Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?

This article explores the conceptual connections between free action and action for which the agent is morally responsible. Questions addressed include the following. Can agents who are never morally responsible for anything sometimes act freely? Can agents who never act freely be morally responsible for some of their actions? Various compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to these questions are discussed, as is the control over their behavior that ordinary agents attribute to themselves.     

School and community participation of in-school teenagers affected by orphanhood in a rural South Africa setting

This study investigated schooling and community participation qualities of teenage learners affected by orphanhood in rural secondary South African setting. Participants were a purposive sample of 30 teenage learners, (female = 60% black = 98%, 12 to 19 years old). Data on their school and community participation were collected using semi-structured individual interviews. The data were thematically analyzed with open-coding. The findings indicated that learners need support for livelihoods, relationship development with extended family or guardians, school attendance, school task engagement and follow through. They experienced material shortages despite state support. From livelihood deprivations and forced opportunities, the learners who had been orphaned enter the working environment earlier than is typical and often do menial jobs.

Children who have been orphaned are those under the age of 18 years who have lost one or both parents from any cause (Jeff & Chris, 2002 Jeff, G., & Chris, D. (2002). Impacts and interventions. South Africa: University of Natal Press. [Google Scholar], UNICEF, 2003). This represents about 18.8% of South African children (3 374 971) and 7.3% of children (24 6373) from the Free State or central province of South Africa alone (Central Statistics South Africa, 2011). According to the World Bank (1998 World Bank. (1998). Confronting AIDS. Washington, DC: World Bank. [Google Scholar]), children affected by orphanhood are less likely to have proper schooling from lack of parenting and the resource deprivation associated with being orphaned. Under guardianship, the host family may reduce a child's attendance at school by labour demands or the inability to pay for schooling (UNICEF, 2003). From these deprivations, learners affected by orphanhood may enter the labour force prematurely, and mostly in the unregulated informal sector (UNICEF, 2012). As a matter of fact, a learner who is orphaned is deprived of childhood from the socio-economic demands on him or her which are developmentally atypical (Ganga & Maphala, 2013).     

Audiogenic Seizures: Insulin and High Blood Sugar

Inverted black-white photographs of the faces of highly familiar peers (classmates, fraternity brothers, etc.) were presented to 350 Ss ranging from 3 to 20 years of age. In an untimed test session, S tried to identify the person in the inverted photograph. Success in this task was positively correlated with age up to approximately 14 years, but performance deteriorated after this age; college-age S s and preschool Ss' performances were approximately equal. This finding contrasts with the current view that the effects of disorientation on perception becomes less potent with age. A cognitive explanation is offered for the early rise in the performance curve; the subsequent reduction in level of performance is attributed to rigidity of the perceptual mechanism as a function of overlearning of a mono-oriented configuration.     

Ethical social justice: Do the ends justify the means?

This article offers an ethical decision‐making model, informed by community psychology values, as a means for guiding psychologists when engaging in social justice‐oriented work. The applicability of this model is demonstrated through a case analysis elucidating how America's psychologists individually and collectively arrived at the decision to endorse torture—ostensibly as a means for preventing terrorism. Critics have wondered how the American Psychological Association succumbed to these involvements, and how to prevent such ethical lapses in the future. Unfortunately, the American Psychological Association's ethical codes fail to provide explicit guidance for psychologists' involvement in social justice work that impacts communities and systems. To address this gap, we present a values‐driven, ethical decision‐making framework that may be used to guide psychologists' future practices. This framework infuses fundamental community psychology values (i.e., caring and compassion; health; self‐determination and participation, human diversity, social justice; and critical reflexivity) into a 9‐step model.     

Aesthetic judgements and motivation

Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing to defend aesthetic non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against aesthetic internalism. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections.     

The role of animacy in spatial transformations

We present evidence that different mental spatial transformations are used to reason about three different types of items representing a spectrum of animacy: human bodies, nonhuman animals, and inanimate objects. Participants made two different judgments about rotated figures: handedness judgments (“Is this the left or right side?”) and matching judgments (“Are these figures the same?”). Perspective-taking strategies were most prevalent when participants made handedness judgments about human bodies and animals. In contrast, participants generally did not imagine changes in perspective to perform matching judgments. Such results suggest that high-level information about semantic categories, including information about a thing’s animacy, can influence how spatial representations are transformed when performing online problem solving. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://mc.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Explaining the modality and contiguity effects: New insights from investigating students' viewing behaviour

The study examined viewing behaviour and learning outcome during multimedia learning in order to explore split‐attention processes in modality and spatial contiguity effects. Fourty students viewed a computer instruction depicting the process of lightning. Exploratory text was spoken, written near or written far from accompanying animations. Students who received spoken text outperformed students who received written text in recalling the major steps (retention) and in identifying correct solutions to problems (transfer), replicating a modality effect. Differences between near and far written text presentation in retention (d = 0.51) and transfer (d = 0.68) tests failed statistical significance. Two major characteristics concerning the learners' viewing behaviour were identified: (a) in written text presentation, learning was largely text directed and (b) learning success was related to the time learners' spent looking at animations, indicating that the processing of animations is a crucial factor in explanations of modality and spatial contiguity effects. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Engaging Narratives and the Limits of Lay Ethics: Introduction

How can one discover the ethical issues associated with nanotechnologies? One heuristic is to tend closely to the ethical reflections of lay publics and the ways in which these are informed by experience with technological innovation, technology governance, and the (broken) promises of visionary science and technology. A close collaboration between social scientists and philosophers took this heuristic to its limits: On the one hand, it achieved remarkably fine–grained insights into public reflection about nanotechnologies. On the other hand, a philosophical analysis of these reflections makes apparent that there is a profound disconnect between the lay ethics rooted in public talk and the ethical and normative commitments that are embedded in nanotechnological research programs and practices. Accordingly, critical engagement with the ways in which ordinary people try to make sense of nanotechnologies constitutes a novel heuristic for the discovery of ethical issues. This introduction and the subsequent four papers show this heuristic at work.     

Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility

This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus.     

Chisholm on freedom

Abstract: This critical examination of Roderick Chisholm's agent causal brand of libertarianism develops a problem about luck that undermines his earlier and later libertarian views on free will and moral responsibility and defends the thesis that a modest libertarian alternative considerably softens the problem. The alternative calls for an indeterministic connection in the action‐producing process that is further removed from action than Chisholm demands. The article also explores the implications of a relatively new variant of a Frankfurt‐style case for Chisholm's views of free will and moral responsibility and for libertarianism in general. It is suggested that Chisholm's efforts will and should continue to offer important assistance to libertarians who are determined to succeed where he apparently fell short.