Intuitionistic mathematics does not needex falso quodlibet

We define a system IR of first-order intuitionistic relevant logic. We show that intuitionistic mathematics (on the assumption that it is consistent) can be relevantized, by virtue of the following metatheorem: any intuitionistic proof of A from a setX of premisses can be converted into a proof in IR of eitherA or absurdity from some subset ofX. Thus IR establishes the same inconsistencies and theorems as intuitionistic logic, and allows one to prove every intuitionistic consequence of any consistent set of premisses.This paper grew out of discussion of a survey talk, on earlier work, that I gave to the 5th A.N.U. Paraconsistency Conference in January 1988. I am greatly indebted to the suggestion by Michael MacRobbie on that occasion that I investigate the so-called non-Ketonen form of the sequent rule for on the right. That suggestion inspired the correspondingly modified rule of Introduction in the system of natural deduction given above.     

Postidentification feedback affects subsequent eyewitness identification performance

Eyewitnesses sometimes view more than one lineup during an investigation. We investigated the effects of postidentification feedback following one lineup on responses to a second lineup. Witnesses (N=621) viewed a mock crime and, later, attempted to identify the culprit from an initial (target-absent) lineup and a second (target-present or target-absent) lineup. Prior to viewing the second lineup, some witnesses received accurate feedback stating that the initial lineup did not contain the culprit. A compound-decision, signal detection approach allowed the effects of feedback on identification responses to be described in terms of differences in discriminability and response bias. For witnesses who made an incorrect foil identification from the initial lineup, feedback (vs. no feedback) was associated with poorer discriminability on the second test. For witnesses who correctly rejected the initial lineup, feedback (vs. no feedback) was associated with greater discriminability on the second test. Only witnesses who received feedback after an initial correct rejection performed at a level comparable with a single-lineup control group, suggesting that an initial identification test can impair, but not enhance, performance on a second test involving the same culprit. From a theoretical perspective, the results are consistent with the idea that the way people use memorial information when making memory decisions is flexible. Analyses of preidentification confidence ratings, obtained in a follow-up study (N=133), suggested that the effects of feedback on identification performance may have operated via differences in witnesses' metacognitive beliefs.     

What,and Where,Luck is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey

In ‘What Luck Is Not’, Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of fortune. Fortune is luck-involving, and therefore easily confused with luck, but it is not itself lucky.     

II. Hamlet without the prince of Denmark revisited: Pörn on Kierkegaard and the self

Ingmar Pörn (Inquiry 27 [1984], nos. 2–3) claims that certain ideas of Kierkegaard's can illuminate a notion of the self articulated in action‐theoretical terms. Through a reconstruction of Kierkegaard's concept of despair, couched in these terms, Pörn aims to show how these ideas can contribute to the study of the self. Because he misconstrues an important distinction in Kierkegaard's account of selfhood, Pörn fails to show this. It remains uncertain what use the study of the self would have for Kierkegaard's notion of selfhood, and whether an action‐theoretical analysis is capable of bringing out whatever may be of interest in it.     

The effects of list composition and perceptual fluency on judgments of learning (JOLs)

The perceptual fluency hypothesis proposes that items that are easier to perceive at study will be given higher memorability ratings, as compared with less fluent items. However, prior research has examined this metamemorial cue primarily using mixed-list designs. Furthermore, certain memory effects are moderated by the design (mixed list vs. pure list) used to present stimuli. The present study utilized mixed as well as pure lists to assess whether judgments of learning based on perceptual fluency are relative or absolute and whether people are sensitive to differences in recall produced by variation in list composition. Using font size and generation manipulations, Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the effect of perceptual fluency on metamemory is relative in nature, occurring only in mixed lists. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that metamemory is insensitive to the effect of list composition on recall. These findings are consistent with the assumptions of Koriat’s (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 126: 349-370, 1997) cue-utilization framework, that JOLs reflect a comparative process and are insensitive to cues pertaining to conditions of learning.     

A case of hand waving: Action synchrony and person perception

While previous research has demonstrated that people’s movements can become coordinated during social interaction, little is known about the cognitive consequences of behavioral synchrony. Given intimate links between the systems that regulate perception and action, we hypothesized that the synchronization of movements during a dyadic interaction may prompt increased attention to be directed to an interaction partner, hence facilitate the information that participants glean during a social exchange. Our results supported this prediction. Incidental memories for core aspects of a brief interaction were facilitated following in-phase behavioral synchrony. Specifically, participants demonstrated enhanced memory for an interaction partner’s utterances and facial appearance. These findings underscore the importance of action perception to social cognition.