Moving eyes and moving thought: On the spatial compatibility between eye movements and cognition

Grant and Spivey (2003) proposed that eye movement trajectories can influence spatial reasoning by way of an implicit eye-movement-to-cognition link. We tested this proposal and investigated the nature of this link by continuously monitoring eye movements and asking participants to perform a problem-solving task under free-viewing conditions while occasionally guiding their eye movements (via an unrelated tracking task), either in a pattern related to the problem’s solution or in unrelated patterns. Although participants reported that they were not aware of any relationship between the tracking task and the problem, those who moved their eyes in a pattern related to the problem’s solution were the most successful problem solvers. Our results support the existence of an implicit compatibility between spatial cognition and the eye movement patterns that people use to examine a scene.     

A negative compatibility effect in priming of emotional faces

The negative compatibility effect (NCE) is the surprising result that low-visibility prime arrows facilitate responses to opposite-direction target arrows. Here we compare the priming obtained with simple arrows to the priming of emotions when categorizing human faces, which represents a more naturalistic set of stimuli and for which there are no preexisting response biases. When inverted faces with neutral expressions were presented alongside emotional prime and target faces, only strong positive priming occurred. However, when the neutral faces were made to resemble the target faces in geometry (upright orientation), time (flashing briefly), and space (appearing in the same location), positive priming gradually weakened and became negative priming. Implications for theories of the NCE are discussed.     

The Weak Normalization of the Simply Typed {lambda}se-calculus

In this paper, we show the weak normalization (WN) of the simply-typeds_e-calculus with open terms where abstractions are decoratedwith types, and metavariables, de Bruijn indices and updatingoperators are decorated with environments. We show a proof ofWN using the _e-calculus, a calculus isomorphic to . This proof is strongly influenced by Goubault-Larrecq'sproof of WN for the -calculus but with subtle differences whichshow that the two styles require different attention. Furthermore,we give a new calculus '_e which works like s_e but which iscloser to than _e. For both _e and '_e we prove WN for typedsemi-open terms (i.e. those which allow term variables but nosubstitution variables), unlike the result of Goubault-Larrecqwhich covered all open terms.     

Temporal tuning and attentional gating: Two distinct attentional mechanisms on the perception of rapid serial visual events

We examined the relationship between two different attention limitations on the perception of rapid events: the attentional awakening (AA, an inability to successfully process a target when it appears early on in a rapid stream of events) and the attentional blink (AB, an inability to successfully process a second target when it appears shortly after a first target [T1]). In four experiments, we failed to find a relationship between the magnitudes of these phenomena. Furthermore, we found two manipulations that selectively modulated the magnitude of each effect without altering the magnitude of the second effect: Expected range of possible rapid serial visual presentation lengths modulated the AA (but not the AB), suggesting that the AA reflects an attentional setup cost for perceiving a protracted series of rapid events, whereas the number of possible T1 positions in the stream modulated the magnitude of the AB (but not the magnitude of the AA). Our results suggest that, despite the surface similarities between the two phenomena, different mechanisms are responsible for these two attentional limitations: Whereas the AA reflects a starting cost associated with the time required to temporally tune attention to the stimulus stream, the AB reflects a blocking of undesired stimuli, aimed at protecting consolidation of T1 processing.     

BEAUTY IN THE LIVING WORLD

Almost all admit that there is beauty in the natural world. Many suspect that such beauty is more than an adornment of nature. Few in our contemporary world suggest that this beauty is an empirical principle of the natural world itself and instead relegate beauty to the eye and mind of the beholder. Guided by theological and scientific insight, the authors propose that such exclusion is no longer tenable, at least in the data of modern biology and in our view of the natural world in general. More important, we believe an empirical aesthetics exists that can help guide experimental design and development of computational models in biology. Moreover, because theology and science can both contribute toward and equally profit from such an aesthetics, we propose that this empirical aesthetics provides the foundation for a living synergy between theology and science.     

Covert shifts of attention function as an implicit aid to insight

Previous research shows that directed actions can unconsciously influence higher-order cognitive processing, helping learners to retain knowledge and guiding problem solvers to useful insights (e.g. Cook, S. W., Mitchell, Z., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2008). Gesturing makes learning last. Cognition, 106, 1047-1058; Thomas, L. E., & Lleras, A. (2007). Moving eyes and moving thought: on the spatial compatibility between eye movements and cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, 663-668). We examined whether overt physical movement is necessary for these embodied effects on cognition, or whether covert shifts of attention are sufficient to influence cognition. We asked participants to try to solve Duncker’s radiation problem while occasionally directing them, via an unrelated digit-tracking task, to shift their attention (while keeping their eyes fixed) in a pattern related to the problem’s solution, to move their eyes in this pattern, or to keep their eyes and their attention fixed in the center of the display. Although they reported being unaware of any relationship between the digit-tracking task and the radiation problem, participants in both the eye-movement and attention-shift groups were more likely to solve the problem than were participants who maintained fixation. Our results show that by shifting attention in a pattern compatible with a problem’s solution, we can aid participants’ insight even in the absence of overt physical movements.     

An adaptive approach to resource allocation

Resource allocation tasks require the decision maker to allocate a limited resource (e.g., budget or staff) to competing activities (e.g., commodities or jobs) in order to maximize an explicit objective (e.g., utility or productivity). In contrast to past research that has compared optimal to observed performance, the present study investigated how individuals learn to improve their resource allocation policies from outcome feedback. A total of 64 subjects received 50 training trials under one of four conditions produced by a 2 × 2 factorial design. One factor was the form of the unknown objective function—it had either a single global maximum, or it had a local maximum below the global maximum. The second factor was a manipulation of prior information —subjects were either told the maximum possible objective function value (but not its location), or this information was withheld. Several measures of learning were analyzed including (a) the cumulative proportion of subjects reaching a criterion as a function of training, (b) the path of the resource allocation policies selected across trials, (c) the magnitude of change in allocations as a function of training, and (d) the probability distribution of search directions selected following success and failure. A learning principle called hill-climbing was useful for interpreting the results.     

The Tree of Life: Universal and Cultural Features of Folkbiological Taxonomies and Inductions

Two parallel studies were performed with members of very different cultures—industrialized American and traditional Itzaj-Mayan—to investigate potential universal and cultural features of folkbiological taxonomies and inductions. Specifically, we examined how individuals organize natural categories into taxonomies, and whether they readily use these taxonomies to make inductions about those categories. The results of the first study indicate that there is a cultural consensus both among Americans and the Itzaj in their taxonomies of local mammal species, and that these taxonomies resemble and depart from a corresponding scientific taxonomy in similar ways. However, cultural differences are also shown, such as a greater differentiation and more ecological considerations in Itzaj taxonomies. In a second study, Americans and the Itzaj used their taxonomies to guide similarity- and typicality-based inductions. These inductions converge and diverge crossculturally and regarding scientific inductions where their respective taxonomies do. These findings reveal some universal features of folkbiological inductions, but they also reveal some cultural features such as diversity-based inductions among Americans, and ecologically based inductions among the Itzaj. Overall, these studies suggest that while building folkbiological taxonomies and using them for folkbiological inductions is a universal competence of human cognition there are also important cultural constraints on that competence.