<Emphasis Type="Italic">On Seeing</Emphasis>: Remarks on Metzger’s Laws of Seeing

Nowadays cognitive science often views sensorial presentations and mental presentations as mutually exclusive, and they are also given separate treatment by neurophysiologists and by cognitive scientists, and some phenomena (like anomalous surfaces or various types of imagery) are reduced to either the former or the latter. Since no adequate methods for its investigation have been developed, the level of perceptual experiences analysed by Gestaltists and magnificently illustrated by Metzger in his Laws of Seeing remains unexplored. Starting from Metzger’s analyses the paper deals with the question of the theoretical value of experimental phenomenology to the theory of knowledge and ontology.     

Dissecting Intentionality in the Lab: Meinong’s Theory

Besides presenting a phenomenological-experimental analysis of consciousness, Meinong challenged one of the major indisputable axioms of current scientific research, i.e. that perception in awareness has to be veridical on the stimulus. Meinong’s analysis of consciousness, which he conducted through a kind of dissection of its structures from a systematic and an experimental viewpoint, offers relevant insights to contemporary consciousness studies.     

Does monocular visual space contain planes?

The issue of the existence of planes—understood as the carriers of a nexus of straight lines—in the monocular visual space of a stationary human observer has never been addressed. The most recent empirical data apply to binocular visual space and date from the 1960s (Foley, 1964). This appears to be both the first and the last time this basic issue was addressed empirically. Yet the question is of considerable conceptual interest. Here we report on a direct empirical test of the existence of planes in monocular visual space for a group of sixteen experienced observers. For the majority of these observers monocular visual space lacks a projective structure, albeit in qualitatively different ways. This greatly reduces the set of viable geometrical models. For example, it rules out all the classical homogeneous spaces (the Cayley-Klein geometries) such as the familiar Luneburg model. The qualitatively different behavior of experienced observers implies that the generic population might well be inhomogeneous with respect to the structure of visual space.     

From Kanizsa Back to Benussi: Varieties of Intentional Reference

The essay analyses the mereological structure of an act of intentional presentation, on the basis of Benussi' and Kanizsa's works. Several aspects are discussed, among which: The existence of diverse formats of representation, their eventual continuity, the presence of subjective integrations at primary levels, and the identification of phrases in the phenomenic structure of an act of presentation. It is argued that the difference between perceptual and mental presence, as elaborated by Kanizsa, proves to be a valid instrument for the categorial analysis of phenomenic appearances.     

Images, Spaces, Representations

The contribution deals with some key problems of cognitive science, whose plurality transcends the boundaries of the disciplines drawn by classical epistemology. In particular, it addresses the issues of mental images, spaces of representation, and the architecture of cognitive processes in vision theory. The thesis presented is that a proper treatment of vision within psychophysics entails an analysis of a series of interconnected spaces, objects and methodologies, from psychophysics to the many virtual realities of representation.