Seeing failure in your life: Imagery perspective determines whether self-esteem shapes reactions to recalled and imagined failure

The present research reveals that when it comes to recalling and imagining failure in one's life, changing how one looks at the event can change its impact on well-being; however, the nature of the effect depends on an aspect of one's self-concept, namely, self-esteem. Five studies measured or manipulated the visual perspective (internal first-person vs. external third-person) individuals used to mentally image recalled or imagined personal failures. It has been proposed that imagery perspective determines whether people's reactions to an event are shaped bottom-up by concrete features of the event (first-person) or top-down by their self-concept (third-person; L. K. Libby & R. P. Eibach, 2011b). Evidence suggests that differences in the self-concepts of individuals with low and high self-esteem (LSEs and HSEs) are responsible for self-esteem differences in reaction to failure, leading LSEs to have more negative thoughts and feelings about themselves (e.g., M. H. Kernis, J. Brockner, & B. S. Frankel, 1989). Thus, the authors predicted, and found, that low self-esteem was associated with greater overgeneralization--operationalized as negativity in accessible self-knowledge and feelings of shame--only when participants had pictured failure from the third-person perspective and not from the first-person. Further, picturing failure from the third-person, rather than first-person, perspective, increased shame and the negativity of accessible knowledge among LSEs, whereas it decreased shame among HSEs. Results help to distinguish between different theoretical accounts of how imagery perspective functions and have implications for the study of top-down and bottom-up influences on self-judgment and emotion, as well as for the role of perspective and abstraction in coping.     

Delaying feedback by three seconds benefits retention of face–name pairs: the role of active anticipatory processing

In three experiments, we used face–name learning to examine the puzzling feedback delay benefit—the tendency for feedback to be more effective when it is delayed rather than presented immediately. In Experiment 1, we found that feedback presented after a 3-s blank screen was more effective than feedback presented immediately, even after controlling for the exposure time to the material. In Experiment 2, we replicated the benefit of a feedback delay even when participants were given extra time to view the feedback or to try to retrieve the answer, indicating that this benefit is specific to a delay before feedback. Finally, in Experiment 3, we showed that the 3-s delay is beneficial only if it involves a blank screen, not if the delay is filled with an unrelated distracter task. These results suggest that the feedback delay benefit in this paradigm could arise from an active anticipatory process that occurs during the delay.     

Vision and intelligence at age 83 in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1921

The extent to which visual function, measured as near and distant visual acuity and contrast sensitivity, is correlated with concurrently measured cognitive function and prior intellectual ability was investigated in a narrow age range group known as the Lothian Birth Cohort of 1921 (LBC1921). Participants were aged ~ 83 years at the time of testing (N = 321). A well-fitting structural equation model highlighted a significant contribution of a latent visual trait to a general fluid intelligence factor in old age, independent of the contribution from childhood intelligence. Additionally, childhood intelligence made a significant contribution to the general visual factor in old age. However, the model fitted equally well when the fluid intelligence factor is assumed to be a cause of the visual function latent trait, in which case childhood intelligence does not significantly influence vision in old age. We discuss these results with respect to four possible mechanisms by which vision and cognition can come to be correlated over the lifecourse.     

EFFECTS OF VIDEO MODELING ON TEACHING BIDS FOR JOINT ATTENTION TO CHILDREN WITH AUTISM

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effects of video modeling to teach children with autism to initiate bids for joint attention. The video model consisted of a child demonstrating three components of a bid for joint attention with an adult conversational partner: orienting toward the object, emitting a vocal statement, and eye gaze shift toward unique objects in the environment. Results indicated that video modeling alone was effective in teaching all components of joint attention for two of the three children, whereas video modeling plus in vivo prompting was effective for the third participant. Further, bids for joint attention did not generalize across novel items for any of the participants. Results are discussed in terms of the social relevance and validity of the use of video modeling to teach a complex social behavior such as bids for joint attention. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Extending Parent–Child Interaction Therapy for Early Childhood Internalizing Problems: New Advances for an Overlooked Population

Although efficacious psychological treatments for internalizing disorders are now well established for school-aged children, until recently there have regrettably been limited empirical efforts to clarify indicated psychological intervention methods for the treatment of mood and anxiety disorders presenting in early childhood. Young children lack many of the developmental capacities required to effectively participate in established treatments for mood and anxiety problems presenting in older children, making simple downward extensions of these treatments for the management of preschool internalizing problems misguided. In recent years, a number of research groups have successfully adapted and modified parent–child interaction therapy (PCIT), originally developed to treat externalizing problems in young children, to treat various early internalizing problems with a set of neighboring protocols. As in traditional PCIT, these extensions target child symptoms by directly reshaping parent–child interaction patterns associated with the maintenance of symptoms. The present review outlines this emerging set of novel PCIT adaptations and modifications for mood and anxiety problems in young children and reviews preliminary evidence supporting their use. Specifically, we cover (a) PCIT for early separation anxiety disorder; (b) the PCIT-CALM (Coaching Approach behavior and Leading by Modeling) Program for the full range of early anxiety disorders; (c) the group Turtle Program for behavioral inhibition; and (d) the PCIT-ED (Emotional Development) Program for preschool depression. In addition, emerging PCIT-related protocols in need of empirical attention—such as the PCIT-SM (selective mutism) Program for young children with SM—are also considered. Implications of these protocols are discussed with regard to their unique potential to address the clinical needs of young children with internalizing problems. Obstacles to broad dissemination are addressed, and we consider potential solutions, including modular treatment formats and innovative applications of technology.     

Trajectories of Depression and Anxiety Symptoms in Adolescent Girls: A Comparison of Parallel Trajectory Approaches

Longitudinal mixture models have become popular in the literature. However, modest attention has been paid to whether these models provide a better fit to the data than growth models. Here, we compared longitudinal mixture models to growth models in the context of changes in depression and anxiety symptoms in a community sample of girls from age 10 to 17. Model comparisons found that the preferred solution was a 5-class parallel process growth mixture model that differed in the course of depression and anxiety symptoms reflecting both ordering of symptoms and qualitative group differences. Comparisons between classes revealed substantive differences on a number of outcomes using this solution. Findings are discussed in the context of clinical assessment and implementation of growth mixture models.     

Waiting for feedback helps if you want to know the answer: the role of curiosity in the delay-of-feedback benefit

When participants answer a test question and then receive feedback of the correct answer, studies have shown that the feedback is more effective when it is delayed by several seconds rather than provided immediately (e.g., Brackbill & Kappy, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 55, 14–18, 1962; Schroth, Contemporary Educational Psychology, 17, 78–82, 1992). Despite several demonstrations of this delay-of-feedback benefit, a theoretical explanation for this finding has not yet been developed. The present study tested the hypothesis that brief delays of feedback are beneficial because they encourage anticipation of the upcoming feedback. In Experiment 1, participants answered obscure trivia questions, and before receiving the answer, they rated their curiosity to know the answer. The answer was then provided either immediately or after a 4-s delay. A later final test over the same questions revealed a significant delay-of-feedback benefit, but only for items that had been rated high in curiosity. Experiment 2 replicated this same effect and showed that the delay-of-feedback benefit only occurs when feedback is provided after a variable, unpredictable time duration (either 2, 4, or 8 s) rather than after a constant duration (always 4 s). These findings demonstrate that the delay-of-feedback effect appears to be greatest under conditions in which participants are curious to know the answer and when the answer is provided after an unpredictable time interval.     

A Bifactor Model of Anxiety Sensitivity: Analysis of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the fit of a bifactor model of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al. Psychological Assessment, 19, 176–188, 2007) as well as to examine measurement invariance of the ASI-3 across gender. Participants were undergraduate students from the University of Cincinnati (n?=?954; 63 % female). Results indicated that the bifactor model was the best fit to the data, and that this model of AS is fully invariant in terms of gender. The current findings suggest that anxiety sensitivity consists of a general factor and three independent group factors (rather than a higher-order factor with three correlated lower-order factors). The ASI-3 subscales from the bifactor model however did not provide incremental predictive utility above and beyond the general AS factor with respect to an external anxiety criterion. Related research and clinical implications are discussed.     

Adorno,Hegel, and Dialectic

This article explores critical theory's relations to German idealism by clarifying how Adorno's thought relates to Hegel's. Adorno's apparently mixed responses to Hegel centre on the dialectic and actually form a coherent whole. In his Logic, Hegel outlines the dialectical process by which categories – fundamental forms of thought and reality – necessarily follow one another in three stages: abstraction, dialectic proper, and the speculative (famously simplified as ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’). Adorno's allegiance to Hegel's dialectic emerges when he traces the dialectical process whereby enlightenment reverts to myth and human domination over nature reverts into our domination by nature. However, Adorno criticizes Hegel's dialectic as the ultimate form of ‘identity thinking’, subsuming unique, material objects under universal concepts by using dialectical reason to expand those concepts to cover objects utterly. These two responses cohere because Adorno shares Hegel's view that dialectical contradictions require reconciliation, but differs from Hegel on the nature of reconciliation. For Hegel, reconciliation unites differences into a whole; for Adorno, reconciled differences co-exist as differences. Finally, against Habermas who holds that Adorno cannot consistently criticize the enlightenment practice of critique, I show that Adorno can do so consistently because of how he reshapes Hegelian dialectic.