Allusive thinking (cognitive looseness) and the propensity to perceive “meaningful” coincidences

This study aimed at evaluating relations between the disposition to make “meaningful” associations between random events and potentially predisposing factors related to a more “loose” cognitive control, that is, loose associative processing (allusive thinking) and poorer inhibition of irrelevant memory content. As the findings of this study suggest, individuals with a higher disposition to perceive coincidences produced a higher rate of unusual associations in the Bridge-the-Associative-Gap test than low scorers, and showed poorer inhibition of no longer relevant memory content in the Recent Probes Task. These relationships were independent from individual differences in paranormal belief. Performance in a random generation task (Mittenecker Pointing Test) yielded no support for an important role of a biased concept of randomness in the perception of coincidences. The findings suggest that common mechanisms may underlie the propensity to perceive meaningful coincidences, cognitive looseness, and positive schizotypy.     

Effectiveness of virtual reality for pediatric pain distraction during i.v. placement.

The objective of this study was to test the efficacy and suitability of virtual reality (VR) as a pain distraction for pediatric intravenous (i.v.) placement. Twenty children (12 boys, 8 girls) requiring i.v. placement for a magnetic resonance imaging/computed tomography (MRI/CT) scan were randomly assigned to two conditions: (1) VR distraction using Street Luge (5DT), presented via a head-mounted display, or (2) standard of care (topical anesthetic) with no distraction. Children, their parents, and nurses completed self-report questionnaires that assessed numerous health-related outcomes. Responses from the Faces Pain Scale-Revised indicated a fourfold increase in affective pain within the control condition; by contrast, no significant differences were detected within the VR condition. Significant associations between multiple measures of anticipatory anxiety, affective pain, i.v. pain intensity, and measures of past procedural pain provided support for the complex interplay of a multimodal assessment of pain perception. There was also a sufficient amount of evidence supporting the efficacy of Street Luge as a pediatric pain distraction tool during i.v. placement: an adequate level of presence, no simulator sickness, and significantly more child-, parent-, and nurse-reported satisfaction with pain management. VR pain distraction was positively endorsed by all reporters and is a promising tool for decreasing pain, and anxiety in children undergoing acute medical interventions. However, further research with larger sample sizes and other routine medical procedures is warranted.     

New uses for the on-line computer medium in mental health care

A number of research projects related to new uses for computers in mental health service delivery are presented. These projects include work on software psychology, new computer applications in mental health care, and studies relating to the successful implementation of technology in mental health settings. Emphasis is placed on developing a better understanding of appropriate uses of technology rather than merely describing new applications.     

Reproductive Health CHOICES for Young Adults with Sickle Cell Disease or Trait: Randomized Controlled Trial Outcomes over Two Years

Interventions to assist reproductive health decision-making in populations affected by sickle cell disease (SCD) or trait (SCT) lack proven efficacy over time. Our aim was to compare effects of CHOICES, a Web-based multimedia education program on implementing informed reproductive plans, and usual care education (e-Book) on reproductive knowledge, intention, and behavior over 24 months. We randomized 234 participants with SCD (n?=?138) or SCT (n?=?96) (age 18–35 years, 35 % male, 94 % African American) to CHOICES and e-Book groups. Participants completed a sickle cell-specific reproductive measure before and four times after the intervention (6, 12, 18 and 24 months). Compared to the e-Book group the CHOICES group had significantly more improvement in knowledge over time (p?=?.004) but not intention (p?=?.18) or behavior (p?=?.69). At baseline, 114 (48.7 %) participants reported having partners who would not put the couple at risk for their children inheriting SCD. Of the 116 (49.6 %) at-risk participants, a higher poroportion of those who were in the CHOICES group chose partners that reduced their risk by the last visit than the e-Book group (p?=?.04). Study findings provide important insights for designing a national trial of the CHOICES intervention focusing on subjects whose partner status puts them at risk for having a child with SCD.     

The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’—at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide- with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires—even in cases where we expect a precise answer.