Transdiagnostic assessment of temporal experience (TATE) a tool for assessing abnormal time experiences

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Currently, anomalous lived temporality is not included in the main diagnostic criteria or standard symptom checklists. In this article, we present the...     

Logical Metonymy Resolution in a Words‐as‐Cues Framework: Evidence From Self‐Paced Reading and Probe Recognition

Logical metonymy resolution (begin a book → begin writing a book) has traditionally been explained either through complex lexical entries (qualia structures) or through the integration of the implicit event via post‐lexical access to world knowledge. We propose that recent work within the words‐as‐cues paradigm can provide a more dynamic model of logical metonymy, accounting for early and dynamic integration of complex event information depending on previous contextual cues (agent and patient). We first present a self‐paced reading experiment on German subordinate sentences, where metonymic sentences and their paraphrased version differ only in the presence or absence of the clause‐final target verb (Der Konditor begann die Glasur → Der Konditor begann, die Glasur spreading the icing). Longer reading times at the target verb position in a high‐typicality condition (baker + icing → spread ) suggest that we make use of knowledge activated by lexical cues to build expectations about events. The early and dynamic integration of event knowledge in metonymy interpretation is bolstered by further evidence from a second experiment using the probe recognition paradigm. Presenting covert events as probes following a high‐typicality or a low‐typicality metonymic sentence (Der Konditor begann die Glasur → SPREAD ), we obtain an analogous effect of typicality at 100 ms interstimulus interval.     

Sex differences in aversive memory in rats: Possible role of extinction and reactive emotional factors

Studies usually show better spatial learning in males and stronger emotional memory in females. Spatial memory differences could relate to diverse strategies, while dissimilar stress reactions could cause emotional memory differences. We compared male and female rats in two emotional (classical emotional conditioning and aversive discrimination memory) and two emotionally “neutral” tasks: (1) plus-maze discriminative avoidance, containing two open and two enclosed arms, one of which presenting aversive stimuli (light/noise). No differences were found in learning, retrieving, or basal emotional levels, while only male rats presented extinction of the task; (2) contextual fear conditioning – a cage was paired to mild foot shocks. Upon reexposure, freezing behavior was decreased in females; (3) spontaneous alternation – the animals were expected to alternate among the arms of a four-arm maze. No differences between genders were found and (4) open-field habituation was addressed in an arena which the rats were allowed to explore for 10 min. Habituation was similar between genders. Differences were found only in tasks with strong emotional contexts, where different fear responses and stress effects could be determinant. The lack of extinction of discriminative avoidance by females points out to stronger consolidation and/or impaired extinction of aversive memories.     

The influence of responsibility and guilt on naive hypothesis-testing

Three experiments were used to investigate individuals' hypothesis-testing process as a function of moral perceived utilities, which in turn depend on perceived responsibility and fear of guilt. Moral perceived utilities are related to individuals' moral standards and specifically to people's attempt to face up to their own responsibilities, and to avoid feeling guilty of irresponsibility. The results showed that responsibility and fear of guilt in testing hypotheses involved a process defined as prudential mode, which entails focusing on and confirming the worst hypothesis, and then reiterating the testing process. In particular, the results showed that responsible and guilt-fearing individuals: (1) tended to search prudentially for examples confirming the worst hypothesis and to search for counter-examples falsifying the positive hypothesis; (2) focused on the worst alternative, and tended to confirm it; (3) prudentially kept up the testing process, even if faced with initial positive evidence. Our discussion of the results emphasises how people are largely pragmatic in their hypothesis testing, using efficient cognitive strategies that focus on error minimisation rather than on truth detection. In a context of responsibility and guilt, the errors are linked to people's failure to face up to their own responsibilities, and are thus moral errors.     

Feelings of error in reasoning—in search of a phenomenon

Recent research shows that in reasoning tasks, subjects usually produce an initial intuitive answer, accompanied by a metacognitive experience, which has been called feeling of rightness. This paper is aimed at exploring the complimentary experience of feeling of error (FOE), that is, the spontaneous, subtle sensation of cognitive uneasiness arising from conflict detection during thinking. We investigate FOE in two studies with the “bat-and-ball” (B&B) reasoning task, in its standard and isomorphic control versions. Study 1 is a generation study, in which participants are asked to generate their own response. Study 2 is an evaluation study, in which participants are asked to choose between two conflicting answers (normative vs. intuitive). In each study, the FOE is measured by the FOE questionnaire. Results show that the FOE is significantly present in the standard B&B task when participants give a wrong answer, that our questionnaire can measure it, and furthermore, that it is diagnostic of genuine error.