Understanding Implicit Bias: Putting the Criticism into Perspective

What is the status of research on implicit bias? In light of meta-analyses revealing ostensibly low average correlations between implicit measures and behavior, as well as various other psychometric concerns, criticism has become ubiquitous. We argue that while there are significant challenges and ample room for improvement, research on the causes, psychological properties, and behavioral effects of implicit bias continues to deserve a role in the sciences of the mind as well as in efforts to understand, and ultimately combat, discrimination and inequality.     

Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?

In discussions of whether and how pragmatic considerations can make a difference to what one ought to believe, two sets of cases feature. The first set, which dominates the debate about pragmatic reasons for belief, is exemplified by cases of being financially bribed to believe (or withhold from believing) something. The second set, which dominates the debate about pragmatic encroachment on epistemic justification, is exemplified by cases where acting on a belief rashly risks some disastrous outcome if the belief turns out to be false. Call those who think that pragmatic considerations make a difference to what one ought to believe in the second kind of case, but not in the first, ‘moderate pragmatists’. Many philosophers – in particular, most advocates of pragmatic and moral encroachment – are moderate pragmatists. But moderate pragmatists owe us an explanation of exactly why the second kind of pragmatic consideration makes a difference, but the first kind doesn’t. I argue that the most promising of these explanations all fail: they are either theoretically undermotivated, or get key cases wrong, or both. Moderate pragmatism may be an unstable stopping point between a more extreme pragmatism, on one hand, and an uncompromising anti-pragmatism on the other.     

Implicit Bias,Moods, and Moral Responsibility

Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘introspectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of partial awareness for individuals' moral responsibility. First, I argue that responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals' partial awareness of their implicit biases makes them (partially) morally responsible for them. I argue by analogy to a close relative of implicit bias: moods.     

Difficult Differences: A Socio‐cultural Analysis of How Diversity Can Enable and Inhibit Creativity

The relationship between diversity and creativity can be seen as paradoxical. A diversity of perspectives should be advantageous for collaborative creativity, yet its benefits are often offset by adverse social processes. One suggestion for overcoming these negative effects is perspective taking. We compared four dyads with low scores on trait perspective taking with four dyads who were high on trait perspective taking on a brainstorming task followed by reconstructive interviews. Trait‐based perspective taking was strongly associated with greater creativity. However, contrary with expectation, interactional perspective taking behaviors (including questioning, signaling understanding, repairing) were associated with lesser creativity. The dyads that generated the fewest ideas were most likely to get stuck within ideational domains, struggling to understand one‐another, having to elaborate and justify their ideas more. In contrast, the dyads that generated many ideas were more likely to recognize each other's ideas as valuable without extensive justification or negotiation. We suggest that perspective taking is crucially important for mediating diversity in the generation of new ideas not only because it enables understanding the perspective of the other, but because it entails an atmosphere of tolerance, playfulness, and mutual recognition.     

Sharing Positive Experiences Boosts Resilient Thinking: Everyday Benefits of Social Connection and Positive Emotion in a Community Sample

The influence of shared enjoyment and positive affect (PA) on resilient thinking was examined in 191 middle‐aged adults (40–65 years), participating in a study of resilience. Participants completed diaries assessing positive events, shared enjoyment, PA, and resilient cognitions (RC). Multilevel structural equation modeling was utilized to examine when and who engages in RC. Participants reported more RC on days they experienced more positive experiences. This relationship was explained by shared enjoyment and PA. Level‐1 proportional reduction of variance (PRV) for shared enjoyment, PA, and RC was 9%, 10%, and 35%, respectively. Individuals reporting more positive experiences trended toward a more resilient mindset; PA accounted for this relationship. Shared enjoyment mediated the relationship between interpersonal events and PA. These findings suggest PA is integral to having a resilient mindset, and shared enjoyment is a potential mechanism that may influence PA. Level‐2 PRV for shared enjoyment, PA, and RC was 22%, 21%, and 55%, respectively. RC were associated with less depression and anxiety; and greater well‐being, vitality, and physical functioning at follow‐up.     

The unique influence of attachment to god on forgiveness among incarcerated males

Religious constructs associated with forgiveness are understudied among incarcerated males. Attachment and forgiveness theory supported hypotheses that attachment to God would uniquely influence forgiveness, controlling for other biopsychosocial resources in regression modeling. Results, utilizing data collected from 261 male prison inmates, ages 45 to 82, demonstrated that each of three blocks of predictors explained significant amounts of variance in forgiveness: (1) biological and control variables; (2) social support and positive evaluation of life; and (3) attachment to God. The final model explained 53.7% of the total variance. Discussion focuses on the use of attachment to God and forgiveness assessments.     

Examining the Unique Characteristics of a Non-Probability Sample of Undocumented Female Sex Workers with Dependent Children: The Case of Haitians in the Dominican Republic

Haitians in the Dominican Republic (DR) are increasingly marginalized due to recent legislation that stripped Haitian-Dominicans of their citizenship and increased Haitian migrants’ deportation risk. Haitian female sex workers (FSWs) are particularly vulnerable, though little is known about them. This study will help public health efforts targeted at sex workers to better reach Haitian FSWs and address their needs by identifying a profile of characteristics unique to this group compared to Dominican FSWs. Data were collected in 2014 among Haitian and Dominican FSWs in Puerto Plata, DR. Surveys assessed respondents’ demographics, health consciousness, depression, and stigma. Adjusted logistic regressions showed that Haitian FSWs were disadvantaged: they had significantly lower rates of education, more children, and less permanent income. Furthermore, Haitian FSWs were more likely to work independently and for fewer hours. Interestingly, Haitian FSWs internalized less stigma than Dominicans. Though we can only speculate, this could be due to migration for sex work, or the lack of formal employment for Haitians. Initiatives to alleviate poverty, create formal jobs, and overturn discriminatory legislation may have the most impact for Haitian FSWs.     

‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All

Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are (a) that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and (b) that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails on its own terms. ‘Ought’ and ‘can’ do not obey the negation test for presupposition, and they do not obey the calculability or the cancelability tests for conversational implicature. I diagnose these failures as partly a result of the importance of the contrapositive of ‘ought implies can’. I end with a final argument emphasizing the role the principle plays in moral thinking, and the fact that no pragmatic account can do it justice.