Developmental trends in the use of perceptual and conceptual attributes in grouping,clustering, and retrieval

In Experiment I, two tasks were administered to children aged 4, 5, and 9 in order to investigate preference for perceptual versus conceptual attributes in grouping of common objects, and in various aspects of memory. The grouping task revealed a clear chronological progression: color and form determined the youngest children's grouping about equally; form dominated in the 5-year-olds; and most of the oldest children grouped primarily by conceptual attributes. In the memory task, three lists—one organized by color, one by form, one by superordinate category—were presented for free, followed by cued recall. Clustering showed the developmental shift from color to form to concept, while cued recall showed conceptual superiority at all ages. Experiment II replicated the memory task, yielding the same results. The results were discussed in terms of the relative abstractness and predictability of conceptual versus perceptual attributes and the difficulty of abstraction in encoding and the function of predictability in retrieval.     

Bars and lines: A study of graphic communication

Interpretations of graphs seem to be rooted in principles of cognitive naturalness and information processing rather than arbitrary correspondences. These predict that people should more readily associate bars with discrete comparisons between data points because bars are discrete entities and facilitate point estimates. They should more readily associate lines with trends because lines connect discrete entities and directly represent slope. The predictions were supported in three experiments--two examining comprehension and one production. The correspondence does not seem to depend on explicit knowledge of rules. Instead, it may reflect the influence of the communicative situation as well as the perceptual properties of graphs.     

Differential weighting of common and distinctive components

We investigated possible explanations of the finding that the relative weight (W) of common components in similarity judgments is higher for verbal than for pictorial stimuli. A serial presentation of stimulus components had no effect on verbal stimuli; it increased the impact of both common and distinctive components of pictorial stimuli but did not affect their relative weight. On the other hand, W was increased by manipulations that reduced the cohesiveness of composite pictures, such as separating, scrambling, and mixing their components. Furthermore, W was decreased by manipulations that enhanced the cohesiveness of composite verbal stimuli by imposing structure on their components. Verbal and pictorial representations of the same stimuli yielded no systematic differences in W.     

Parts and the basic level in natural categories and artificial stimuli: Comments on Murphy (1991)

Natural taxonomies consist of categories that vary in level of abstraction. Categories at the basic level, such as chair and apple, are preferred in a broad range of situations (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Several studies have revealed qualitative differences between the basic level and other levels. For example, Tversky and Hemenway (1984) presented evidence that parts proliferative at the basic level; they proposed that parts link the appearance of category members with their functions. Although not taking issue with these findings, Murphy (1991) investigated whether parts are necessary or sufficient for a basic level. In an attempt to demonstrate that parts are not necessary, Murphy used artificial stimuli that did not capture the essential features of natural taxonomies. These discrepancies preclude any conclusions based on his studies. Murphy's data also do not support his claim that parts are not sufficient for a basic level. Finally, it is unlikely that pursuing questions of necessity or sufficiency will produce insights into human categorization.     

CHRISTIAN AND BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVES ON NEURO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN PERSON: PNEUMA AND PRATITYASAMUTPADA

Abstract. Recent discussions of the mind‐brain and the soul‐body problems have been both advanced and complexified by the cognitive sciences. I focus explicitly here on emergence, supervenience, and nonreductive physicalist theories of human personhood in light of recent advances in the Christian‐Buddhist dialogue. While traditional self and no‐self views pitted Christianity versus Buddhism versus science, I show how the nonreductive physicalist proposal regarding human personhood emerging from the neuroscientific enterprise both contributes to and is enriched by the Christian concept of pneuma (spirit) and the Buddhist concept of pratityasamutpada (codependent origination).