Do positive illusions contribute to human well-being?

Psychologists such as Shelly E. Taylor have championed the idea that certain false beliefs, referred to as positive illusions, fulfill a significant role in contributing to human well-being. The goal of this article is to critically review the empirical evidence for this claim. The main concern, then, is whether the empirical evidence is conclusive in regard to the value of positive illusions for agents. The conclusion to be developed is that the latest psychological research is inconclusive in regard to the value positive illusions. This is due not only to evidence that draws into question the value of positive illusions for agents, but also due to methodological and conceptual problems with the positive illusion literature. Consequently, it could be the case that false beliefs contribute to agent well-being in specific situations, but it is difficult to claim that certain false beliefs are required for agent well-being.     

Aprendiendo de La Vida (Learning from Life): Development of a Radionovela to Promote Preventive Health Care Utilization among Indigenous Farmworkers from Mexico Living in California

Journal of Medical Humanities - Mixtecs and Zapotecs, originating from the Oaxaca area in Mexico, are among the largest indigenous groups of workers in California. Many adults in this community...     

Neural correlates of action observation and execution in 14-month-old infants: an event-related EEG desynchronization study

There is increasing interest in neurobiological methods for investigating the shared representation of action perception and production in early development. We explored the extent and regional specificity of EEG desynchronization in the infant alpha frequency range (6-9 Hz) during action observation and execution in 14-month-old infants. Desynchronization during execution was restricted to central electrode sites, while action observation was associated with a broader desynchronization across frontal, central, and parietal regions. The finding of regional specificity in the overlap between EEG responses to action execution and observation suggests that the rhythm seen in the 6-9 Hz range over central sites in infancy shares certain properties with the adult mu rhythm. The magnitude of EEG desynchronization to action perception and production appears to be smaller for infants than for adults and older children, suggesting developmental change in this measure.     

Wild birds recognize individual humans: experiments on magpies, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pica pica</Emphasis>

The ability to distinguish among heterospecific individuals has been reported in only a few animal species. Humans can be viewed as a special type of heterospecifics because individuals differ widely in behavior, ranging from non-threatening to very threatening toward animals. In this study, we asked whether wild magpies can recognize individual humans who had accessed their nests. We compared the behavior of breeding pairs toward individual humans before and after the humans climbed up to the birds’ nests, and also toward climbers and non-climbers. We have evidence for (i) aggressive responses of the magpie pairs toward humans who had repeatedly accessed their nests (climbers) and a lack of response to humans who had not accessed the nest (non-climbers); (ii) a total lack of scolding responses toward climbers by magpie pairs whose nests had not been accessed; (iii) a selective aggressive response to the climber when a climber and a non-climber were presented simultaneously. Taken together, these results suggest that wild magpies can distinguish individual humans that pose a threat to their nests from humans that have not behaved in a threatening way. The magpie is only the third avian species, along with crows and mockingbirds, in which recognition of individual humans has been documented in the wild. Here, we propose a new hypothesis (adopted from psychology) that frequent previous exposure to humans in urban habitats contributes to the ability of birds to discriminate among human individuals. This mechanism, along with high cognitive abilities, may predispose some species to learn to discriminate among human individuals. Experimental tests of these two mechanisms are proposed.     

Beliefs, experiences and misplaced being: an interactionist account of delusional misidentification

This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to “progress” from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying phenomenal experience in accounting for the specificity of the delusional content. The role played by patient phenomenology is examined in light of Ratcliffe’s recent phenomenological account. Similarities and differences are discussed. The paper concludes that a purely phenomenological account is unable to differentiate between non-delusional patient groups, who have what appear to be equivalent phenomenal experiences to patients suffering from delusional misidentification but without the delusional belief, and delusional groups, something the interactionist model is able to do.     

Contextual interference and augmented feedback: is there an additive effect for motor learning?

Learning to perform a skilled behavior is affected by the context of the practice session and the frequency of augmented feedback. We studied the combined effect of these variables in the acquisition of a ballistic, bi-directional lever movement pattern involving four different target locations as measured by performance in practice, retention, and transfer tests. Augmented feedback was presented in either an every-trial or a faded schedule during random and blocked practice. Consistent with the contextual interference effect, the blocked practice group produced lower errors in acquisition, but the random practice group outperformed the blocked practice group in both retention and transfer. In contrast, faded feedback did not have a beneficial effect on learning and degraded learning when provided during blocked practice. While the results were consistent with previous findings of random and blocked practice, they were not consistent with previous findings of reduced feedback frequencies.     

Shedding light on photosensitive behaviour in brown planaria (Dugesia Tigrina)

The planarian flatworm is one of the simplest animals to develop two eyecups that enable them to detect the presence and direction of light, which they typically avoid. In this study we assessed responses of planaria to different intensities of light. We found that they exhibited a graded, sigmoidal, photonegative response to light intensity. A two-octave increase in luminance (on the upward slope of the sigmoid) corresponded to a 9% increase in the speed planaria travelled to avoid light.     

Internet-addicted kids and South Korean government efforts: boot-camp case

Computer overuse has been a serious problem for the past several years. One aspect of the information age has been the novel concerns deriving from advanced IT technology--which include Internet addiction, gambling, and so on. These Internet-based problems have emerged in many countries, including South Korea. In an effort to solve this problem, the South Korean government has created a variety of programs designed to cure teenagers' Internet addictions, most notably the Jump Up Internet Rescue School, a camp designed to cure Internet-addicted or online game-addicted children. In this study, we review this boot-camp program and present a brief review of the literature concerning Internet addiction and habit theory. Additionally, we provide some useful implications for the Korean government and other countries, practitioners, and researchers. It is also anticipated that the findings from this study will provide us with a better understanding of how case-study-based research into Internet addiction curative programs can be regarded as a burgeoning field of Internet-related research.     

The paradox of moral focus

When we evaluate moral agents, we consider many factors, including whether the agent acted freely, or under duress or coercion. In turn, moral evaluations have been shown to influence our (non-moral) evaluations of these same factors. For example, when we judge an agent to have acted immorally, we are subsequently more likely to judge the agent to have acted freely, not under force. Here, we investigate the cognitive signatures of this effect in interpersonal situations, in which one agent (“forcer”) forces another agent (“forcee”) to act either immorally or morally. The structure of this relationship allowed us to ask questions about both the “forcer” and the “forcee.” Paradoxically, participants judged that the “forcer” forced the “forcee” to act immorally (i.e. X forced Y), but that the “forcee” was not forced to act immorally (i.e. Y was not forced by X). This pattern obtained only for human agents who acted intentionally. Directly changing participants’ focus from one agent to another (forcer versus forcee) also changed the target of moral evaluation and therefore force attributions. The full pattern of judgments may provide a window into motivated moral reasoning and focusing bias more generally; participants may have been motivated to attribute greater force to the immoral forcer and greater freedom to the immoral forcee.