Attentional biases and memory for emotional stimuli in men and male rhesus monkeys

We examined attentional biases for social and non-social emotional stimuli in young adult men and compared the results to those of male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) previously tested in a similar dot-probe task (King et al. in Psychoneuroendocrinology 37(3):396–409, 2012). Recognition memory for these stimuli was also analyzed in each species, using a recognition memory task in humans and a delayed non-matching-to-sample task in monkeys. We found that both humans and monkeys displayed a similar pattern of attentional biases toward threatening facial expressions of conspecifics. The bias was significant in monkeys and of marginal significance in humans. In addition, humans, but not monkeys, exhibited an attentional bias away from negative non-social images. Attentional biases for social and non-social threat differed significantly, with both species showing a pattern of vigilance toward negative social images and avoidance of negative non-social images. Positive stimuli did not elicit significant attentional biases for either species. In humans, emotional content facilitated the recognition of non-social images, but no effect of emotion was found for the recognition of social images. Recognition accuracy was not affected by emotion in monkeys, but response times were faster for negative relative to positive images. Altogether, these results suggest shared mechanisms of social attention in humans and monkeys, with both species showing a pattern of selective attention toward threatening faces of conspecifics. These data are consistent with the view that selective vigilance to social threat is the result of evolutionary constraints. Yet, selective attention to threat was weaker in humans than in monkeys, suggesting that regulatory mechanisms enable non-anxious humans to reduce sensitivity to social threat in this paradigm, likely through enhanced prefrontal control and reduced amygdala activation. In addition, the findings emphasize important differences in attentional biases to social versus non-social threat in both species. Differences in the impact of emotional stimuli on recognition memory between monkeys and humans will require further study, as methodological differences in the recognition tasks may have affected the results.     

Empirically Supported Treatments for Insomnia

The purpose of this study was to examine the level of fears in Swedish children and to examine the relation of those fears to state and trait anxiety. The purpose was also to do a normative study of FSSC-R (Fear Survey Schedule for Children - Revised). In total, 550 children between 8 and 16 years of age answered the questionnaires. The results indicate that there are no gender differences in total fear score, factor scores and number of fears. In contrast to earlier results, there was no correlation between fear and trait anxiety; however, a modest correlation was found between fear and state anxiety     

Social perception from visual cues: role of the STS region

Social perception refers to initial stages in the processing of information that culminates in the accurate analysis of the dispositions and intentions of other individuals. Single-cell recordings in monkeys, and neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies in humans, reveal that cerebral cortex in and near the superior temporal sulcus (STS) region is an important component of this perceptual system. In monkeys and humans, the STS region is activated by movements of the eyes, mouth, hands and body, suggesting that it is involved in analysis of biological motion. However, it is also activated by static images of the face and body, suggesting that it is sensitive to implied motion and more generally to stimuli that signal the actions of another individual. Subsequent analysis of socially relevant stimuli is carried out in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, which supports a three-structure model proposed by Brothers. The homology of human and monkey areas involved in social perception, and the functional interrelationships between the STS region and the ventral face area, are unresolved issues.     

A response to the critique of rational choice theory: Lakatos' and Laudan's conceptions applied

This paper analyzes the main features of rational choice theory and evaluates it with respect to the conceptions of Lakatos' research program and Laudan's research tradition. The analysis reveals that the thin rationality assumption, the axiomatic method and the reduction to the micro level are the only features shared by all rational choice models. On these grounds, it is argued that rational choice theory cannot be characterized as a research program. This is due to the fact that the thin rationality assumption cannot be understood as a hard core in Lakatos' terms. It is argued that Laudan's conception of a research tradition better characterizes rational choice theory. On the basis of this conclusion, certain important criticisms of rational choice theory are answered. First, the criticisms concerning the core assumptions of rational choice theory are countered. It is argued that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of rational choice theory as a unified set of models, such as Lakatos' research program. Second, Green and Shapiro's rational choice ‘pathologies’ – inconsistent predictions, post hoc theory development and arbitrary domain restrictions – are evaluated. Contrary to Green and Shapiro, it is argued that post hoc theory development is a more preferable strategy for developing RCT than domain restrictions based on ex ante rules.     

Kant on freedom: A reply to my critics

The first two sections of this paper are devoted respectively to the criticisms of my views raised by Stephen Engstrom and Andrews Reath at a symposium on Kant's Theory of Freedom held in Washington D.C. on 28 December 1992 under the auspices of the North American Kant Society. The third section contains my response to the remarks of Marcia Baron at a second symposium in Chicago on 24 April 1993 at the APA Western Division meetings. The fourth section deals with some general criticisms of my treatment of Kant's theory of freedom and its connection with transcendental idealism that have been raised by Karl Ameriks, who was also a participant in the second symposium, in an earlier piece published in Inquiry and by Paul Guyer in a review. The paper as a whole is thus an attempt to reformulate and clarify some of the central claims of my book in light of the initial critical reaction.     

Divine self-testimony and the knowledge of God

A proof is offered that aims to show that there can be no knowledge of God, excluding knowledge based on natural theology, without divine self-testimony. Both special and general revelation, if they occur, would be forms of divine self-testimony. It is argued that this indicates that the best way to model such knowledge of God is on the basis of an analogy with knowledge gained through testimony, rather than perceptual models of knowledge, such as the prominent model defended by Plantinga. Appropriate causal chains and reliable cognitive processes only seem at best to ensure that a belief proposed for acceptance is the belief the testifier wants accepted; they do not ensure that it is rational to accept the belief. This particularly applies where there is much at stake, where it seems rational to seek some form of evidence, if available. Some brief comments are made on Trinitarian self-testimony. Another model of the ‘inner witness’ is briefly sketched out, based on the analogy with conscience. This model may capture some of the features of Plantinga’s approach, but leaves room for a free rejection of divine self-testimony, in a way that the perceptual analogy does not. A point connected to Plantinga’s aims is then made about the link between evidence, value and divine self-testimony, in relation to religious experience. Finally, it is suggested that the earlier proof may apply in a particular sense to all knowledge of God, including that based on natural theology.     

Sucking Behavior: A Review of the Literature

One hundred and twenty alienated alcoholics were exposed to high and low status models claiming task success rates of 25% or 50%. The effects of such modeling on the subjects' claimed task success and mood were complex. Subjects exposed to a two-peer 2.5% rate increased their claimed task success on two tasks and decreased their depressive mood. Subjects exposed to a single-peer 50% rate changed only mood scores apparently due to rejection of the model (Semantic Differential). Overall findings suggest that behavioral changes produced appropriate mood changes and that modeling of modest success rates can produce these changes.     

Middle school students overestimate normative support for aggression and underestimate normative support for nonviolent problem‐solving strategies

This study tested five hypotheses related to the accuracy of students' perceptions of school norms for aggression and nonviolent problem‐solving strategies with two cohorts (ns = 852 and 968) of 6th‐grade students in 12 schools. Students consistently overestimated peer normative support for aggression and underestimated peer normative support for nonviolent problem‐solving strategies. This effect remained significant in tests of moderation by gender, ethnicity, and aggression level. Tests for moderation by the degree of provocation (e.g., if a student was hit first) and a test measuring actual norms from eighth graders and perceived norms from seventh graders suggested that the discrepancy was not due to self‐serving bias or social desirability. Longitudinal analysis found that the discrepancy remained through 8th grade. The discrepancy between actual and perceived norms has implications for risk and violence prevention, which are discussed.     

The emergence and reduction of bias in letters of recommendation

Despite the widespread use of letters of recommendation (LORs) in selection systems, research has largely failed to consider the potential emergence of bias in interpretations of LORs. The present study fills this void by examining both race and gender bias in evaluations of LORs and assessing the efficacy of elaboration as a strategy for reducing such bias. Undergraduate students (n = 423) rated four LORs that varied with regard to applicant race and gender. Results suggest that bias does exist in evaluations of LORs, but that requiring raters to expand on their evaluations (i.e., elaborate) reduces this bias. Implications include elaboration as a strategy organizations can implement to reduce bias from emerging when relying on LORs as a selection tool.