More than meets the eye: a consideration of the influence of a counsellor's visual impairment upon his therapeutic relationships

Other than through personal reflection and anecdotal evidence, I have had little opportunity to explore the influence of my visual impairment upon my therapeutic relationships. In order to address this, I conducted three research conversations with former clients (participants), each of whom had expressed an interest in participating in the research. Potential participants also had to meet the inclusion criteria for the research and provide informed consent prior to their participation. Research conversations were conducted between March and July 2009 and were analysed qualitatively, using a method informed by Moustakas's heuristic inquiry. Participants demonstrated idiosyncratic responses to my visual impairment; their perception of their responses to my visual impairment sometimes differed from mine. Feelings identified included uncertainty, disappointment and relief. My visual impairment appeared to influence the therapeutic relationship in a variety of ways, including resonance with the inner world significance of disability to the participant and interaction with my personal process. While not the therapeutic agent, my visual impairment had the potential to act as a catalyst in therapeutic change. The potential for me to either under-estimate or over-estimate the significance of my visual impairment highlights the need for continued self-awareness and the maintenance of an open and non-defensive attitude.     

The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values

While individual differences in the willingness and ability to engage analytic processing have long informed research in reasoning and decision making, the implications of such differences have not yet had a strong influence in other domains of psychological research. We claim that analytic thinking is not limited to problems that have a normative basis and, as an extension of this, predict that individual differences in analytic thinking will be influential in determining beliefs and values. Along with assessments of cognitive ability and style, religious beliefs, and moral values, participants judged the wrongness of acts considered disgusting and conventionally immoral, but that do not violate care- or fairness-based moral principles. Differences in willingness to engage analytic thinking predicted reduced judgements of wrongness, independent of demographics, political ideology, religiosity, and moral values. Further, we show that those who were higher in cognitive ability were less likely to indicate that purity, patriotism, and respect for traditions and authority are important to their moral thinking. These findings are consistent with a “Reflectionist” view that assumes a role for analytic thought in determining substantive, deeply-held human beliefs and values.     

A Semantic Network Approach to the Creativity Quotient (CQ)

The Creativity Quotient (CQ) is a novel metric building on ideational fluency that accounts for both the number of novel ideas (ideation) and the number of distinct categories (fluency) these ideas fall into. Categories are, however, difficult to define unambiguously and objectively. We propose that the principal contribution of this article is an entirely algorithmic approach based on concept networks, and an information metric defined thereon. It requires only measures of the similarity between concepts, which may come from databases such as Wordnet, Wikipedia, Google, or corpus analysis tools. In the special case of strong, unique categories it reduces directly to CQ.     

An Indicator of Suicidal Ideation on the Rorschach Test

We examined the impact of patient- and therapist-rated alliance developed during psychological assessment on the subsequent alliance measured early and late in formal psychotherapy. We hypothesized that a working alliance developed during psychological assessment conducted from a collaborative therapeutic model of assessment (TMA; Finn &; Tonsager, 1992, 1997; Fischer, 1994) between the patient and therapist would carry into formal psychotherapy. We also hypothesized that alliance for those patients receiving a TMA would be significantly greater than patients receiving psychological testing as usual. To test this hypothesis, we administered the Combined Alliance Short Form-Patient Version (Hatcher &; Barends, 1996) and the Combined Alliance Short Form-Therapist Version (Hatcher, 1999) to a sample of outpatients and their therapists at the end of the assessment feedback session, early, and late in psychotherapy. The hypotheses were supported as alliance scales rated at the assessment feedback session demonstrated positive and significant relationships with alliance throughout formal psychotherapy and in relation to a control group. The clinical utility and research implications of these findings are discussed.     

Aristotelian necessities

In his Parts of Animals, Aristotle distinguishes three modes of the necessary.However, it is not clear just what these three modes are.Nor is it clear how this passage fits with other texts where Aristotle distinguishes modalities in different ways.Here I present and explain Aristotle’s three modes of necessity, and claim that they are the only three recognized by Aristotle.I then explain how this passage agrees with other passages where Aristotle mentions formal and structural features of the modalities.I end by showing how having three modes of necessity does not make ‘necessary’ ambiguous.Rather, I claim, Aristotle has a single, central notion of necessity and hence a unified theory of modality     

Contextual interference effects in sequence learning for young and older adults

Practice of different tasks in a random order induces better retention than practicing them in a blocked order, a phenomenon known as the contextual interference (CI) effect. Our purpose was to investigate whether the CI effect exists in sequence learning, such that practicing different sequences in a random order will result in better learning of sequences than practicing them in blocks, and whether this effect is affected by aging. Subjects practiced a serial reaction time task where a set of three 4-element sequences were arranged in blocks or in a random order on 2 successive days. Subjects were divided into 4 groups based on a 2-GROUP (young or old) by 2-ORDER (random or blocked practice) between-subject design. Three days after practice (Day 5), subjects were tested with practiced and novel sequences to evaluate sequence-specific learning. The results replicate the CI effect in sequence learning in both young and older adults. Older adults retained sequences better when trained in a random condition than in a blocked condition, although the random condition incurs greater task switching costs in older adults during practice. Our study underscores the distinction between age-related effects on learning vs. performance, and offers practical implications for enhancing skill learning in older adults.     

Job Preference in the People's Republic of China: Distinguishing the Self From Others

Job-preference rankings were collected from a sample of middle-level managers and cadres in the People's Republic of China in 1986. Respondents provided rankings of 10 job factors as they applied to themselves, other Chinese, and United States workers. Chinese managers viewed their own job preferences as different from the preferences of the other two groups and perceived other Chinese and U.S. workers to have relatively similar job preferences. The Chinese managers also ranked an intrinsic job factor more highly for themselves and extrinsic job factors more highly for other Chinese and U.S. workers. These findings are discussed in terms of management training, leadership roles, perceptual and attributional processes, and cultural factors.     

Positive academic emotions moderate the relationship between self‐regulation and academic achievement

Background. Research has shown how academic emotions are related to achievement and to cognitive/motivational variables that promote achievement. Mediated models have been proposed to account for the relationships among academic emotions, cognitive/motivational variables, and achievement, and research has supported such mediated models, particularly with negative emotions. Aims. The study tested the hypotheses: (1) self‐regulation and the positive academic emotions of enjoyment and pride are positive predictors of achievement; and (2) enjoyment and pride both moderate the relationship between self‐regulation and achievement. Sample. Participants were 1,345 students enrolled in various trigonometry classes in one university. Methods. Participants answered the Academic Emotions Questionnaire‐Math (Pekrun, Goetz, & Frenzel, 2005) and a self‐regulation scale (Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1991) halfway through their trigonometry class. The students’ final grades in the course were regressed to self‐regulation, positive emotions, and the interaction terms to test the moderation effects. Results and Conclusions. Enjoyment and pride were both positive predictors of grades; more importantly, both moderated the relationship between self‐regulation and grades. For students who report higher levels of both positive emotions, self‐regulation was positively associated with grades. However, for those who report lower levels of pride, self‐regulation was not related to grades; and, for those who reported lower levels of enjoyment, self‐regulation was negatively related to grades. The results are discussed in terms of how positive emotions indicate positive appraisals of task/outcome value, and thus enhance the positive links between cognitive/motivational variables and learning.     

Leibniz and Luther on the Non-Cognitive Component of Faith

Leibniz was a Lutheran. Yet, upon consideration of certain aspects of his philosophical theology, one might suspect that he was a Lutheran more in name than in intellectual practice. Clearly Leibniz was influenced by the Catholic tradition; this is beyond doubt. However, the extent to which Leibniz was influenced by his own Lutheran tradition—indeed, by Martin Luther himself—has yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this essay, the views of Luther and Leibniz on the non-cognitive component of faith are considered in some detail. According to Luther, the only non-cognitive aspect of faith worth favoring is trust (fiducia), since it is trust in God’s promise of mercy that warrants justification for the sinner. Leibniz, for his part, sides with the Thomistic tradition in emphasizing love (caritas) as the non-cognitive element of faith par excellence. I argue that Leibniz falls into a trap forewarned by Luther himself, even if Leibniz had systematic metaphysical reasons for his disagreement.