Personal theories, intellectual ability, and epistemological beliefs: adult age differences in everyday reasoning biases

Age-related differences in everyday reasoning biases were explored. In each of 2 social domains, examination of theoretical beliefs and biases along 2 dimensions of scientific reasoning, involving the law of large numbers and the evaluation of experimental evidence, revealed that, across age groups, scientific reasoning was used to reject evidence that contradicted prior beliefs; relatively cursory reasoning was used to accept belief-consistent evidence. Biased reasoning was more common among middle-aged and older adults than among young adults. Dispositions to engage in analytic processing were negatively related to biases, but intellectual abilities and bias were not related. The findings support a 2-process view of adult cognitive development and suggest that the tendency to rely on heuristic information processing increases with age.     

Aging, encoding fluency, and metacognitive monitoring

Encoding fluency (how rapidly one generates a mediator for a new association) may be a cue used to judge one's own learning. To evaluate age differences in utilization of this cue, older and younger adults were instructed to use interactive imagery to study paired associates, pressing a button to indicate when an image had been formed for a given pair. A judgment of learning (JOL) was also made immediately after each pair had been studied. Hence, at least two cues pertaining to encoding fluency-whether an image had been formed (a diagnostic cue) and the latency of formation (a nondiagnostic one)-were available when making JOLs. Age equivalence was found in JOL accuracy, and JOLs for both age groups were positively related to imagery formation and were negatively related to the latency of image formation. Moreover, subjectively judged latency correlated higher with JOLs than actual (objective) latency, supporting the hypothesis that perceived fluency is a cue used in constructing JOLs.     

Knowing good from bad: the paradox of neuroticism, negative affect, and evaluative processing

There are pragmatic benefits to trait-consistent mood states, especially when people are evaluating new objects within the environment (M. Tamir, M. D. Robinson, & G. L. Clore, 2002). The present studies, involving both naturally occurring (Studies 1 and 2) and manipulated (Study 3) mood states, demonstrated such trait-consistent interactions within the context of neuroticism and negative mood states. Individuals high in neuroticism were faster to make evaluations when in a negative mood state like sadness. By contrast, individuals low in neuroticism were faster to make evaluations when in a neutral mood state. The present studies demonstrate that although negative mood states are hedonically unpleasant, they can be beneficial in some ways for individuals high in neuroticism.     

Inferences about the authentic self: when do actions say more than mental states?

Three studies involving 478 undergraduates examined the perceived importance of observable actions versus mental states in revealing the "true self"-the authentic and fundamental nature of a target person. Results suggest that when people have only limited information about a target, they believe that an action is more diagnostic of the individual's true self than the accompanying mental state. When participants have knowledge concerning chronic dispositional tendencies of the target, however, they judge that a chronic mental state is more diagnostic of the true self than a chronic action tendency. Considered together, the findings suggest that people conceptualize the true self as a relatively private entity but nevertheless believe that an action of a little-known person may be particularly informative about that individual. Perceived diagnosticity of the true self was partially mediated by inferences concerning the relative stability of actions versus states but not by inferences of volition.     

Extraversion, threat categorizations, and negative affect: a reaction time approach to avoidance motivation

The authors sought to measure a component of the avoidance self-regulation system, specifically one related to object appraisal functions. Participants performed a choice reaction time task (Studies 1 & 2) or a go/no go task (Study 3) in which they were asked to categorize words (e.g., knife) as threatening in nature. In a series of three studies involving 236 undergraduates, the authors found that introverts who were skilled at categorizing events as threatening (vs. introverts slow to do so) experienced more negative affect in their daily lives. Among extraverts, threat categorization performance did not predict negative affect. The authors suggest that implicit threat categorizations render individuals vulnerable to negative affect but that high levels of Extraversion are capable of inhibiting such affective consequences. The authors discuss implications of the findings for extant views of Extraversion, avoidance motivation, and self-regulation.     

Changing Beliefs About Corporal Punishment: Increasing Knowledge About Ineffectiveness to Build More Consistent Moral and Informational Beliefs

Although the effectiveness of corporal punishment (CP) has received little empirical support, public support for this disciplinary method continues despite calls for its abandonment by researchers. Even among educators, favorable attitudes toward the use of CP are prevalent. We measured education majors beliefs about CP before and after they read about CP research on its effectiveness and side effects. Students who changed their behavioral intent regarding whether they would use CP as a parent increased their knowledge about its ineffectiveness, resulting in greater consistency between their moral and informational beliefs (Wainryb, 1998). Persons who are likely to change from defending to opposing CP regard it as being similar to bad-tasting medicine—not very pleasant but nonetheless necessary. Recommendations concerning implementation and changing other beliefs are discussed.     

Fragment memories mark the end of childhood amnesia

Adults described and dated two kinds of first remembrances: a personal event memory (the recollection of a personal episode that had occurred at some time in some place) and a memory fragment (an isolated memory moment having no event context and remembered, perhaps, as an image, a behavior, or an emotion). First fragment memories were judged to have originated substantially earlier in life than first event memories--approximately 3 1/3 years of age for first fragment memories versus roughly 4 years of age for first event memories. We conclude that the end of childhood amnesia is marked not by our earliest episodic memories, but by the earliest remembered fragments of childhood experiences.     

Does quick to blame mean quick to anger? The role of agreeableness in dissociating blame and anger

Two studies investigated agreeableness, the accessibility of blame, and their potential interactive effects on anger. To measure the chronic accessibility of blame, a choice reaction time task was created that required participants to classify words as blameworthy or not. It was found that for individuals low in agreeableness, blame accessibility was positively related to anger and arguments during the course of daily life, hostile feelings during the course of a semester, and anger in response to a short video involving a blameworthy action. This same straightforward relationship between the accessibility of blame and anger did not characterize those high in agreeableness. The results suggest that agreeableness plays an important role in facilitating (low agreeableness) or inhibiting (high agreeableness) the link between accessible blame and anger.     

Why the sunny side is up: association between affect and vertical position

Abstract— Metaphors linking spatial location and affect (e.g., feeling up or down) may have subtle, but pervasive, effects on evaluation. In three studies, participants evaluated words presented on a computer. In Study 1, evaluations of positive words were faster when words were in the up rather than the down position, whereas evaluations of negative words were faster when words were in the down rather than the up position. In Study 2, positive evaluations activated higher areas of visual space, whereas negative evaluations activated lower areas of visual space. Study 3 revealed that, although evaluations activate areas of visual space, spatial positions do not activate evaluations. The studies suggest that affect has a surprisingly physical basis.