The effect of the frequencies of three consecutive content words on eye movements during reading

The frequencies of three consecutive content words were simultaneously varied in the first sentence of a two-sentence passage. Various eye movement measures of first-pass processing (first-fixation duration, gaze duration, and go-past time) all revealed frequency effects for all three words. The size of the effect did not differ significantly across the three words on either first-fixation duration or gaze duration, but it increased markedly for go-past time from the first to the second word, possibly indicating an accumulation of the difficulty of processing. In addition, there was a delayed effect of the frequency manipulation: For the sentences with three low-frequency words, processing at the beginning of the next (second) sentence was lengthened. (The beginning of the second sentence was always at least four words from the last of the frequency-manipulated words.) These findings indicate that word frequency has effects beyond initial lexical access in reading. A list of the experimental items and supplemental analyses may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

The illusion of knowledge: When more information reduces accuracy and increases confidence

Intuition suggests that having more information can increase prediction accuracy of uncertain outcomes. In four experiments, we show that more knowledge can decrease accuracy and simultaneously increase prediction confidence. Participants were asked to predict basketball games sampled from a National Basketball Association season. All participants were provided with statistics (win record, halftime score), while half were additionally given the team names. Knowledge of names increased the confidence of basketball fans consistent with their belief that this knowledge improved their predictions. Contrary to this belief, it decreased the participants’ accuracy by reducing their reliance on statistical cues. One of the factors contributing to this underweighting of statistical cues was a bias to bet on more familiar teams against the statistical odds. Finally, in a real betting experiment, fans earned less money if they knew the team names while persisting in their belief that this knowledge improved their predictions.     

Probability as a psychological distance: Construal and preferences

We argue that probability, like space and time, instantiates psychological distance. Unlikely outcomes may seem more remote than likely outcomes and may therefore be construed at a relatively high level. Specifically, when the probability of an outcome is low, ends-related primary features should be more salient than means-related secondary features, but as the probability of the outcome increases, means-related features may become no less and even more salient than ends-related features. Thus, increases in probability should increase the weight of means-related features relative to the weight of ends-related features in decisions, thereby decreasing (or even reversing) the preference for a more desirable/less feasible outcome over a less desirable/more feasible outcome. We observed this pattern in two experiments. Analyses of judgments, monetary decisions, and self-reported reasons for decisions showed that the weight of means-related features was more sensitive to changes in probability than the weight of ends-related features in decisions.