Experience And The Active Mind

This paper investigates a new species ofskeptical reasoning about visual experience that takesits start from developments in perceptual science(especially recent work on change blindness andinattentional blindness). According to thisskepticism, the impression of visual awareness of theenvironment in full detail and high resolution isillusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends onmisguided assumptions about the character ofperceptual experience, about whether perceptualexperiences are 'internal' states, and about how bestto understand the relationship between a person's oranimal's perceptual capacities and the brain-level orneural processes on which they depend. I propose aconception of perceptual experience as a form ofskillful engagement with the environment on the partof the whole person or animal.     

What it is like to see: A sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience

The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the 'felt'aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of'give-and-take' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also ableto approach the issues of visual awareness andconsciousness in a satisfactory way. Finally weconsider a number of testable empirical consequences,one of which is the striking prediction of thephenomenon of 'change blindness'.     

The critique of pure phenomenology

The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.     

Responses to Persons with AIDS: Fear of Contagion or Stigma?1

Recently it has been argued that responses to persons with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) are more a function of the association of AIDS with homosexuality than they are concerns about contagion. This research provided a further test of these arguments using an experimental design in which the target disease's contagiousness and association with homosexuality were manipulated. The results indicated that willingness to interact with a disease victim was strongly related to the contagiousness of the disease but only weakly related to its association with homosexuality. These findings are in line with recent research on lay conceptions of physical illness and argue that avoidance of disease victims, including persons with AIDS, primarily reflects concerns over contracting the disease. The implications of these findings for lay illness conceptions and how lay people respond to disease victims are discussed.     

Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ‘corporality’ and ‘alerting capacity’

How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.     

Marital Quality and Global Well-Being Among Older Adult Israeli Couples in Enduring Marriages

In order to profile family therapy users in China, this study examined 612 cases of a family therapy center in Beijing, including demographic data and presenting problems. It was found that, different to the western experience, cases reviewed were predominately families who presented with problems concerning children and adolescents. Typically presenting relationship issues, individual users had lower intake than the family modality, and couples had the lowest among three modalities. The overall results would seem to evidence some Chinese cultural characteristics, such as prioritizing the filial relationship above the couple one, and a particular focus on the children.     

On What We See

This paper investigates the idea that perception can be, at once, a mode of direct awareness of the world and an encounter, in the first instance, with mere appearances. In developing this point, I introduce a sensorimotor account of perception according to which the senses are ways of exploring the environment mediated by different patterns of sensorimotor contingency (i.e. by the distinctive ways in which what the perceiver does affects how things appear).