Selective effects of emotion on the phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories

The present study investigates the emotional determinants of the phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories. A total of 84 participants completed the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ, Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) after retrieving and orally describing a negative, a positive, and a neutral autobiographical memory. In addition, self-report and physiological measures of emotional state at retrieval were recorded. Results suggest that recall of perceptual, sensory, and semantic elements is better for emotional memories than for neutral ones. This difference is not significant for contextual and temporal aspects, suggesting that emotional memories are more vivid but no more specific than are neutral ones. In addition, positive memories yielded higher MCQ ratings than did negative memories for sensory, temporal, and contextual aspects. Finally, correlations suggest a positive relation between emotional state at retrieval and level of phenomenal detail of retrieved memories. Results are interpreted in terms of multilevel models of emotion and of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's (2000) model.     

Rapid induction of specific associative behavioral memory by stimulation of the nucleus basalis in the rat

Hypothesized circuitry enabling behavioral memory formation can be tested by its direct activation in the absence of normal experience. Neuromodulation via the cortical release of acetylcholine by the nucleus basalis (NB) is hypothesized to be sufficient to induce specific, associative behavioral memory. Previously, we found that tone paired with stimulation of the nucleus basalis (NBs) for 3000 trials over 15 days induced such memory, supporting the hypothesis. However, as standard associative memory can be established much more rapidly, we asked whether NB-induced memory develops rapidly. Adult male Sprague-Dawley rats, trained and tested in the same calm, waking state, were divided into Paired (n=5) and control (n=4) groups, each of which received a single session of 200 trials of an 8.0 kHz conditioned stimulus (CS) either paired with NBs or with unpaired presentation of NBs. Respiration, cardiac activity, and evoked potentials in the primary auditory cortex (ACx) were recorded. Memory and its degree of specificity were assessed 24 h later by presenting tones of various frequencies (1-15 kHz) in the absence of NBs to yield behavioral frequency generalization gradients. Behavioral responses to test tones consisted of interruption of ongoing respiration and changes in heart rate. Post-training behavioral generalization gradients exhibited response peaks centered on the CS frequency for the Paired group alone. Tone evoked potentials from the ACx also developed CS-specific plasticity. The findings indicate that NB induction of specific behavioral associative memory, like normal memory, can develop rapidly and is accompanied by specific cortical plasticity, supporting the view that NB engagement during normal learning produces memory.     

Door-in-the-face technique and monetary solicitation: an evaluation in a field setting

To test the door-in-the-face technique for a private solicitation, 53 men and 37 women in several bars were engaged. In one condition, a female confederate asked the subject to buy her drink because her boyfriend had left without paying the bill. After the subject refused, the confederate requested only 2 or 3 coins. In the control condition, the latter request was the only one. Analysis showed a dramatic increase in compliance for the door-in-the-face condition. A positive effect of the door-in-the-face technique was also observed for the average amount of the donation. The accentuation of the solicitor's dependency in the door-in-the-face condition seemed relevant for explanation.     

Evidence for an attentional component of the perceptual misalignment between moving and flashing stimuli

If a pair of dots, diametrically opposed to each other, is flashed in perfect alignment with another pair of dots rotating about the visual fixation point, most observers perceive the rotating dots as being ahead of the flashing dots (flash-lag effect). This psychophysical effect was first interpreted as the result of a perceptual extrapolation of the position of the moving dots. Also, it has been conceived as the result of differential visual latencies between flashing and moving stimuli, arising from purely sensory factors and/or expressing the contribution of attentional mechanisms as well. In a series of two experiments, we had observers judge the relative position between rotating and static dots at the moment a temporal marker was presented in the visual field. In experiment 1 we manipulated the nature of the temporal marker used to prompt the alignment judgment. This resulted in three main findings: (i) the flash-lag effect was observed to depend on the visual eccentricity of the flashing dots; (ii) the magnitude of the flash-lag effect was not dependent on the offset of the flashing dot; and (iii) the moving stimulus, when suddenly turned off, was perceived as lagging behind its disappearance location. Taken altogether, these results suggest that neither visible persistence nor motion extrapolation can account for the perceptual flash-lag phenomenon. The participation of attentional mechanisms was investigated in experiment 2, where the magnitude of the flash-lag effect was measured under both higher and lower predictability of the location of the flashing dot. Since the magnitude of the flash-lag effect significantly increased with decreasing predictability, we conclude that the observer's attentional set can modulate the differential latencies determining this perceptual effect. The flash-lag phenomenon can thus be conceived as arising from differential visual latencies which are determined not only by the physical attributes of the stimulus, such as its luminance or eccentricity, but also by attentional mechanisms influencing the delays involved in the perceptual processing.     

Emotional Valence and Perceived Event Frequency Affect Memory Accuracy for a Personally Relevant Life Event

False autobiographical remembering is known to be affected both by an event's emotional valence and its perceived frequency (PEF). Here, we present a procedure that enables the assessment of retrieval accuracy for details of an overarching personally relevant real‐life event (a graduation ceremony) while taking into account variations in both their valence and PEF. Former university students who attended the same graduation ceremony completed a questionnaire with true and false statements about the ceremony. Their task was to judge whether the event details were true. Event details were previously rated for valence (positive vs. negative) and PEF (high vs. low) and their truth status was confirmed with original video footage from the ceremony. The results showed that valence modulated the effect of PEF on memory accuracy in that a decrease in false memory judgements was observed only for negative low‐PEF (implausible) event details. These results are interpreted within the affect‐as‐information framework. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

More Grounds for Grounding Nominalism

Philosophia - In this paper, I examine Peter Schulte’s “Grounding Nominalism” (Schulte, 2018), understood as the claim that first-order properties and relations are grounded in...     

Motivationally neutral stimulation of the nucleus basalis induces specific behavioral memory

The cholinergic system has been implicated in learning and memory. The nucleus basalis (NB) provides acetylcholine (ACh) to the cerebral cortex. Pairing a tone with NB stimulation (NBstm) to alter cortical state induces both associative specific tuning plasticity in the primary auditory cortex (A1) and associative specific auditory behavioral memory. NB-induced memory has major features of natural memory that is induced by pairing a tone with motivational reinforcers, e.g., food or shock, suggesting that the cholinergic system may be a “final common pathway” whose activation promotes memory storage. Alternatively, NB stimulation might itself be motivationally significant, either rewarding or punishing. To investigate these alternatives, adult male rats (n = 7) first formed a specific NB-induced memory (CS = 8.0 kHz, 2.0 s paired with NBstm, ISI = 1.8 s, 200 trials), validated by post-training (24 h) frequency generalization gradients (1–15 kHz) of respiration interruption that were specific to the CS frequency. Thereafter, they received the same level of NBstm that had induced memory, while confined to one quadrant of an arena, and later tested for place-preference, i.e., avoidance or seeking of the quadrant of NBstm. This NBstm group exhibited neither preference for nor against the stimulated quadrant, compared to sham-operated subjects (n = 7). The findings indicate that specific associative memory can be induced by direct activation of the NB without detectable motivational effects of NB stimulation. These results are concordant with a memory-promoting role for the nucleus basalis that places it “downstream” of motivational systems, which activate it to initiate the storage of the current state of its cholinergic targets.     

Basic Self‐Awareness

Basic self‐awareness is the kind of self‐awareness reflected in our standard use of the first‐person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first‐person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third‐person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self‐awareness. In this paper, I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self‐awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self‐awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self‐aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection.