Bergson,human rights,and joy

Continental Philosophy Review - This article examines Henri Bergson’s conception of human rights in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). I claim that he provides an original view...     

Climate justice after Paris: a normative framework

This paper puts forward a normative framework to differentiate between the climate-related responsibilities of different countries in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement. It offers reasons for applying the chief moral principles of ‘historical responsibility’ and ‘capacity’ to climate finance instead of climate change mitigation targets. This will (i) provide a normative basis to realize the goal of climate change mitigation while allowing for developing and newly industrialized countries to develop economically and (ii) offer an account of the distributive principles that can regulate climate finance. This is a real-world interpretation of the 1992 UNFCCC principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ that takes into account the progress accomplished at the COP21 in Paris and offers a solution to the still unsolved problem of differentiated responsibilities. This paper offers an application of this proposal to the Green Climate Fund.     

Vestibular stimulation interferes with the dynamics of an internal representation of gravity

The remembered vanishing location of a moving target has been found to be displaced downward in the direction of gravity (representational gravity) and more so with increasing retention intervals, suggesting that the visual spatial updating recruits an internal model of gravity. Despite being consistently linked with gravity, few inquiries have been made about the role of vestibular information in these trends. Previous experiments with static tilting of observers’ bodies suggest that under conflicting cues between the idiotropic vector and vestibular signals, the dynamic drift in memory is reduced to a constant displacement along the body’s main axis. The present experiment aims to replicate and extend these outcomes while keeping the observers’ bodies unchanged in relation to physical gravity by varying the gravito-inertial acceleration using a short-radius centrifuge. Observers were shown, while accelerated to varying degrees, targets moving along several directions and were required to indicate the perceived vanishing location after a variable interval. Increases of the gravito-inertial force (up to 1.4G), orthogonal to the idiotropic vector, did not affect the direction of representational gravity, but significantly disrupted its time course. The role and functioning of an internal model of gravity for spatial perception and orientation are discussed in light of the results.     

A dog at the keyboard: using arbitrary signs to communicate requests

As a consequence of domestication, dogs have a special readiness for communication with humans. We here investigate whether a dog might be able to acquire and consistently produce a set of arbitrary signs in her communication with humans, as was demonstrated in “linguistic” individuals of several species. A female mongrel dog was submitted to a training schedule in which, after basic command training and after acquiring the verbal labels of rewarding objects or activities, she learned to ask for such objects or activities by selecting lexigrams and pressing keys on a keyboard. Systematic records taken during spontaneous interaction with one of the experimenters showed that lexigrams were used in an appropriate, intentional way, in accordance with the immediate motivational context. The dog only utilized the keyboard in the experimenter’s presence and gazed to him more frequently after key pressing than before, an indication that lexigram use did have communicative content. Results suggest that dogs may be able to learn a conventional system of signs associated to specific objects and activities, functionally analogous to spontaneous soliciting behaviors and point to the potential fruitfulness of the keyboard/lexigram procedure for studying dog communication and cognition. This is the first report to systematically analyze the learning of arbitrary sign production in dogs. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.     

Execution and pauses in writing narratives: processing time, cognitive effort and typing skill

At the behavioural level, the activity of a writer can be described as periods of typing separated by pauses. Although some studies have been concerned with the functions of pauses, few have investigated motor execution periods. Precise estimates of the distribution of writing processes, and their cognitive demands, across periods of typing and pauses are lacking. Furthermore, it is uncertain how typing skill affects these aspects of writing. We addressed these issues, selecting writers of low and high typing skill who performed dictation and composition tasks. The occurrences of writing processes were assessed through directed verbalization, and their cognitive demands were measured through interference in reaction times (IRT). Before writing a narrative, 34 undergraduates learned to categorize examples of introspective thoughts as different types of activities related to writing (planning, translating, or revising). Then, while writing, they responded to random auditory probes, and reported their ongoing activity according to the learned categories. Convergent with previous findings, translating was most often reported, and revising and planning had fewer occurrences. Translating was mostly activated during motor execution, whereas revising and planning were mainly activated during pauses. However, none of the writing processes can be characterized as being typical of pauses, since translating was activated to a similar extent as the other two processes. Regarding cognitive demands, revising is likely to be the most demanding process in narrative writing. Typing skill had an impact on IRTs of motor execution. The demands of execution were greater in the low than in the high typing skill group, but these greater demands did not affect the strategy of writing processes activation. Nevertheless, low typing skill had a detrimental impact on text quality.     

Paradoxical hypodoxes

Synthese - Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’)....     

Effects of daily environmental enrichment on memory deficits and brain injury following neonatal hypoxia-ischemia in the rat

Environmental enrichment (EE) results in improved learning and spatial memory, as well as attenuates morphological changes resulting from cerebral ischemia in adult animals. This study examined the effects of daily EE on memory deficits in the water maze and cerebral damage, assessed in the hippocampus and cerebral cortex, caused by neonatal hypoxia-ischemia. Male Wistar rats in the 7th postnatal day were submitted to the Levine-Rice model of neonatal hypoxia-ischemia (HI), comprising permanent occlusion of the right common carotid artery and a period of hypoxia (90 min, 8%O(2)-92%N(2)). Starting two weeks after the HI event, animals were stimulated by the enriched environment (1h/day for 9 weeks); subsequent to the stimulation, performance of animals in the water maze was assessed. HI resulted in spatial reference and working memory impairments that were completely reversed by EE. Following the behavioral study, animals were killed and the hippocampal volume and cortical area were estimated. There was a significant reduction of both hippocampal volume and cortical area, ipsilateral to arterial occlusion, in HI animals; environmental stimulation had no effect on these morphological measurements. Presented data indicate that stimulation by the daily environmental enrichment recovers spatial memory deficits caused by neonatal hypoxia-ischemia without affecting tissue atrophy in either hippocampus or cortex.     

What is the nature of the mind's pattern-recognition process?

If we look at the human mind as a pattern-recognition device, what is the nature of its pattern-recognizing? And how does it differ from the majority of pattern-recognition methods we have collectively devised over the decades? These broad philosophical questions emerge from the studies of chess thought, and we propose that a major task of the mind is to engage in “experience recognition” (Linhares & Freitas, 2010). One of the basic tenets of that proposal is that pattern recognition, in cognitive science and related disciplines, does not accurately reflect human psychology. As an example, the well-known article by Chase and Simon, “perception in chess”, and the benchmark cognitive computational models of chess, by Gobet et al. were criticized. Lane and Gobet (2011) provide serious skepticism concerning some of those arguments, and here we take the opportunity to respond and expand the theoretical constructs of “experience recognition”. We postulate that the mind's pattern-recognizing process holds the following properties: it is a highly path-dependent process; it prioritizes internal encodings; it is a self-organizing process in constant change; and it constructs its future information-processing pathways by continuously recognizing the possibilities that lie within the adjacent possible.     

Nestling barn owls assess short-term variation in the amount of vocally competing siblings

Assessing the amount of rivals is crucial to optimally adjust investment into a contest. If laboratory animals show numerical abilities, little is known about the ecological implications particularly in young animals. The two to nine barn owl (Tyto alba) siblings vocally compete for priority of access to food resources before parents actually deliver them. In dyads, the individual that vocalizes at the highest rate in the absence of parents deters its siblings from competing for next delivered prey. We tested the novel hypothesis that to optimally adjust vocal investment, barn owl nestlings assess how many of their siblings are currently competing. To singleton owlets, we broadcasted a fixed global number of calls emitted by one, two or four pre-recorded unfamiliar nestlings. We could thus distinguish the independent effect on singletons’ vocal behavior of the global number of calls produced by a brood from the number of competitors that produced these calls. Overall, nestlings retreated more from vocal contest when facing more competitors. However, in front of one highly motivated competitor, nestlings refrained from vocalizing to a larger extent than when competing against more but less motivated individuals. Therefore, young animals assess variation in the number of currently competing siblings based on individual-specific vocal cues.     

Why Are We Certain that We Exist?

Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self‐reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito.