Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non‐Triviality

This paper outlines a non‐reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non‐trivial truth‐conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non‐trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.     

Eye remember you two: gaze direction modulates face recognition in a developmental study

The effects of gaze direction on memory for faces were studied in children from three different age groups (6-7, 8-9, and 10-11 years old) using a computerized version of a task devised by Hood, Macrae, Cole-Davies and Dias (2003). Participants were presented with a sequence of faces in an encoding phase, and were then required to judge which faces they had previously encountered in a surprise two-alternative forced-choice recognition test. In one condition, stimulus eye gaze was either direct or deviated at the viewing phase, and eyes were closed at the test phase. In another condition, stimulus eyes were closed at the viewing phase, with either direct or deviated gaze at the test phase. Modulation of gaze direction affected hit rates, with participants demonstrating greater accuracy for direct gaze targets compared to deviated gaze targets in both conditions. Reaction times (RT) to correctly recognized stimuli were faster for direct gaze stimuli at the viewing phase, but not at the test phase. The age group of participants differentially affected these measures: there was a greater hit rate advantage for direct gaze stimuli in older children, although RTs were less affected by age. These findings suggest that while the facilitation of face recognition by gaze direction is robust across encoding and recognition stages, the efficiency of the process is affected by the stage at which gaze is modulated.     

More human than you: attributing humanness to self and others

People typically evaluate their in-groups more favorably than out-groups and themselves more favorably than others. Research on infrahumanization also suggests a preferential attribution of the "human essence" to in-groups, independent of in-group favoritism. The authors propose a corresponding phenomenon in interpersonal comparisons: People attribute greater humanness to themselves than to others, independent of self-enhancement. Study 1 and a pilot study demonstrated 2 distinct understandings of humanness--traits representing human nature and those that are uniquely human--and showed that only the former traits are understood as inhering essences. In Study 2, participants rated themselves higher than their peers on human nature traits but not on uniquely human traits, independent of self-enhancement. Study 3 replicated this "self-humanization" effect and indicated that it is partially mediated by attribution of greater depth to self versus others. Study 4 replicated the effect experimentally. Thus, people perceive themselves to be more essentially human than others.     

Near Death Experiences and Gnostic Christianity: Parallels in Antiquity

Long considered to be heretical, ancient Gnostic Christian texts unearthed this century display compelling similarities between Gnostic conceptions of life and death and modern NDEs. The Gnostic texts devoted extensive tracts to what readers could expect to encounter when they died. Other passages make numerous allusions to NDE-like experiences that can be realized in this life, most notably the human encounter with a Divine Light. The Gnostic Christian literature gives us one more example of NDEs and similar experiences in the ancient world.     

How chance explains

What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We claim that their setups do. Chances, we think, mediate these explanations of outcome by setup but do not feature in them. Facts about chances do feature in explanations of a different kind: higher-order explanations, which explain how and why setups explain their outcomes. In this paper, we elucidate this 'mediator view' of chancy explanation and defend it from a series of objections. We then show how it changes the playing field in four metaphysical disputes concerning chance. First, it makes it more plausible that even low chances can have explanatory power. Second, it undercuts a circularity objection against reductionist theories of chance. Third, it redirects the debate about a prominent argument against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it sheds light on potential chancy explanations of the Universe's origin.     

A longitudinal exploration of the continuity of children's social participation and social withdrawal across socioeconomic status levels and social settings

The major purpose of this study was to determine the stability across time and social setting of children's social participation and social withdrawal. We followed a sample of Canadian children, aged five years at the beginning of the study, for two years. Children from lower‐SES homes were less involved than those from the higher‐SES in group play after school and during outdoor recess. Across the full sample, social withdrawal was not very stable. There was, however, considerable stability across setting and time among extreme groups of withdrawn participants. Social withdrawal was largely unrelated to parents' initiation of peer contacts for their children. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conceptual beliefs about human values and their implications: human nature beliefs predict value importance, value trade-offs, and responses to value-laden rhetoric

Beliefs that may underlie the importance of human values were investigated in 4 studies, drawing on research that distinguishes natural-kind (natural), nominal-kind (conventional), and artifact (functional) beliefs. Values were best characterized by artifact and nominal-kind beliefs, as well as a natural-kind belief specific to the social domain, "human nature" (Studies 1 and 2). The extent to which values were considered central to human nature was associated with value importance in both Australia and Japan (Study 2), and experimentally manipulating human nature beliefs influenced value importance (Study 3). Beyond their association with importance, human nature beliefs predicted participants' reactions to value trade-offs (Study 1) and to value-laden rhetorical statements (Study 4). Human nature beliefs therefore play a central role in the psychology of values.