A developmental evaluation of the role of word shape in word recognition

Fourth- and seventh-grade children and college-age adults proofread passages typed either in lowercase or in all capital letters. Words were misspelled by deleting one of four letters, s, c, k, or p, that have similar features in lowercase and uppercase. Proofreading errors decreased with age and increasing reading ability, but all of the subjects were sensitive to changes in word shape--they missed more words with deletions of s or c than k or p in the lowercase passage but not in the all-capitals passage. These findings indicate that word shape is an important variable in recognizing familiar words, even for young readers.     

Output and retrieval interference in the missing-number task

Three experiments are reported that represent a reexamination of the missing-number method (Buschke, 1963b) of estimating short-term memory span. The missing-number task involved presenting a random sequence of all but one of the numbers of a known reference set and asking subjects to identify the missing number. Experiment 1 introduced a modified missing-number task that included two missing items and two choices made by the subject. With a large decline in performance for the second choice relative to the first, it is possible that only the second choice was subject to output or retrieval interference. An alternative explanation is that subjects output the number with the weakest memory representation as their first response. By postcuing subjects to report their two choices in a forward or backward sequence, Experiment 2 provided evidence against the importance of output interference and support either for the importance of retrieval interference or for the "weakest-first" hypothesis. However, with a paradigm that replaced only correctly identified missing numbers, a prediction that subjects would select the number with the weakest memory representation as their first response was not confirmed in Experiment 3. Instead, retrieval interference was implicated to explain the first-choice superiority found in Experiments 1 and 3. The results were interpreted in terms of the TODAM model of Murdock (1982, 1987, in press).     

Detection errors in a task with articulatory suppression: Phonological receding and reading

In two experiments, subjects read passages of text and circled instances of a target letter under normal conditions or while engaged in articulatory suppression. In Experiment 1, subjects searching for the letter e made a disproportionately large number of errors on the word “the” and more errors when e occurred in unstressed than in stressed syllables of three-syllable words. In Experiment 2, subjects searching for the letter f made an exceedingly large number of errors on the word “of.” Articulatory suppression significantly reduced the stress effect in the three-syllable words but did not reduce the tendency to make errors on “the” or “of,” suggesting that phonological recoding is responsible for this effect of stress but does not influence the unitization processes of reading.     

In search of the false-uniqueness phenomenon: fear and estimates of social consensus

An examination of the social perception literature yields little evidence for the false-uniqueness phenomenon (Valins & Nisbett, 1972), the perception that one's attributes are more unique than is the case. In contrast, the tendency for individuals to project their own characteristics onto other people and assume that more people are like themselves is a robust phenomenon. One reason researchers may not have found false uniqueness is that they have not looked at the accuracy of consensus estimates. A close look at the results of Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alloy (1983) and Sanders and Mullen (1983), who did assess accuracy, suggests that people possessing undesirable attributes over-estimate consensus, whereas people holding desirable attributes underestimate consensus. The latter pattern is a form of false uniqueness. In this study we looked at the accuracy of social consensus estimates in the context of psychological fears. A sample of subjects filled out an abbreviated version of a fear survey and made estimates of consensus. The results showed that both high- and low-fear respondents overestimated the incidence of high fear among their peers, but high-fear subjects were more inaccurate in their estimates. A false-uniqueness effect was found on the part of low-fear subjects, as they tended to underestimate the incidence of low fear among their peers. These findings are consistent with a motivational interpretation that emphasizes the individual's need to justify or normalize stigmatized behavior and to bolster perceived self-competence.     

Raging better: Reflections on the Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage

Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage is a significant addition to the growing body of analytic philosophy that succeeds in not just engaging but shaping and even creating new forms of public discourse. It does so while remaining an exemplar for what good analytic philosophy should look like: filled with systematic and clear distinctions that illuminate rather than obfuscate real and concrete lived phenomena. I offer two challenges to Cherry's typology of rage: first, I rehabilitate two of variations she takes to be morally and politically problematic, and, second, I argue that the freedom to feel, express, and act on Lordean rage proper should be more limited than Cherry allows. I then raise a set of questions about the aesthetics of persuasive anger. Finally, I highlight two striking insights in Cherry's rich argument.