Training generalized spatial skills

Spatial transformation skills are an essential aspect of cognitive ability. These skills can be improved by practice, but such improvement has usually been specific to tasks and stimuli. The present study investigated whether intensive long-term practice leads to change that transcends stimulus and task parameters. Thirty-one participants (14 male, 17 female) were tested on three cognitive tasks: a computerized version of the Shepard-Metzler (1971) mental rotation task (MRT), a mental paper-folding task (MPFT), and a verbal analogies task (VAT). Each individual then participated in daily practice sessions with the MRT or the MPFT over 21 days. Postpractice comparisons revealed transfer of practice gains to novel stimuli for the practiced task, as well as transfer to the other, nonpracticed spatial task. Thus, practice effects were process based, not instance based. Improvement in the nonpracticed spatial task was greater than that in the VAT; thus, improvement was not merely due to greater ease with computerized testing.     

Metaphysical Realism and Objectivity: Some Theoretical Reflections

In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed.     

Detour behaviour in three species of birds: quails (Coturnix sp.), herring gulls (Larus cachinnans) and canaries (Serinus canaria)

Detour behaviour is the ability of an animal to reach a goal stimulus by moving round any interposed obstacle. It has been widely studied and has been proposed as a test of insight learning in several species of mammals, but few data are available in birds. A comparative study in three species of birds, belonging to different eco-ethological niches, allows a better understanding of the cognitive mechanism of such detour behaviour. Young quails (Coturnix sp.), herring gulls (Larus cachinnans) and canaries (Serinus canaria), 1 month old, 10–25 days old and 4–6 months old, respectively, were tested in a detour situation requiring them to abandon a clear view of a biologically interesting object (their own reflection in a mirror) in order to approach that object. Birds were placed in a closed corridor, at one end of which was a barrier through which the object was visible. Four different types of barrier were used: vertical bar, horizontal bar, grid and transparent. Two symmetrical apertures placed midline in the corridor allowed the birds to adopt routes passing around the barrier. After entering the apertures, birds could turn either right or left to re-establish social contact with the object in the absence of any local sensory cues emanating from it. Quails appeared able to solve the task, though their performance depended on the type of barrier used, which appeared to modulate their relative interest in approaching the object or in exploring the surroundings. Young herring gulls also showed excellent abilities to locate spatially the out-of-view object, except when the transparent barrier was used. Canaries, on the other hand, appeared completely unable to solve the detour task, whatever barrier was in use. It is suggested that these species differences can be accounted for in terms of adaptation to a terrestrial or aerial environment.     

Sharing

This paper addresses the status of the act of sharing a message in a social network. Scholars do not agree on what kind of act sharing is and what kind of communicative and illocutionary act is performed when a post is shared. We defend the view that sharing is an act similar to photocopying and distributing a document. Such an act is a basic act that can be used for communicative aims in certain contexts but that is not necessarily communicative. One can repost for several reasons—to manifest agreement or derision, to inform, to please the author, to show activity on social networks, to have an economic return—and only some of them are communicative. However, even when reposters do not perform a communicative act, they are not relieved of every responsibility; in fact, the responsibilities of reposters are like those of the persons who copy and distribute something.     

Self-motion perception and vestibulo-ocular reflex during whole body yaw rotation in standing subjects: the role of head position and neck proprioception

Self-motion perception and vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR) were studied during whole body yaw rotation in the dark at different static head positions. Rotations consisted of four cycles of symmetric sinusoidal and asymmetric oscillations. Self-motion perception was evaluated by measuring the ability of subjects to manually track a static remembered target. VOR was recorded separately and the slow phase eye position (SPEP) was computed. Three different head static yaw deviations (active and passive) relative to the trunk (0°, 45° to right and 45° to left) were examined. Active head deviations had a significant effect during asymmetric oscillation: the movement perception was enhanced when the head was kept turned toward the side of body rotation and decreased in the opposite direction. Conversely, passive head deviations had no effect on movement perception. Further, vibration (100 Hz) of the neck muscles splenius capitis and sternocleidomastoideus remarkably influenced perceived rotation during asymmetric oscillation. On the other hand, SPEP of VOR was modulated by active head deviation, but was not influenced by neck muscle vibration. Through its effects on motion perception and reflex gain, head position improved gaze stability and enhanced self-motion perception in the direction of the head deviation.     

Is the face-perception system human-specific at birth?

The present study investigates the human-specificity of the orienting system that allows neonates to look preferentially at faces. Three experiments were carried out to determine whether the face-perception system that is present at birth is broad enough to include both human and nonhuman primate faces. The results demonstrate that the newborns did not show any spontaneous visual preference for the human face when presented simultaneously with a monkey face that shared the same features, configuration, and low-level perceptual properties (Experiment 1). The newborns were, however, able to discriminate between the 2 faces belonging to the 2 different species (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, the newborns were found to prefer looking at an upright, compared with an inverted, monkey face, as they do for human faces. Overall, the results demonstrate that newborns perceive monkey and human faces in a similar way. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the system underlying face preference at birth is broad enough to bias newborns' attention toward both human and nonhuman primate faces.     

Ideal Objects for Set Theory

Journal of Philosophical Logic - In this paper, we argue for an instrumental form of existence, inspired by Hilbert’s method of ideal elements. As a case study, we consider the existence of...     

Staring us in the face? An embodied theory of innate face preference

Human expertise in face perception grows over development, but even within minutes of birth, infants exhibit an extraordinary sensitivity to face‐like stimuli. The dominant theory accounts for innate face detection by proposing that the neonate brain contains an innate face detection device, dubbed ‘Conspec’. Newborn face preference has been promoted as some of the strongest evidence for innate knowledge, and forms a canonical stage for the modern form of the nature–nurture debate in psychology. Interpretation of newborn face preference results has concentrated on monocular stimulus properties, with little mention or focused investigation of potential binocular involvement. However, the question of whether and how newborns integrate the binocular visual streams bears directly on the generation of observable visual preferences. In this theoretical paper, we employ a synthetic approach utilizing robotic and computational models to draw together the threads of binocular integration and face preference in newborns, and demonstrate cases where the former may explain the latter. We suggest that a system‐level view considering the binocular embodiment of newborn vision may offer a mutually satisfying resolution to some long‐running arguments in the polarizing debate surrounding the existence and causal structure of newborns' ‘innate knowledge’ of faces.