Children’s Understanding and Use of Four Dimensions of Social Status

ABSTRACT

Beginning early in life, children are exposed to people who differ in social status. In five studies, we investigate whether 3- to 6-year-old children recognize different dimensions of status (i.e., wealth, physical dominance, decision-making power, and prestige) and use these dimensions to inform their social judgments (preferences and resource allocation). Across studies, we found that by age 3, children identify high-status people as in-charge. Further, while 3-6-year-olds favor higher status individuals over lower status individuals on a preference measure, 5-6-year-olds allocate a resource to a lower status individual over a higher status individual and 3-4-year-olds are at chance in their allocation. We observed minimal differences across dimensions of status in these studies. Taken together, across five pre-registered studies, we demonstrated that children identify and use social status distinctions to inform their social judgments across a variety of different dimensions.     

Situated Action: A Symbolic Interpretation

The congeries of theoretical views collectively referred to as “situated action” (SA) claim that humans and their interactions with the world cannot be understood using symbol-system models and methodology, but only by observing them within real-world contexts or building nonsymbolic models of them. SA claims also that rapid, real-time interaction with a dynamically changing environment is not amenable to symbolic interpretation of the sort espoused by the cognitive science of recent decades. Planning and representation, central to symbolic theories, are claimed to be irrelevant in everyday human activity. We will contest these claims, as well as their proponents' characterizations of the symbol-system viewpoint. We will show that a number of existing symbolic systems perform well in temporally demanding tasks embedded in complex environments, whereas the systems usually regarded as exemplifying SA are thoroughly symbolic (and representational), and, to the extent that they are limited in these respects, have doubtful prospects for extension to complex tasks. As our title suggests, we propose that the goals set forth by the proponents of SA can be attained only within the framework of symbolic systems. The main body of empirical evidence supporting our view resides in the numerous symbol systems constructed in the past 35 years that have successfully simulated broad areas of human cognition.