Rehabilitating Self-Sacrifice: Care Ethics and the Politics of Resistance

ABSTRACT

How should feminists view acts of self-sacrifice performed by women? According to a long-standing critique of care ethics such acts ought to be viewed with scepticism. Care ethics, it is claimed, celebrates acts of self-sacrifice on the part of carers and in doing so encourages women to choose caring for others over their own self-development. In doing so, care ethics frustrates attempts to liberate women from the oppression of patriarchy. Care ethicists have responded to this critique by noting limits on the level, form, or scope of self-sacrifice that work to restrict its role in their theories. While we do not here take issue with the initial feminist critiques of self-sacrifice, we suspect that the strategies offered by Care ethicists in response are importantly flawed. Specifically, these responses undervalue the positive roles that self-sacrifice can play in fighting patriarchal oppression. As a result, in attempting to restrict an oppressive norm, these responses risk foreclosing on valuable means of resistance. Our aim is to explore these positive roles for self-sacrifice and thereby rehabilitate its standing with feminists.     

Conflict Management for Justice,Innovation, and Strategic Advantage in Organizational Relationships

This study proposed that conflict management affects organizations’ beliefs that they have an effective voice (procedural justice), have shared their benefits fairly (distributive justice), and are treated respectfully (interactional justice). Structural equation analysis results suggest that a cooperative approach to conflict facilitates justice in its 3 forms in organizational relationships, and that justice, in turn, results in partner strategic advantage and innovation. Results from a sample of 103 pairs of customer and supplier organizations in Shanghai were interpreted as providing support for the value of justice for collaborative work between organizations. The findings also suggest that a cooperative approach to managing conflict is an important antecedent to justice in organizational relationships in China.     

Are Human Rights Redundant in the Ethical Codes of Psychologists?

The codes of ethics and conduct of a number of psychology bodies explicitly refer to human rights, and the American Psychological Association recently expanded the use of the construct when it amended standard 1.02 of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. What is unclear is how these references to human rights should be interpreted. In this article I examine the historical development of human rights and associated constructs and the contemporary meaning of human rights. As human rights are generally associated with law, morality, or religion, I consider to which of forms of these references most likely refer. I conclude that these references in ethical codes are redundant and that it would be preferable not to refer to human rights in codes. Instead, the profession should acknowledge human rights as a separate and complimentary norm system that governs the behavior of psychologists and should ensure that they have adequate knowledge of human rights and encourage them to promote human rights.     

Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent

It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two people act in the same way but with only the person who acted with altruistic intent counting as having performed an act of supererogation. In such cases Heyd’s intention requirement plays an important role in ruling out acts that intuitively are not supererogatory. Despite this, I will argue that we should reject Heyd’s requirement and replace it with a moral intention requirement. I will then investigate how to formulate this requirement and respond to two objections that might be raised against it.     

Dislocation relaxation and alloy softening of bcc alloys

Recently, low-frequency internal friction measurements on a series of Fe–Cr alloys by Konstantinovi? and Terentyev [M.J. Konstantinovi? and D. Terentyev, Mater. Sci. Eng. A 521–522 (2009) p.106] have demonstrated that increasing Cr concentrations lead to an increase in the strength of the β-relaxation at the cost of the γ-relaxation (Chambers’ notation). In the same concentration and temperature regime, the alloys show alloy softening. It is argued that both phenomena are due to the same process, namely the influence of foreign atoms on the transformation of the cores of a ₀?1 1 1?/2 screw dislocations from their low-temperature configuration, capable of forming kink pairs on {1 1 0} planes, to their high-temperature configuration with kink-pair generation on {2 1 1} planes.     

Kane,Luck, and the significance of free will

Abstract

This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the “Intelligibility” and “Existence” questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls “The Significance Question” about free will: “Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom ‘worth wanting’... and, if so, why?” A desire for “objective worth” has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire.