions, two modifications to this model are suggested. First, the processing of response dimension(s) needs some attentional resources. Second, provision for a mixed model is indicated, which would include trials where no illusory conjunctions are formed.     

A TEST OF SHAVELSON'S HIERARCHICAL MULTIFACETED SELF-CONCEPT MODEL IN A FILIPINO COLLEGE SAMPLE

Shavelson's hierarchical, multifaceted self-concept model (HMFM) has proven useful to educational and psychological researchers. The reliability and factorial validity of a well-known HMFM instrument - the Fleming-Courtney Self-Rating Scales (SRS) - were examined for a sample of 198 Filipino college students. Confirmatory factor analysis compared six structural models. A six-factor, oblique model that included two social factors (Social Acceptance and Social Anxiety) fit the data best, and a second-order factor analysis supported the hierarchical structure of the SRS. The men were significantly higher than the women on three self-concept scales, but the only large effect was for Physical Abilities, consistent with findings in a U.S. college sample. Results provided some support for the utility of both the SRS and HMFM for Filipinos.     

Instructions and reinforcement in the observing behavior of adults and children

Observing responses of college students and children of different ages (4 to 5, 9 to 10, and 13 to 14 years) were studied using two-component schedules of reinforcement. Different frequencies or numbers of points were given in the components and points were backed by either money or instructions about getting points (e.g., “points are for the experimenter's information only”). Stimuli that were either correlated or uncorrelated with the components were contingent on presses on either of two concurrently available levers (observing responses). In each of three experiments, preferences for stimuli were consistent with the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing but inconsistent with the uncertainty-reduction hypothesis. Stimulus preferences were established, eliminated, or reversed by instructions about the significance of getting points not backed with money. Instructions to in effect ignore points with no monetary value eliminated stimulus preference provided that money was not associated with points in other conditions for the same subjects. Stimulus preferences were otherwise independent of monetary point value. Instructions that described reinforcement contingencies promoted more rapid adjustment to the contingencies than occurred without them, and preferences were less variable across sessions within subjects and were on the average more extreme. Although some results involving absolute rates of observing depended upon the age of subjects, stimulus preferences did not. The data suggest that the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing has considerable generality for humans in choice procedures in the laboratory. That monetary value of points did not affect preferences in a graded fashion is consistent with versions of the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis which emphasize reduction in delay to reinforcement over other reinforcement parameters.     

Neuroticism,life stress and concern about eating,body weight and apperance in a non-clinical population

Studies with clinical populations have shown a high level of neuroticism amongst those with an eating disorder. It is unclear however whether the elevated neuroticism is a function of the disorder, or if it is an aetiological factor in the disorder's development. The present survey of a non-clinical female population revealed that those high in neuroticism gave higher—but not abnormally high—scores on a measure of concern about eating. The high-N group also reported a significantly greater number of undesirable life events; a greater familiarity with ‘diet literature’; increased dieting; but no difference in body weight from those in the middle and lower ranges on the N scale. On the basis of these findings it is suggested that neuroticism is an aetiological factor in disordered eating, at least with secondary if not primary disorders. It is propesed that neuroticism is one mediating psychological factor in a triadic relationship between personal environment contingencies, socio-cultural pressures for thinness and psychological variables. Suggestions are made for future investigation of the role of neuroticism in eating disturbance, with note of potential therapeutic application of such knowledge.     

Behavior analysis and behavioral ecology: A synergistic coupling

Recent trends in behavioral ecology and behavior analysis suggest that the two disciplines complement one another, underscoring the desirability of an integrated approach to behavior. Three examples from the foraging literature illustrate the potential value of an interdisciplinary approach. For example, a model of natural selection for foraging efficiency-optimal foraging theory-makes several predictions consistent with an hypothesis of a more proximate phenomenon, the reduction in delay to primary reinforcement. Not only are the ecological and behavior analytic approaches to behavior complementary, but each may provide insights into the operation of controlling variables in situations usually thought of as being the other's domain.     

Attributional self-presentation and information available to the audience

Public ability attributions of public task performance were investigated as a function of test performance (high or low), task performance (high or low), and the availability of information about test performance to the audience (audience informed or audience not informed). The results were largely in agreement with self-presentation expectations, Ability attributions concerning public task performance addressed to an audience which was not informed about test results, were found to be strongly self-serving, although they were also influenced by consistency of test and task performance. In ability attributions directed at an informed audience, self-serving biases were completely absent, the attributions being in accordance with the consistency or inconsistency of test and task performances.     

Adaptation and vulnerability in high-risk adolescents: An examination of environmental mediators

The relationship of characteristics of the social environment to the adaptation of adolescents from high-risk predisposing environments was examined. Specifically, the degree to which adolescents' perceptions of various dimensions of their family and school environment as well as sources of social support related to differential levels of personal well-being and academic adjustment was explored. Multiple regression analyses revealed differences in the salience of the dimensions of the social environment as a function of the particular sphere of functioning under consideration. Implications of the findings for developing a model for understanding the relative vulnerability of individuals at risk as well as of the design of preventive interventions are discussed.     

Effects of delayed conditioned reinforcement in chain schedules.

The contingency between responding and stimulus change on a chain variable-interval 33-s, variable-interval 33-s, variable-interval 33-s schedule was weakened by interposing 3-s delays between either the first and second or the second and third links. No stimulus change signaled the delay interval and responses could occur during it, so the obtained delays were often shorter than the scheduled delay. When the delay occurred after the initial link, initial-link response rates decreased by an average of 77% with no systematic change in response rates in the second or third links. Response rates in the second link decreased an average of 59% when the delay followed that link, again with little effect on response rates in the first or third links. Because the effect of delaying stimulus change was comparable to the effect of delaying primary reinforcement in a simple variable-interval schedule, and the effect of the unsignaled delay was specific to the link in which the delay occurred, the results provide strong evidence for the concept of conditioned reinforcement.