META‐HUMANS AND METANOIA: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF EXTRATERRESTRIALS

Abstract. Although we do not know whether intelligent extraterrestrials exist, they are a permanent fixture of literature and philosophical argument. Part of their appeal is that they watch us from above and thus serve as a metaphor for human self‐reflexivity. This makes fictional aliens especially useful when moral issues are at stake. In order to evaluate stories about aliens with respect to moral conclusions two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the stories have to be detailed enough that we can understand the circumstances of the aliens' moral choices. Therefore science fiction often is more useful than arguments involving aliens in short technical papers. Second, their fictional lives need to be possible in our own universe, or very nearly so, in order to be relevant for our own moral conduct. Taking as an example the unfallen aliens in C. S. Lewis's novels Out of the Silent Planet (1938) and Perelandra (1943), we can acknowledge the theological interest and literary subtlety. Nonetheless, the stories fail as moral parables in one important respect: The aliens depicted could not be a product of evolution in our universe, at least as we currently understand its scientific laws. This realization has important consequences for our self‐understanding and thus underlines how fictional aliens can be useful in making sense of the complexities involved in moral argumentation.     

Effects of reduced contrast on the perception and control of speed when driving

Misperception of speed under low-contrast conditions has been identified as a possible contributor to motor vehicle crashes in fog. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the effects of reduced contrast on drivers' perception and control of speed while driving under real-world conditions. Fourteen participants drove around a 2.85 km closed road course under three visual conditions: clear view and with two levels of reduced contrast created by diffusing filters on the windscreen and side windows. Three dependent measures were obtained, without view of the speedometer, on separate laps around the road course: verbal estimates of speed; adjustment of speed to instructed levels (25 to 70 km h(-1)); and estimation of minimum stopping distance. The results showed that drivers traveled more slowly under low-contrast conditions. Reduced contrast had little or no effect on either verbal judgments of speed or estimates of minimum stopping distance. Speed adjustments were significantly slower under low-contrast than clear conditions, indicating that, contrary to studies of object motion, drivers perceived themselves to be traveling faster under conditions of reduced contrast. Under real-world driving conditions, drivers' ability to perceive and control their speed was not adversely affected by large variations in the contrast of their surroundings. These findings suggest that perceptions of self-motion and object motion involve neural processes that are differentially affected by variations in stimulus contrast as encountered in fog.     

Dissociation of Processes Underlying Spatial S-R Compatibility: Evidence for the Independent Influence of What and Where

The process-dissociation procedure was used to estimate the influence of spatial and form-based processing in the Simon task. Subjects made manual (left/right) responses to the direction of arrows (> or <) presented to the left or right of fixation. Manipulating the proportion of incongruent trails (e.g., a right-pointing arrow presented to the left of fixation) affected both the size and direction of the Simon effect. To account for this pattern of data, we compared process estimates based on three possible relationships between spatial and form-based processing: independence, redundancy, and exclusivity. The independence model provided the best account of the data. Most telling was that independent form-based estimates were superior at predicting observed performance on arrows presented at fixation and did so consistently across conditions (r′s > .80). The results provide evidence that the form ("what") and spatial location ("where") of a single stimulus can have functionally independent effects on performance. They also indicate the existence of two kinds of automaticity—an associative ("implicit learning") component that reflects prior S-R mappings and a nonassociative component that reflects the correspondence between stimulus and response codes.     

The problem with moralism

Moralism is often described as a vice. But what exactly is wrong with moralism that makes it aptly described as a character flaw? This paper will argue that the problem with moralism is that it downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism. First, I will argue that moralism involves an inflated sense of the extent to which moral criticism is appropriate. Next, I will examine the value of legitimate moral criticism, arguing that its value stems from enabling us to take a stand against immoral behavior. Finally, I will argue that unwarranted moral criticism downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism and that this is why moralism should be seen as a vice.