Why Doomsday Arguments are Better than Simulation Arguments

Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments, Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument says: people who think advanced civilisations would run many fully‐conscious simulated minds should also think they're probably simulated minds themselves. However, Bostrom's conclusions can (and should) be resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic reasoning. This paper initially offers a posterior‐probabilistic ‘Doomsday lottery’ argument against Bostrom's conclusions. Suggestions are then offered for deriving anti‐simulation conclusions using weaker assumptions. Anti‐simulation arguments herein use more (epistemically and metaphysically) robust reference classes than Bostrom's argument, require no Principles of Indifference, abide better by the total evidence requirement, and yet use empirically plausible priors and likelihoods. However, while Doomsday arguments are probabilistically, epistemically and metaphysically stronger than the Simulation Argument, anthropic reasoning can (and should) refrain from embracing either.     

The Role of Women's Relationships With Their Partners in Their Adjustment Following Prenatal Genetic Testing1

This study explored how aspects of the couple relationship contributed to the adjustment of 95 women who underwent prenatal diagnostic (PND) testing because of advanced maternal age (AMA). Participants completed self‐report measures prior to genetic counseling (T1), during the waiting period for PND test results (T2), and after normal results were received (T3). At T2, distress was predicted by the degree to which women approached the PND decision jointly with their partners, and marital adjustment was predicted by women's satisfaction with the support received from their partners. Marital adjustment at T3 was predicted by earlier levels of partner agreement about PND‐related issues. Results suggest that the couple relationship has the potential to facilitate or hinder women's experience of PND testing.     

Line-bisectioning and obstacle avoidance: Evidence for separate strategies

Previous studies have frequently applied a combination of line-bisection tasks (in which participants indicate the middle of a line) and obstacle avoidance tasks (in which participants move their hand between two obstacles) with the aim of revealing perception–action dissociations in certain neurological disorders, such as visual form agnosia and optic ataxia. However, valid conclusions about the underlying processing pathways can only be drawn if participants apply the same strategy in both tasks (i.e. finding the middle between the obstacles). Yet, this assumption has never been tested directly. In this experiment, we investigated whether participants perform obstacle avoidance and line-bisectioning using similar strategies by manipulating the position of the obstacles and the start position of the hand relative to the obstacles. Our results indicate that the lateral hand position during obstacle avoidance does not only vary as a function of obstacle location but also strongly depends on the start position. Moreover, participants showed increased sensitivity to obstacle shifts occurring closer to the hand's start position. In contrast, during line-bisectioning the sensitivity to obstacles shifts was unaffected by the hand's start position. The findings suggest that during obstacle-avoidance the need to keep a safe distance from the obstacles is balanced with the requirement to minimise energetic demands. In contrast, the main intention during line-bisectioning is to move to the perceived midpoint as accurately as possible. The fact that very different constraints underlie trajectory planning in both tasks implies that caution has to be taken when interpreting differences in performance levels.     

Animal Rights and Animal Experiments: An Interest-Based Approach

This paper examines whether non-human animals have a moral right not to be experimented upon. It adopts a Razian conception of rights, whereby an individual possesses a right if an interest of that individual is sufficient to impose a duty on another. To ascertain whether animals have a right not to be experimented on, three interests are examined which might found such a right: the interest in not suffering, the interest in staying alive, and the interest in being free. It is argued that while the first two of these interests are sufficient to ground animal rights against being killed and made to suffer by experiments, the interest in freedom does not ground a general animal right not to be used in experimentation. Winner of the second annual Res Publica Postgraduate Essay Prize, 2006.     

Book reviews

Perspectives on Quantum Reality: Non‐Relativistic, Relativistic, and Field‐Theoretic, Rob Clifton, Ed., 1996. Dordrecht, The Netherlands Kluwer Academic Publishers, xi + 243, US$112.00, ISBN 0–7923–3812‐X

Reconstruction of Scientific Theory Change (Russian title: Rekonstrukcija Processa Smeni Fundamentalnih Nauchnih Teorii), Rinat M. Nugayev, 1989. Kazan, Kazan University Press, 208 pp., ISBN: 5–7464–0240–0

The Beat of a Different Drum: The Life and Science of Richard Feynman, Jagdish Mehra, 1994. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. xxxii + 630, US$19.95 (Pbk), ISBN 0 19 853948 (Hbk), ISBN 0 19 851887 0 (Pbk)     

Assessing Safety Behaviors in Fear of Storms: Validation of the Storm-Related Safety Behavior Scale

With the exception of one self-report questionnaire assessing storm fear severity (Nelson et al. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 36(1), 105–114, 2014), there are few brief published assessment tools to measure the cognitive, behavioral, and physical manifestations of storm fear. A principal feature of phobic disorders is the use of safety behaviors to alleviate distress. Safety behaviors are believed to perpetuate anxiety by preventing the disconfirmation of feared outcomes (Salkovskis Behavioural Psychotherapy, 19(1), 6–19, 1991). To date, no studies have examined the use of safety behaviors in storm fear. The purpose of the current research was to develop and validate the Storm-Related Safety Behavior Scale (SRSBS; Vorstenbosch and Antony 2017), a 24-item self-report scale that measures safety behavior use in adults with a fear of storms. Two studies examined the (1) factor structure, internal consistency, validity, and test-retest reliability of the SRSBS, as well as the frequency with which specific safety behaviors were endorsed; and (2) ability of the SRSBS to differentiate between a group of adults with low and high fear of storms after exposure to a virtual thunderstorm. Factor analysis revealed that the SRSBS is best captured by one factor. Results provided preliminary evidence of convergent and discriminant validity, as well as test-retest reliability. Finally, significant group differences were found between participants with high versus low fear of storms following a virtual thunderstorm. These findings demonstrate the value of the SRSBS for assessing safety behavior use.     

The role of attention in eye-movement awareness

People are unable to accurately report on their own eye movements most of the time. Can this be explained as a lack of attention to the objects we fixate? Here, we elicited eye-movement errors using the classic oculomotor capture paradigm, in which people tend to look at sudden onsets even when they are irrelevant. In the first experiment, participants were able to report their own errors on about a quarter of the trials on which they occurred. The aim of the second experiment was to assess what differentiates errors that are detected from those that are not. Specifically, we estimated the relative influence of two possible factors: how long the onset distractor was fixated (dwell time), and a measure of how much attention was allocated to the onset distractor. Longer dwell times were associated with awareness of the error, but the measure of attention was not. The effect of the distractor identity on target discrimination reaction time was similar whether or not the participant was aware they had fixated the distractor. The results suggest that both attentional and oculomotor capture can occur in the absence of awareness, and have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between attention, eye movements, and awareness.