Configural Frequency Analysis in Applied Psychological Research

L'Analyse de Fréquence des Configurations (AFC) est une méthode de recherche des classes et anticlasses dans les classifications croisées de catégories de variables. Les classes sont des modèles de catégories de variables qui apparaissent plus souvent que le hasard ne le laisse supposes. Les anticlasses sont des modèles de catégorie de variables qui apparaissent moins souvent que le hasard ne le laisse supposes. On présente quatre applications d'AFC: l'AFC de premier ordre, l'AFC prédictive, l'AFC de symétrie axiale, et un modèle d'AFC longitudinale. On examine les caractéristiques de l'AFC en insistant sur les contraintes et l'applicabilité. On compare aussi l'AFC avec d'autres méthodes permettant l'analyse multivariée de catégories de données, en particulier la modèlisation log-linéaire. Des sorties informatiques sont traitées.
Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA) is a method for the search for types and antitypes in cross-classifications of categorical variables. Types are patterns of variable categories that occur more often than expected from chance. Antitypes are patterns of variable categories that occur less often than expected from chance. Four applications of CFA are reviewed: the First Order CFA, the Prediction CFA, Axial Symmetry CFA, and one model of Longitudinal CFA. Characteristics of CFA are discussed, focusing on constraints posed and applicability. Comparisons are made of CFA with other methods for multivariate analysis of categorical data, in particular, log-linear modelling. Computational issues are discussed.     

Creative Fixation is No Laughing Matter: The Effects of Funny and Unfunny Examples on Humor Production

How do people come up with humorous ideas? In creative cognition research, exposure to good examples sometimes causes fixation (people get “stuck” on the examples) but other times sparks inspiration (people's responses are more creative). The present research examined the effects of funny and unfunny examples on joke production. A sample of 175 adults read scenarios that they completed with funny responses. All participants were instructed to be funny, but before responding they read (a) funny responses as examples of good responses to emulate, (b) unfunny responses as examples of poor responses to avoid, or (c) no examples. The participants’ own responses were rated for funniness and for similarity to the example responses, and response times were recorded. Reading either funny or unfunny examples, compared to no examples, caused people to come up with funnier jokes. Similarity to the examples was low in all conditions, so fixation was relatively modest, but people who saw unfunny examples spent more time coming up with their responses. Taken together, the findings support the growing literature showing that examples are often inspiring rather than constraining, and they imply that good and bad examples spark creative thought via different paths.     

‘Very Truly,I Tell You,Before Abraham was,I am’: A Theological Treatise on the Concept of Time in John’s Gospel

This essay analyses temporal peculiarity in John’s Gospel, identified as eschatological and narratological in nature. Part one employs historical‐critical and literary‐critical exegesis to explain the interrelation and function of these peculiarities, while part two derives a temporal metaphysic from the exegesis to explain the concept of time in the Gospel. This exposition is used to make sense of the Gospel’s claim that the one who possesses eternal life will never die. The essay concludes that the Gospel’s future and realised eschatology act as reflections of one another, and argues that the future eschatological scheme functions as a distension of the realised scheme.     

Two Kinds of Logical Impossibility

In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic.