The effects of source and type of feedback on child witnesses' metamemory accuracy

This study investigated the effect of feedback on the accuracy (realism) of 12‐year‐old children's metacognitive judgments of their answers to questions about a film clip. Two types of judgments were investigated: confidence judgments (on each question) and frequency judgments (i.e. estimates of overall accuracy). The source of feedback, whether it was presented as provided by a teacher or a peer child, did not influence metacognitive accuracy. Four types of feedback were given depending on whether the participant's answer was correct and depending on whether the feedback confirmed or disconfirmed the child's answer. The children showed large overconfidence when they received confirmatory feedback but much less so when they received disconfirmatory feedback. The children gave frequency judgments implying that they had more correct answers than they actually had. No main gender differences were found for any of the measures. The results indicate a high degree of malleability in children's metacognitive judgments. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.     

Increased realism in eyewitness confidence judgements: the effect of dyadic collaboration

This study investigated to what extent, and under what circumstances, pair collaboration influences the realism in eyewitness confidence in event memory. The participants first saw a short film clip and then confidence rated their answers to questions on its content. A condition (the Individual–Pair condition) where individual effort preceded pair collaboration showed better calibration compared with a condition (the Simple Pair condition) where no individual effort took place. Furthermore, within the Individual–Pair condition, better calibration, and lower overconfidence, were found in the pair phase compared with the individual phase. The eyewitnesses in the Individual–Pair condition made more realistic judgements of the total number of questions answered correctly. In a control experiment no effect on realism in confidence was found when individuals performed the same task twice. The improved realism in the Individual–Pair condition may partly be explained in terms of the increased accuracy and lowered confidence found for such items where the pair members' had given different answers in the individual phase, and by a risky shift effect for such items where they had given the same answer. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stability in the metamemory realism of eyewitness confidence judgments

The stability of eyewitness confidence judgments over time in regard to their reported memory and accuracy of these judgments is of interest in forensic contexts because witnesses are often interviewed many times. The present study investigated the stability of the confidence judgments of memory reports of a witnessed event and of the accuracy of these judgments over three occasions, each separated by 1 week. Three age groups were studied: younger children (8–9 years), older children (10–11 years), and adults (19–31 years). A total of 93 participants viewed a short film clip and were asked to answer directed two-alternative forced-choice questions about the film clip and to confidence judge each answer. Different questions about details in the film clip were used on each of the three test occasions. Confidence as such did not exhibit stability over time on an individual basis. However, the difference between confidence and proportion correct did exhibit stability across time, in terms of both over/underconfidence and calibration. With respect to age, the adults and older children exhibited more stability than the younger children for calibration. Furthermore, some support for instability was found with respect to the difference between the average confidence level for correct and incorrect answers (slope). Unexpectedly, however, the younger children’s slope was found to be more stable than the adults. Compared to the previous research, the present study’s use of more advanced statistical methods provides a more nuanced understanding of the stability of confidence judgments in the eyewitness reports of children and adults.     

Considering the Knowledge You Have: Effects on Realism in Confidence Judgements

In three experiments, the hypothesis was tested that the realism of subjects' item-specific confidence judgements of their own answers to general knowledge questions would be improved by making the subjects heed content which might be expected to lower their confidence ratings. In each experiment, all subjects answered knowledge questions and then rated their confidence in their chosen answer. Before each question, the subjects in the experimental condition assessed the extent of their knowledge in a knowledge-area encompassing the knowledge question. Experiments 1 and 2 differed only in the design of the knowledge-area assessment scale. In Experiment 3, when making knowledge-area assessments, the subjects were asked to find examples of knowledge they lacked in the knowledge-area. Both Experiments 2 and 3 showed significantly improved realism in the subjects' confidence judgements. An aggregate assessment of the total number of questions believed to be answered correctly, given by the subjects at the end of Experiments 2 and 3, showed underconfidence in the experimental condition, particularly in Experiment 3. The results support the idea that the content active in subjects' memory at the time when confidence judgements are made affects their realism. Furthermore, our results show that the realism of subjects' item-specific confidence judgements can be improved without giving feedback.     

Error detection processes in statistical problem solving

Problem solvers' error detection processes were studied by instructing 16 subjects to think aloud when solving two statistical problems. The evaluative episodes occurring in subjects' protocols were analyzed into Affirmative evaluation, Direct error-hypotheses, Error suspicion, and Standard check episodes, the last three of which are assumed to cover all main types of error detection processes. Most errors (78%) were found to have contributed to a solution part that triggered some evaluative episode. However, only one-third of the undetected errors had contributed to such a solution part. The Standard check episodes, seen as centrally-invoked, only led to the detection of few errors in proportion to the number of times they were performed. Evidence was found for two types of spontaneous error detections, one occurring abruptly and the other as a result of a more elaborated error detection process, initiated by the solver perceiving the solution as dissatisfying or strange. The perception of a symptom was a fairly reliable source of information about errors. However, subjects often did not manage to detect the error after having noticed a symptom. The closer a relevant Error suspicion episode followed an error, the greater was the probability of detecting the error. Good problem solvers detected a higher proportion of their errors compared to poor problem solvers, probably due to differences in the processes leading up to the triggering of an evaluative episode rather than to differences after the episode had been triggered.