Why is 9+7 harder than 2+3? Strength and interference as explanations of the problem-size effect

In four experiments, the problem-size effect was investigated, using an alphabet-arithmetic task in which subjects verified such problems as A + 2 = C. Problem size was manipulated by varying the magnitude of the digit addend (e.g., A + 2, A + 3, and A + 4). The frequency and similarity of problems was also manipulated to determine the contribution of strength and interference, respectively. Experiment 1 manipulated frequency at low levels of practice and found that strength could account for the problem-size effect. Experiment 2 manipulated frequency at higher levels of practice, and found that strength alone could not account for the problem-size effect at asymptote. Experiment 3 manipulated frequency and similarity and found a substantial problem-size effect at asymptote, suggesting that both strength and interference contribute to the problem-size effect. Experiment 4 manipulated similarity, keeping frequency constant, and found no problem-size effect at asymptote, suggesting that interference alone is not responsible for the problem-size effect. The results are related to findings with number arithmetic.     

Graphics in written directions: Appreciated by readers but not writers

This series of studies investigated the ability of literate adults to exploit communications options that are available to writers but have no counterpart in speech. Specifically it examined people's use of sketches when giving written directions to help a stranger cross town. When writing an informal letter to a friend most directions were given in prose paragraph style (Experiment 1). Almost no-one included a sketch, even if given a street map as an aid. Yet most subjects could draw adequate sketch maps (Experiment 2), and everyone said yes when asked whether they would include a sketch in a letter. So the previous choices were not constrained either by graphic skill or by judgements concerning the appropriateness of a sketch, When people were asked to 'design' the back page of a leaflet they still did not include a sketch (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that any bias in the instructions was towards rather than against the use of sketches. The need to generate the sketch was removed in Experiment 5 where subjects composed the leaflet page from pre-formed sections that included alternative routes in both words and diagrams. Nearly all subjects now included a sketch in their directions. In case subjects previously, in haste, had not considered the possibility of including a sketch map, they were made aware of the drawing option by rating the usability of route information in a variety of communication styles immediately before writing their own directions (Experiment 6). People rated directions that included diagrams as significantly more usable, but still most subjects did not include a sketch in the directions they gave. So the communication styles that readers recognized as successful were not determining their choices as writers. It is suggested that, when giving written directions, inexperienced writers rely too heavily on how they would respond as speakers.     

Brief report: Effects of informational feedback on aluminum can recycling

The impact of informational feedback on the depositing of aluminum cans in recycling receptacles at a medium-sized university was investigated. Informational signs were placed over 20-recycling receptacles in three academic buildings. Each informational sign was placed at eye level, with the number of aluminum cans deposited for recycling during the previous week displayed in red digits. A 65% increase in the number of aluminum cans deposited in recycling receptacles with the informational signs was observed. Furthermore, removal of the informational signs was observed to reliably decrease the number of aluminum cans deposited. These results are discussed in the context of employing feedback to increase environmental protection behaviors.     

Ethics education in science and engineering: The case of animal research

Conclusion The past one hundred fifty years of debate over the use of animals in research and testing has been characterized mainly byad hominem attacks and on uncritical rejection of the other sides’ arguments. In the classroom, it is important to avoid repeating exercises in public relations and to demand sound scholarship. This paper is a modification of material originally included in the handbook which accompanied the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993.     

Contextual effects in difference judgments

Manipulating stimulus spacing, stimulus frequency, or stimulus range usually affects intensity judgments. In six experiments, I investigated the locus of analogues of these contextual effects in a “difference” estimation task. When all stimuli elicited the same taste quality, stimulus distribution affected the scale values only when water was included in the stimulus set (Experiments 1–3). When the subjective ranges of two taste qualities were manipulated, different scale values were obtained for the separate qualities in the two conditions (Experiment 4). Manipulation of the expected response distribution did not affect the scale values or the responses (Experiments 5–6). It is concluded that shifts in stimulus distributions or stimulus ranges result in shifts in subjective scale values. The contextual effects can be interpreted as relative shifts of a number of gustatory continua, with water lying on a separate continuum. Proposed is a model for context-dependent judgments, consisting of four stages: stimulus classification, stimulus placement, continuum placement, and continuum projection.     

Three- and four-year-olds’ perceptual confusions for spoken words

Although infants have the ability to discriminate a variety of speech contrasts, young children cannot always use this ability in the service of spoken-word recognition. The research reported here asked whether the reason young children sometimes fail to discriminate minimal word pairs is that they are less efficient at word recognition than adults, or whether it is that they employ different lexical representations. In particular, the research evaluated the proposal that young children’s lexical representations are more “holistic” than those of adults, and are based on overall acoustic-phonetic properties, as opposed to phonetic segments. Three- and four-year-olds were exposed initially to an invariant target word and were subsequently asked to determine whether a series of auditory stimuli matched or did not match the target. The critical test stimuli were nonwords that varied in their degree of phonetic featural overlap with the target, as well as in terms of the position(s) within the stimuli at which they differed from the target, and whether they differed from the target on one or two segments. Data from four experiments demonstrated that the frequency with which children mistook a nonword stimulus for the target was influenced by extent of featural overlap, but not by word position. The data also showed that, contrary to the predictions of the holistic hypothesis, stimuli differing from the target by two features on a single segment were confused with the target more often than were stimuli differing by a single feature on each of two segments. This finding suggests that children use both phonetic features and segments in accessing their mental lexicons, and that they are therefore much more similar to adults than is suggested by the holistic hypothesis.     

Begging the question as a pragmatic fallacy

The aim of this paper is to make it clear how and why begging the question should be seen as a pragmatic fallacy which can only be properly evaluated in a context of dialogue. Included in the paper is a review of the contemporary literature on begging the question that shows the gradual emergence over the past twenty years or so of the dialectical conception of this fallacy. A second aim of the paper is to investigate a number of general problems raised by the pragmatic framework.The work in this paper was supported by a Fellowship from the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS) and a Research Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Thanks are due to Erik Krabbe for discussions, and to the members of the NIAS Research Group on Fallacies as Violations of Rules of Argumentative Discourse: Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Sally Jackson, Scott Jacobs, Agnes Haft van Rees, Agnes Verbiest, Charles Willard, and John Woods.