Color realism and color science

The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically, types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical objects are not colored, and that the colors are "subjective" or "in the mind." The article has two other purposes: First, to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to some distinctively philosophical tools that are useful in tackling the problem of color realism and, second, to clarify the various positions and central arguments in the debate. The first part explains the problem of color realism and makes some useful distinctions. These distinctions are then used to expose various confusions that often prevent people from seeing that the issues are genuine and difficult, and that the problem of color realism ought to be of interest to anyone working in the field of color science. The second part explains the various leading answers to the problem of color realism, and (briefly) argues that all views other than our own have serious difficulties or are unmotivated. The third part explains and motivates our own view, that colors are types of reflectances and defends it against objections made in the recent literature that are often taken as fatal.     

Relationship of depression and anxiety to cancer patients' medical decision-making

The purpose of this study was to examine the relation of depression and anxiety to cancer patients' medical decision-making. Participants were 79 rural and urban cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy. The four decisional styles of the Decisional Processing Model were the independent variables. Dependent variables were anxiety and depression, measured by Spielberger's State-Trait Anxiety and the Center for Disease Control Depression Scale, respectively. Consistent with the Decisional Processing Model, analysis suggested that patients make medical decisions by information seeking, information processing, advice following, or ruminating. Decisional style did not vary according to type or stage of cancer, prognosis, time elapsed since initial diagnosis, or whether cancer was initial or recurrent. Decisional style did not systematically vary with depression and anxiety suggesting how a person makes decisions is a stable personality trait. Thus, decision-making may follow a cognitive schema. It is likely that patients' decisional styles help to manage anxiety and depression when confronted with life-threatening illness. Implications for informed consent and patients' involvement in decision-making are discussed.     

Values and behavior: strength and structure of relations

Three studies address unresolved issues in value-behavior relations. Does the full range of different values relate to common, recurrent behaviors? Which values relate more strongly to behavior than others? Do relations among different values and behaviors exhibit a meaningful overall structure? If so, how to explain this? We find that stimulation and tradition values relate strongly to the behaviors that express them; hedonism, power, universalism, and self-direction values relate moderately; and security, conformity, achievement, and benevolence values relate only marginally. Additional findings suggest that these differences in value-behavior relations may stem from normative pressures to perform certain behaviors. Such findings imply that values motivate behavior, but the relation between values and behaviors is partly obscured by norms. Relations among behaviors, among values, and jointly among values and behavior exhibit a similar structure. The motivational conflicts and congruities postulated by the theory of values can account for this shared structure.     

Physical imagery: kinematic versus dynamic models.

Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e. g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influence physical imagery.     

It takes two to fight: a test of relational factors and a method for assessing aggressive dyads.

Observations of aggressive interactions in boys' laboratory play groups were used to evaluate the relative importance of relational and individual factors in accounting for aggressive acts. A classroom peer-rating method for identifying mutually aggressive dyads was validated in 11 5-session play groups, composed of 2 mutually aggressive boys and 4 randomly selected male classmates from 11 predominately African American 3rd-grade classrooms. When the social relations model was used, relationship effects accounted for equally as much of the variance in total aggression and proactive aggression as either actor or target effects. Mutually aggressive dyads displayed twice as much total aggression as randomly selected dyads. Members of mutually aggressive dyads attributed greater hostile intentions toward each other than did randomly selected dyads, which may serve to explain their greater aggression toward each other. The importance of studying relational factors, including social histories and social-cognitive processes, is discussed.     

Measuring infant spatial working memory using a modified delayed-response procedure

Infant spatial working memory was assessed in 96 nine-month-old human infants using a modification of the delayed-response procedure. A person was the hidden stimulus, gaze was used as the response modality, the response context was a naturalistic "peek-a-boo" game, and a salient cue (i.e. curtains opening to reveal two windows) was used to evoke responses. Infants responded on most trials and performed significantly above chance in delay conditions of 10 and 20 seconds. Reinforcement affected performance, but performance was above chance even in a 0% reinforcement condition. These procedural variations boost estimates of infant spatial working memory over previous estimates and enhance the usefulness of the delayed-response procedure as a marker task for infant spatial working memory.     

The semantic side of decision making

The research reported in this paper follows the perspective that decision making is a meaningful act that conveys information. Furthermore, the potential meanings associated with decision options may affect the decisions themselves. This idea is examined in the contexts of compensation, donation, and exchange. In general, judgments were relation dependent and meaning dependent. Furthermore, the results show nonmonotonicities and limited substitutability in a pattern that challenges straightforward ways of mapping decisions onto a common currency of utility.     

The Powerful Other: How Divine Control Shapes the Relationship Between Personal Control and Psychological Distress

In the sociological study of mental health, the sense of personal control represents a core psychological resource, but some studies document a curvilinear association between personal control and depressive symptoms. This body of research is largely secular in orientation, even though research also demonstrates that some individuals believe in an involved and engaged Powerful Other (e.g., God). We evaluate if such beliefs moderate the relationship between personal control and depression. Using data from the 2005 Work, Stress, and Health Study in the United States (N = 1,791), we first demonstrate that the sense of personal control has an overall curvilinear association with depression, in line with previous research. Then, we document that divine control beliefs modify this association such that the curvilinear association is found primarily among individuals with low levels of divine control. By contrast, among those who more strongly endorse divine control, we observe no relationship between personal control and depression. We situate our findings in the differing and complicated perspectives on the implications of religious beliefs for psychological resources and well‐being.