Measuring health status and quality of life in HIV and AIDS

Abstract

HIV can diminish quality of life profoundly, and it is important to understand and measure such effects of HIV and its treatments Although the term quality of life is commonly used, “health status” more accurately describes dimensions that are directly health related and that may be affected by traditional interventions. There is a substantial literature on general health status measurement, and several of the most established measures have been applied or adapted for use in HIV infected populations These measures include the Medical Outcomes Study health ratings, the Quality of Well-Being scale, and the Sickness Impact Profile. Cancer-specific measures such as the EORTC Quality of Life Core Questionnaire and the CARES have also been adapted. In the last three years, health status measures for HIV have been completed by several thousand patients, and have generally proved to be reliable and valid indicators of relevant clinical differences such as disease stage, numbers of symptoms, and other psychometic measures of disability and distress. Health status measures were included in a few completed clinical trials, and are being incorporated in a growing number of antiretroviral and antimicrobial studies. Health status measures provide the best way to evaluate psychosocial interventions directly aimed at improving patients' quality of life. Although challenges remain in further developing health status measures for HIV disease and in applying them, measurement of these concepts has proved to be both technically and operationally feasible. Measures of health status and quality of life can play an important role in the evaluation of clinical treatments in research studies, directing clinical treatment, assessing changes in health care delivery, and planning health care services.     

The Burden of Criticism: Consequences of Taking a Critical Stance

Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convincingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of “directiveness” that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether there are normative requirements that enhance the directiveness of criticism. Does the opponent have in circumstances a dialectical obligation to provide clarifications, explanations, or even arguments? In this paper, it is hypothesized that the competitiveness inherent in critical discussion must be mitigated by making the opponent responsible for providing her counterconsiderations, if available, thus assisting the proponent in developing an argumentative strategy that defuses them.     

Actuality and the a priori

Book Information Nietzsche's Middle Period. Nietzsche's Middle Period Ruth Abbey New York Oxford University Press 2000 xvii + 208 Hardback £33.50 By Ruth Abbey. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. xvii + 208. Hardback:£33.50,     

“Scatter Analysis” Techniques Applied to Anxiety Neurotics from a Restricted Culturo-Educational Environment

Hearing-impaired children were individually administered a task in which possession of accumulating candy rewards was made contingent upon the child's decision to stop any further accumulation of the candy. Hearing-impaired children, who under instruction periodically made American Sign Language (ASL) statements about the goodness of the reward, waited significantly longer before terminating the waiting period than did hearing-impaired children instructed to sign statements about the act of waiting and somewhat longer than did hearing-impaired children instructed to sign a neutral statement. Since the pattern of delay was unlike that reported in earlier investigations when nonhandicapped children verbalized similar statements and since variation in mode of communication did not influence delay in nonhandicapped children in the present investigation, the results were interpreted in terms of differences in cognitive controlling mechanisms between nonhandicapped and hearing-impaired children.     

Departures From Sensible Play in Computer Blackjack

Gambling has been viewed as irrational, and even though blackjack offers rational strategies (i.e., Basic [E. Thorp, 1966] and card counting), people exhibit departures from rationality (e.g., “Never Bust” strategies). To determine whether departures from rational behavior reflect ignorance or fatigue, university students were provided with on-line Basic advice while playing a simplified computer blackjack. Although the on-line advice initially affected the totals these players sat on, it was eventually discarded for higher risk strategies. Irrational play did not reflect ignorance or fatigue and was not necessarily conservative. Real fluctuations of odds in blackjack may lead to situations in which Basic is not perceived by players as effective. Because Basic is not a personalized strategy, it seems less likely to be maintained in the face of losses. Players were more optimistic that they might win when utilizing their personalized strategies.     

Ethical beliefs and behaviors in applied sport psychology: The AAASP ethics survey

Abstract

AAASP members (N = 508) were surveyed to obtain preliminary data on ethical beliefs and behaviors specific to the practice of applied sport psychology. Completed surveys were received from 165 individuals. On the structured response portion of the survey, there were few differences in ethical beliefs and behaviors as a function of gender, professional/student status, and academic discipline. Nevertheless, a large number of controversial behaviors (N = 24) and difficult judgments (N = 8) were identified. Results of the open-ended portion of the survey indicated that most of the questionable ethical practices cited by respondents corresponded to violations of American Psychological Association (APA) Ethical Standards. The findings lend initial support for AAASP to adopt the APA Ethical Standards and suggest the need for ethics training specific to applied sport psychology.     

On predicting others’ words: Electrophysiological evidence of prediction in speech production

The present study investigated whether lexical processes that occur when we name objects can also be observed when an interaction partner is naming objects. We compared the behavioral and electrophysiological responses of participants performing a conditional go/no-go picture naming task in two different conditions: individually and jointly with a confederate participant. To obtain an index of lexical processing, we manipulated lexical frequency, so that half of the pictures had corresponding names of high-frequency and the remaining half had names of low-frequency. Color cues determined whether participants should respond, whether their task-partner should respond, or whether nobody should respond. Behavioral and ERP results showed that participants engaged in lexical processing when it was their turn to respond. Crucially, ERP results on no-go trials revealed that participants also engaged in lexical processing when it was their partner’s turn to act. In addition, ERP results showed increased response inhibition selectively when it was the partner’s turn to act. These findings provide evidence for the claim that listeners generate predictions about speakers’ utterances by relying on their own action production system.     

The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.