Introduction to Bayesian Inference for Psychology

We introduce the fundamental tenets of Bayesian inference, which derive from two basic laws of probability theory. We cover the interpretation of probabilities, discrete and continuous versions of Bayes’ rule, parameter estimation, and model comparison. Using seven worked examples, we illustrate these principles and set up some of the technical background for the rest of this special issue of Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. Supplemental material is available via https://osf.io/wskex/.     

Group Dynamics In The State Of Nature

One common interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature views itas a social dilemma, a natural extension of the well-knownprisoner's dilemma to a group context. Kavka (1986)challenges this interpretation, suggesting that the appropriate wayto view the state of nature is as a quasi social dilemma. Iargue that Hobbes's remarks on the rationality of keeping covenantsin the state of nature indicate that the quasi social dilemma doesnot accurately represent the state of nature. One possiblesolution, I suggest, views the state of nature as a social dilemmabetween groups rather than individuals. Although thiscleanly represents the strategic problem faced in the state ofnature, it also means we should take intergroup dynamics intoaccount when putting forth a solution. I argue that Hobbes'ssolution of commonwealth by institution – the favored solution forHobbesian social contract theories – will not work in the state ofnature viewed this way.     

On Wright's Argument against Deflationism

I consider Crispin Wright's much discussed 'inflationary' argument against deflationism about truth. I identify a principle apparently involved in it, which I call Wright's principle, and present Wright's argument with the following dilemma. If Wright's principle is sound, the deflationist has a straightforward rejoinder to Wright's argument. If Wright's principle is unsound, the central part of Wright's argument, concerned with how 'true' commutes with the negation operator, is rendered superfluous. I conclude that Wright's argument is either a straightforward failure or completely otiose.     

Processing of indexical information requires time: Evidence from change deafness

Studies of change detection have increased our understanding of attention, perception, and memory. In two innovative experiments we showed that the change detection phenomenon can be used to examine other areas of cognition-specifically, the processing of linguistic and indexical information in spoken words. One hypothesis suggests that cognitive resources must be used to process indexical information, whereas an alternative suggests that it is processed more slowly than linguistic information. Participants performed a lexical decision task and were asked whether the voice presenting the stimuli changed. Nonwords varying in their likeness to real words were used in the lexical decision task to encourage participants to vary the amount of cognitive resources/processing time. More cognitive resources/processing time are required to make a lexical decision with word-like nonwords. Participants who heard word-like nonwords were more likely to detect the change when it occurred (Experiment 1) and were more confident that the voice was the same when it did not change (Experiment 2). These results suggest that indexical information is processed more slowly than linguistic information and demonstrate how change detection can provide insight to other areas of cognition.