The critique of pure phenomenology

The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.     

Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ‘corporality’ and ‘alerting capacity’

How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.     

Marital Quality and Global Well-Being Among Older Adult Israeli Couples in Enduring Marriages

In order to profile family therapy users in China, this study examined 612 cases of a family therapy center in Beijing, including demographic data and presenting problems. It was found that, different to the western experience, cases reviewed were predominately families who presented with problems concerning children and adolescents. Typically presenting relationship issues, individual users had lower intake than the family modality, and couples had the lowest among three modalities. The overall results would seem to evidence some Chinese cultural characteristics, such as prioritizing the filial relationship above the couple one, and a particular focus on the children.     

On What We See

This paper investigates the idea that perception can be, at once, a mode of direct awareness of the world and an encounter, in the first instance, with mere appearances. In developing this point, I introduce a sensorimotor account of perception according to which the senses are ways of exploring the environment mediated by different patterns of sensorimotor contingency (i.e. by the distinctive ways in which what the perceiver does affects how things appear).