A Critical Assessment of the Programmes of Producing ‘Islamic Science’ and ‘Islamisation of Science/Knowledge’

In the present article, working from within the framework of critical rationalism and focusing mostly on the views developed by some Iranian writers, I argue that the programmes of producing ‘Islamic Science’ (cIS) and ‘Islamisation of Science/Knowledge’ (IoK) are doomed to failure. I develop my arguments in three parts. I start by explaining that the advocates of the programmes of producing cIS or IoK subscribe to mistaken images of science that are shaped by either a positivist or outmoded culturalist/interpretivist theories of science. I shall then focus on the similarities and differences of ‘science’ and ‘technology’, arguing that despite close interconnection between the two it is of utmost importance, for analytical purposes, to keep these two socially constructed entities apart. Drawing on the above distinction, I argue that while creating ‘Islamic’ or ‘indigenous’ sciences is impossible, constructing ‘Islamic’ or ‘indigenous’ technologies is, in principle, feasible. Lastly, I turn to some of the more recent works on creating/constructing cIS and/or IoK. I shall try to show that none of the arguments introduced by the advocates of the projects of cIS/IoK is tenable.     

Preference‐based Learning of Ideal Solutions in TOPSIS‐like Decision Models

Combining established modelling techniques from multiple‐criteria decision aiding with recent algorithmic advances in the emerging field of preference learning, we propose a new method that can be seen as an adaptive version of TOPSIS, the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution decision model (or at least a simplified variant of this model). On the basis of exemplary preference information in the form of pairwise comparisons between alternatives, our method seeks to induce an ‘ideal solution’ that, in conjunction with a weight factor for each criterion, represents the preferences of the decision maker. To this end, we resort to probabilistic models of discrete choice and make use of maximum likelihood inference. First experimental results on suitable preference data suggest that our approach is not only intuitively appealing and interesting from an interpretation point of view but also competitive to state‐of‐the‐art preference learning methods in terms of prediction accuracy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Wandering Mind is Not Always a Creative Mind: How Thought Dynamics Explain the Relationship between Mind Wandering and Creativity

A wandering mind is not always a creative mind. Anecdotes about ideas spontaneously entering awareness during walks, showers, and other off-task activities are plenty. The science behind it, however, is still inconclusive. Creativity might result from how thought context—whether thoughts are on-task or off-task—relates to thought dynamics—how thoughts unfold. To explore this, study 1 (n = 85) surveyed creative professionals about a single idea they had earlier in the day. The spontaneity of thoughts positively correlated with self-reported creativity, whereas off-task thoughts or doing something else did not. Study 2 (n = 180) replicated these findings in a student sample during an idea generation task and added that free movement of thoughts also correlates with self-reported originality during idea generation. As indicated by expert ratings, no relationship of thought dynamics and thought context was found with population-level creativity. Herewith, this study suggests that thought dynamics, rather than thought context, explain the often suggested relationship between mind wandering and creativity.     

Women seek more variety in rewards when closer to ovulation

We propose that women's increased generalized sensitivity to rewards during the fertile phase of the menstrual cycle causes them to seek more variety in rewards when they are in the fertile phase than when they are not in the fertile phase of the cycle. In Studies 1–3, across the reward domains of mating and hedonic food, we show that women seek more variety in rewards when closer to ovulation. Moreover, we provide support for the proposition that women's increased reward sensitivity during the fertile phase of the menstrual cycle causes their greater variety seeking. Specifically, in Study 3, we show that fertile women's greater variety seeking does not extend to non-rewards, such as non-hedonic food. Our findings suggest that behavioral effects of women's hormonal shifts during the menstrual cycle are not limited to the mating domain and may extend to a wide category of reward domains.     

Phenomenal conservatism, classical foundationalism, and internalist justification

In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism is most faithful to the central internalist intuition. I argue that Huemer’s self-defeat argument fails, that classical foundationalism is able to accommodate fallible introspective beliefs, and that classical foundationalism has no difficulty accommodating a relatively clear internalist intuition. I also show that the motivation for phenomenal conservatism is less than clear.     

ISLAM AND SCIENCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS FOR A GENUINE DEBATE

What does it take for Islam and science to engage in a genuine conversation with each other? This essay is an attempt to answer this question by clarifying the conditions which make having such a conversation possible and plausible. I will first distinguish between three notions of conversation: the trivial conversation (which requires sharing a common language and the meaning of its ordinary expressions), superficial conversation (in which although the language is shared, the communicators fail to share the meaning of their theoretical terms), and genuine conversation (which implies sharing the language and the meaning of ordinary as well as theoretical terms). I will then argue that our real concern with regard to the exchange between Islam and science is to be to specify the conditions under which their proponents can engage in a genuine conversation with each other and that such a conversation to take place essentially requires sharing a common ontology. Following Quine, I will argue that Muslims, like the followers of any religion, would have no other choice but to work from within science. Doing so, however, would not prevent Muslims from having a genuine conversation with the proponents of other worldviews because when the shared ontology fails to offer any potentially testable answer to our remaining questions about the world, the Islamic viewpoint can appear as a genuine alternative among other underdetermined ones, deciding between which would be a matter of pragmatic criteria.     

Development and validation of the counterfactual thinking for negative events scale

We examined the psychometric properties of the newly created Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale (CTNES) in two studies involving university undergraduates. In Study 1 (N = 634), factor analysis revealed four subscales that correspond with various types of counterfactual thinking: Nonreferent Downward, Other-Referent Upward, Self-Referent Upward, and Nonreferent Upward. The subscales were largely orthogonal and had adequate internal consistency and test-retest reliability. The CTNES subscales were positively correlated with a traditional method of assessing counterfactual thinking and were related as expected to contextual aspects of the negative event, negative affect, and cognitive style. In Study 2 (N = 208), we further examined the validity of the scale and demonstrated that the subscales were sensitive to an experimental manipulation concerning the type of negative event participants recalled. Moreover, the CTNES subscales correlated in the expected direction with measures of coping and cognitive style.