Methods,minds, memory,and kinds

ABSTRACT

The acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of propositional knowledge on the other, appear to be different sorts of epistemic achievements. Does this difference lie in the nature of the knowledge involved, marking a joint between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge? Intellectualists say no: All knowledge is propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists say yes: Knowledge-how and propositional knowledge are different in kind. What resources or methods may we legitimately and fruitfully employ to adjudicate this debate? What is (or are) the right way(s) to show the nature of the knowledge knowers know? Here too there is disagreement. I defend the legitimacy of the anti-intellectualist appeal to cognitive neuroscientific findings against a recent claim that anti-intellectualists conflate the scientific categories of procedural and declarative knowledge with the mental kinds of skill (knowledge-how) and propositional knowledge, respectively. I identify two kinds of arguments for this claim and argue that neither succeeds.     

Institutional Affiliation and Satisfaction Among Feminist Professors

Do feminist professors of psychology who teach at women's colleges derive more satisfaction from their academic lives than feminist professors who teach at coed colleges or at (coed) universities? If one assumes that gynocentric environments are more pleasing to feminists, the answer should be "yes." Using questionnaire and interview data from 76 self-identified feminist psychology professors, we tested the expectation that feminist women teaching at women's colleges are more satisfied than their counterparts elsewhere. We found that feminist professors were generally satisfied with their pedagogical situations and were generally dedicated to and successful at teaching. Institutional affiliation produced little difference in satisfaction or practice, but feminists at women's colleges generally did feel more supported than feminists elsewhere.