Modified Taylor Complex Figure: Normative data from 290 adults

Data for copying and delayed recall (after a 15‐min delay) of the Modified Taylor Complex Figure (MTCF), an alternative form of the Rey‐Osterrieth Complex Figure (ROCF), were collected from 290 healthy participants. Normative data are provided. Age and education were significantly correlated with MTCF scores and must be corrected for to interpret results accurately. More specifically, increasing age adversely affected performance, whereas a higher education resulted in a better performance. Twenty‐five participants were tested with both complex figures (MTCF and ROCF) in two separate sessions to assess correlation, which proved to be high. The collected data allow using the MTCF as a valid alternative material for testing visual long‐term memory avoiding implicit learning that can occur when the same version of the ROCF is used for repeated testing sessions.     

Nietzsche on the Diachronic Will and the Problem of Morality

In this paper I offer an innovative interpretation of Nietzsche's metaethical theory of value which shows him to be a kind of constitutivist. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude which institutes values, rather than tracking what is independently of value. What is characteristic of those acts of willing which institute values is that they are owned or authored. Nietzsche makes this point using the vocabulary of self‐mastery. One crucial feature of those who have achieved this feat, and have consequently become agents, is that they possess a diachronic or long will and are consequently capable of the rational governance of future behaviour. The possession of a will of this sort is crucial because it is a necessary condition for engaging in temporally unified activities which are a requisite of authorship. Nietzsche, I argue, makes these points in his doctrine of eternal recurrence which provides a test that acts of will must pass to count as laws. In the final section of the paper I argue for the superiority of this interpretation over some of its competitors.     

On feeling good at work: the role of regulatory mode and passion in psychological adjustment

The major postulate of this work is that regulatory modes influence the type of passion people experience with regard to an activity, which in turn influences their psychological adjustment. Integrating regulatory mode theory and the dualistic model of passion, we hypothesized that locomotion—associated with intrinsic and autonomous motivations—would positively predict harmonious passion, which in turn would enhance workers' psychological adjustment. In contrast, we hypothesized that assessment—associated with extrinsic and non‐autonomous motivations—would positively predict obsessive passion, which in turn would reduce workers' psychological adjustment. Two field studies supported these hypotheses with psychological adjustment measures of stress (Study 1) and burnout (Study 2) in different work contexts.     

Incommensurability,Comparability, and Non-reductive Ontological Relations

We begin by highlighting some points related to Kuhn’s later thoughts on the incommensurability thesis and then show to what extent the standard version of the thesis given by the structuralist metatheory allows us to capture Kuhn’s ideas. Our main aim is to establish what constitutes the basis of comparability between incommensurable theories, even in cases of incommensurability with respect to theoretical and non-theoretical terms. We propose that comparability between (radical) incommensurable theories requires some connection between their respective ontologies that can be captured by means of an ontological non-reductive relation. At this point, the structuralist notion of “echeloned partial substructure” may be of help. When the incommensurability is very drastic, the existence of ontological connections between the theories involved may only be evident by common terms of their non-characteristic vocabularies. So, this notion of non-characteristic vocabulary becomes relevant in our proposal.     

Illness Perception and Well-Being Among Persons with Multiple Sclerosis and Their Caregivers

This study jointly examined illness beliefs held by persons with multiple sclerosis (PwMS) and caregivers in relation to well-being. A group of 68 PwMS and their caregivers completed the Revised Illness Perception Questionnaire, Psychological Well-being Scales, Satisfaction with Life Scale and Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule. Findings revealed that PwMS’ well-being was primarily predicted by their own illness beliefs, and that also caregivers’ well-being was primarily predicted by their own beliefs. Across the two groups, well-being was positively associated with their belief that they understood the disease, and inversely associated with their representations of negative emotions. In addition, among PwMS, well-being was inversely associated with the number of symptoms they specifically attributed to their illness, while among caregivers, well-being was positively associated with beliefs that treatment could control the disease. Based on the study findings, psychoeducational and cognitive-behavioral strategies are suggested to promote well-being among PwMS and caregivers.     

An Epistemic Argument for Conservatism

‘Epistemic’ arguments for conservatism typically claim that given the limits of human reason, we are better off accepting some particular social practice or institution rather than trying to consciously improve it. I critically examine and defend here one such argument, claiming that there are some domains of social life in which, given the limits of our knowledge and the complexity of the social world, we ought to defer to those institutions that have robustly endured in a wide variety of circumstances in the past while not being correlated with intolerable outcomes. These are domains of social life in which our ignorance of optimal institutions is radical, and there is uncertainty (rather than quantifiable risk) about the costs of error. This is an argument for the preservation of particular institutions, not particular policies or outcomes, and it specifically identifies these with the institutions that John Rawls called ‘the basic structure of society.’ The argument further implies that to the extent that there is any reason to change these institutions, changes should be calculated as far as possible to increase their ‘epistemic power.’