What do dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) understand about hidden objects?

Object permanence, the ability to mentally represent and reason about objects that have disappeared from view, is a fundamental cognitive skill that has been extensively studied in human infants and terrestrial animals, but not in marine animals. A series of four experiments examined this ability in bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus). After being trained on a “find the object” game, dolphins were tested on visible and invisible displacement tasks, and transpositions. In Experiments 1 and 2, dolphins succeeded at visible displacements, but not at invisible displacements or transpositions. Experiment 3 showed that they were able to pass an invisible displacement task in which a person’s hand rather than a container was used as the displacement device. However, follow-up controls suggested they did so by learning local rules rather than via a true representation of the movement of hidden objects. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the dolphins did not rely on such local rules to pass visible displacement tasks. Thus, like many terrestrial animals, dolphins are able to succeed on visible displacement tasks, but seem unable to succeed on tasks requiring the tracking of hidden objects.     

Cognitive effects of hormone therapy in early postmenopausal women

Recent reports suggest that hormone therapy (HT) with estrogen may have a protective effect on the ageing brain and cognitive function. However, clinical evidence regarding the cognitive effects in menopausal women under HT has produced conflicting results. The purpose of the present study was to assess and compare the cognitive effects after 6 months of HT in 30 early postmenopausal women, who were divided into three groups as follows: group I, Therapy conjugated equine estrogen (ET) CEE 0.625 mg/day (n = 10); group II, Estrogen‐Progestin Therapy (EPT), CEE 0.625 mg/day plus, chlormadinone 1 mg/day (n = 10); and group III, the control group, who did not receive treatment (n = 10). The three groups were matched by age and years of education. Exclusion criteria were: central nervous system diseases, severe cardiac disease, and clinical history of cancer and depression. Subjects were tested using a comprehensive battery for the evaluation of attention, memory and executive functions, which was standardized and validated in Spanish‐speaking subjects. The rate of cognitive change was defined by the difference between the measurements at the sixth month minus the baseline score. Mean group differences were assessed with MANOVA, followed by one‐way ANOVA considering statistical significance when p < .05; the alpha significance level .05 was corrected using the Bonferroni procedure. The EPT group showed higher scores than the control group and ET group in the Total Attention Score and in the copy of the Rey‐Osterreith Complex Figure. The ET group showed significantly higher scores than the control group and the EPT group in the subtest of Spatial Backward Span and in the Immediate Face Codification. The short‐term positive effects observed with HT in this sample could be related to the stimulation of brain receptors and/or neurotrophic factors that are still present at this age.     

Developmental changes in visual object recognition between 18 and 24 months of age

Two experiments examined developmental changes in children's visual recognition of common objects during the period of 18 to 24 months. Experiment 1 examined children's ability to recognize common category instances that presented three different kinds of information: (1) richly detailed and prototypical instances that presented both local and global shape information, color, textural and featural information, (2) the same rich and prototypical shapes but no color, texture or surface featural information, or (3) that presented only abstract and global representations of object shape in terms of geometric volumes. Significant developmental differences were observed only for the abstract shape representations in terms of geometric volumes, the kind of shape representation that has been hypothesized to underlie mature object recognition. Further, these differences were strongly linked in individual children to the number of object names in their productive vocabulary. Experiment 2 replicated these results and showed further that the less advanced children's object recognition was based on the piecemeal use of individual features and parts, rather than overall shape. The results provide further evidence for significant and rapid developmental changes in object recognition during the same period children first learn object names. The implications of the results for theories of visual object recognition, the relation of object recognition to category learning, and underlying developmental processes are discussed.     

Participants' understanding of the process of psychological research: informed consent

Sixty-five undergraduates participating in a wide range of psychological research experiments were interviewed in depth about their research experiences and their views on the process of informed consent. Overall, 32% of research experiences were characterized positively and 41% were characterized negatively. One major theme of the negative experiences was that experiments were perceived as too invasive, suggesting incomplete explication of negative aspects of research during the informed consent process. Informed consent experiences were viewed positively 80% of the time. However, most of the participants had a limited view of the purpose of informed consent: less than 20% viewed the process as a decision point. Results suggest a number of common pitfalls to standard informed consent practices that have not generally been recognized. Results are discussed in terms of both ethical and methodological implications. Suggestions for improving the informed consent process are also provided.     

The Political Philosophy of Science and the Problem of Rationality

The present article offers an introductory vision to the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science is a new field of study where the philosophy of science and political philosophy converge. We will see the main contents of this field. We will also note that it depends on the construction of a model of rationality where science and politics can meet each other. Finally, the article tries to outline such a model of rationality. In order to do so, we will review the relationship between Karl Popper’s scientific and political philosophy. I suggest to read Popper’s critical rationalism in terms of a kind of prudential rationality.     

Family Structure and Child Adjustment in Spain

This paper presents the results of a study carried out in Spain with 214 families with children aged between 3 and 10, comparing the quality of family context and the internal and external adjustment of children living in six different types of family structure: traditional, single-parent, stepfamilies, adoptive, same-sex parent and multiple-birth. Members of the research team interviewed the families in their homes and administered the assessment instruments (Development History, HOME inventory, Parenting Stress Index and Behavior Assessment System for Children). The results indicate that although some significant differences were observed between families (children living in same-sex parent families scored higher for internal and external adjustment, and those from stepfamilies scored lowest in these same measures), these differences disappeared when the effects of sociodemographic and contextual variables were statistically controlled in a covariance analysis. It can therefore be concluded that it was not family structure itself that was related to children’s adjustment, but rather the sociodemographic and contextual variables associated with it. Thus, all the family structures analysed in the study are capable of promoting positive child development and adjustment, providing they meet the necessary conditions, such as good-quality care and a stimulating environment free from conflict and stress.     

The Brain Is Not a Tool

Some psychologists claim that the brain is a tool. This claim can be construed either literally or figuratively. We argue that, in the former case, it is false, whereas in the latter case it has no place in scientific psychology. We also try to show why this discussion is relevant and suggest how a metaphor should behave to be of use in science.