Unemployed Adults’ Career Thoughts,Career Self‐Efficacy,and Interest: Any Similarity to College Students?

Little empirical knowledge about unemployed adults exists during a time when this group needs substantial career assistance. Because there is greater empirical understanding of college student career development compared with what is known about unemployed adults, a chi square and analyses of covariance were used to compare the career thinking, self‐efficacy, and interests of 169 unemployed adults seeking public job center assistance with that of 200 college students. Additionally, a diverse sample of 2,444 unemployed adults is demographically reviewed. Unemployed adults reported a higher level of Realistic interests and similar levels of negative career thinking and career decision‐making self‐efficacy compared with college students.     

Additional weight influences the reaching behavior of low-risk preterm infants

The authors investigated the influence of additional weight in the reaching behavior of preterm infants. Nine low-risk preterm and 10 full-term infants age 5-7 months participated. A toy was presented in two procedures: (a) baseline and (b) additional weight (bracelet with weight of 20% of the infant's upper limb mass). The additional weight reduced the straightness index at 5 months, increased the mean velocity and decreased the movement units at all months, and increased unsuccessful grasps at 5 and 7 months in preterm infants. Preterm infants showed less movement units at all months and less unsuccessful grasps at 6 months compared with full-term infants. Weight disturbance seems to change the intrinsic dynamics involved in reaching movements of 5-7-month-old preterm infants.     

On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo

This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so‐called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they form.