Conflict Management for Justice,Innovation, and Strategic Advantage in Organizational Relationships

This study proposed that conflict management affects organizations’ beliefs that they have an effective voice (procedural justice), have shared their benefits fairly (distributive justice), and are treated respectfully (interactional justice). Structural equation analysis results suggest that a cooperative approach to conflict facilitates justice in its 3 forms in organizational relationships, and that justice, in turn, results in partner strategic advantage and innovation. Results from a sample of 103 pairs of customer and supplier organizations in Shanghai were interpreted as providing support for the value of justice for collaborative work between organizations. The findings also suggest that a cooperative approach to managing conflict is an important antecedent to justice in organizational relationships in China.     

Are Human Rights Redundant in the Ethical Codes of Psychologists?

The codes of ethics and conduct of a number of psychology bodies explicitly refer to human rights, and the American Psychological Association recently expanded the use of the construct when it amended standard 1.02 of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. What is unclear is how these references to human rights should be interpreted. In this article I examine the historical development of human rights and associated constructs and the contemporary meaning of human rights. As human rights are generally associated with law, morality, or religion, I consider to which of forms of these references most likely refer. I conclude that these references in ethical codes are redundant and that it would be preferable not to refer to human rights in codes. Instead, the profession should acknowledge human rights as a separate and complimentary norm system that governs the behavior of psychologists and should ensure that they have adequate knowledge of human rights and encourage them to promote human rights.     

Collecting Informed Consent with Juvenile Justice Populations: Issues and Implications for Research

Researchers must provide participants with opportunities to make informed decisions about whether to participate in research studies. Investigators conducting research with youth in the juvenile justice system face unique ethical, legal, and practical challenges to obtaining informed consent. Juvenile justice researchers must navigate multiple legal and ethical standards for collecting informed consent, take into account youths’ dual vulnerabilities as children and prisoners, and overcome practical limitations to obtaining parental/guardian permission. Given the challenges and complexity of obtaining standard informed consent of youth in juvenile justice facilities, this paper provides suggestions for overcoming obstacles to recruiting these youth for research participation. It offers guidance for fostering the enrollment of juvenile justice youth in research studies using procedures that comply with ethical and legal standards for research with this dually vulnerable population. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent

It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two people act in the same way but with only the person who acted with altruistic intent counting as having performed an act of supererogation. In such cases Heyd’s intention requirement plays an important role in ruling out acts that intuitively are not supererogatory. Despite this, I will argue that we should reject Heyd’s requirement and replace it with a moral intention requirement. I will then investigate how to formulate this requirement and respond to two objections that might be raised against it.     

Dislocation relaxation and alloy softening of bcc alloys

Recently, low-frequency internal friction measurements on a series of Fe–Cr alloys by Konstantinovi? and Terentyev [M.J. Konstantinovi? and D. Terentyev, Mater. Sci. Eng. A 521–522 (2009) p.106] have demonstrated that increasing Cr concentrations lead to an increase in the strength of the β-relaxation at the cost of the γ-relaxation (Chambers’ notation). In the same concentration and temperature regime, the alloys show alloy softening. It is argued that both phenomena are due to the same process, namely the influence of foreign atoms on the transformation of the cores of a ₀?1 1 1?/2 screw dislocations from their low-temperature configuration, capable of forming kink pairs on {1 1 0} planes, to their high-temperature configuration with kink-pair generation on {2 1 1} planes.     

Kane,Luck, and the significance of free will

Abstract

This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the “Intelligibility” and “Existence” questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls “The Significance Question” about free will: “Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom ‘worth wanting’... and, if so, why?” A desire for “objective worth” has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire.     

Autonomy and Akrasia

Abstract

Strict akratic actions, by definition, are performed freely. However, agents may seem not to be selfgoverned with respect to such actions and therefore not to perform them autonomously. If appearance matches reality here, freedom and autonomy part company in this sphere. Do they? That is this article's guiding question. To make things manageable, it is assumed that there are free actions, including strict akratic actions. Two theses are defended. First, the combination of (i) an intentional action's being uncompelled and (ii) its being - or executing - in appropriate informational circumstances, a sane decision that, as the agent recognizes, is for a course of action that she believes to be inferior to an alternative course of action open to her is sufficient for the action's being freely performed. (Condition (i) provides elbow room allegedly needed for free action, and (ii) encompasses freedom-level psychological sophistication.) Second, the same combination is sufficient for an intentional action's being autonomously performed.