A Tale of Two Scepticisms or Relying on What Comes Naturally or The Problem with Deriving an Epistemology from Literary Theory

Some years ago — never mind how long precisely — three eminent thinkers, having little or no need for more money in their purses, and nothing particular to interest them in the law reviews and philosophy journals, set out to meet and discuss legal philosophy in a literary part of the world. It is a way these three have of driving off ennui and formulating the next publication. Whenever they find themselves growing stale about the pen; whenever it is adamp, drizzly November in London; whenever they find themselves involuntarily churning out conference papers and bringing up the rear of every symposium on offer; and especially whenever they find their critics getting such an upper hand on them, that it requires a strong moral principle to prevent them from deliberately sitting down and methodically knocking off a paper excoriating every stranger they have met — then, they account it high time to gettogether as soon as they can.     

I still think it was a banana: memorable 'lies' and forgettable 'truths'

Interpersonal influences on cognition can distort memory judgements. Two experiments examined the nature of these 'social' influences, and whether their persistence is independent of their accuracy. Experiment 1 found that a confederate's social proximity, as well as the content and the confidence of their utterances, interactively modulates participants' immediate conformity. Notably, errant confederate statements that 'lied' about encoded material had a particularly strong immediate distorting influence on memory judgements. Experiment 2 revealed that these 'lies' were also memorable, continuing a day later to impair memory accuracy, while accurate confederate statements failed to produce a corresponding and lasting beneficial effect on memory. These findings suggest that an individual's 'informational' social influence can be selectively heightened when they express misinformation to someone who suspects no deceptive intent. The methods newly introduced here thus allow multiple social and cognitive factors impinging on memory accuracy to be manipulated and examined during realistic, precisely controlled dyadic social interactions.     

Individual and social dimensions of Filipino students' achievement goals

Achievement goal theory assumes that self-instrumental (mastery) achievement goals are associated with academic achievement, whereas social-instrumental (performance) goals are not. However, research on Asian students shows that both mastery and performance-approach goals are positively related to achievement; possibly because achievement motivation in Asian cultures is socially oriented and not individually oriented. The current study explored the structure of the social and individual achievement motivation orientations, and how these achievement orientations and achievement goals were related to achievement of Filipino university students. The results showed two dimensions of social-oriented achievement motivations-parent-oriented and teacher-oriented motivations-and two dimensions of individual-oriented achievement motivations-personal performance standards and personal goal choice. However, these achievement motivation orientations were not associated with achievement. Instead mastery and performance-approach goals were both positively associated with academic achievement, personal performance standards, and parent-oriented achievement motivation.     

The anachronism of moral individualism and the responsibility of extended agency

Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism’s explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections that might be raised on the basis of intentions and deserts.

Metaphor and Thinking in Science and Religion

Excerpts from Chapters 1 and 3 of New Maps for Old: Explorations in Science and Religion (Gerhart and Russell 2001) explore the ramifications of metaphoric process for changes in thinking, especially those changes that lead to a new understanding of our world. Examples are provided from science, from religion, and from science and religion together. In excerpts from Chapter 8, a double analogy—theology is to science as science is to mathematics—is proposed for better understanding the contemporary relationship between science and religion. A conservation of epistemological sufficiency is disclosed as one moves from mathematics to empirical science to theology—a move from one discipline to another that involves a sacrifice of one aspect of thought to gain another.     

Changing Worldviews: Responding to Betty Birner and Robert Masson

Worldviews are changed by higher viewpoints that can develop by metaphoric process, the equating of two formerly disparate known concepts. The equating results in a distortion—a tectonic reformation—of the associated fields of meanings that effects a rearrangement of associated concepts leading to new cognitive relations. We comment on reviews of our books Metaphoric Process (1984) and New Maps for Old (2001) by Robert Masson and Betty Birner. Metaphoric process may further understanding of the formation of diverse worldviews and their reconciliation.     

An emerging theory of apology

There is no consensus in the psychological literature regarding the operational definition of an apology, nor is there a comprehensive theory of apology. The object of this study was to use a hermeneutic phenomenological approach and grounded theory methodology to develop a theory of apology based on lay people's interpretation of apologetic responses. Data were methodically gathered by interviewing 23 people who had been wronged by an intimate partner. The analysis of the data suggests that there is not a single discrete definition of an apology, but that it is more appropriate to conceptualise apology as a process that consists of one or more of three components: affect, affirmation, and action. Each of these components has two categories; one that reflects a self‐focus on the part of the wrongdoer, and the other a self–other focus. What will be accepted as a good enough apology appears to depend on the severity of the consequences of the wrong, the level of responsibility attributed to the wrongdoer, and the perceived wrongfulness of the behaviour.