Are you looking at me? Eye gaze and person perception

Previous research has highlighted the pivotal role played by gaze detection and interpretation in the development of social cognition. Extending work of this kind, the present research investigated the effects of eye gaze on basic aspects of the person–perception process, namely, person construal and the extraction of category–related knowledge from semantic memory. It was anticipated that gaze direction would moderate the efficiency of the mental operations through which these social–cognitive products are generated. Specifically, eye gaze was expected to influence both the speed with which targets could be categorized as men and women and the rate at which associated stereotypic material could be accessed from semantic memory. The results of two experiments supported these predictions: Targets with nondeviated (i.e., direct) eye gaze elicited facilitated categorical responses. The implications of these findings for recent treatments of person perception are considered.     

Repetition-based credibility enhancement of unfamiliar faces

This experiment demonstrated that rating the credibility of nonfamous faces results in a significant increase in rated credibility on a subsequent encounter relative to new nonfamous faces. The degree of credibility enhancement is comparable for both honesty and sincerity ratings and at both short (2-day) and long (14-day) interrating intervals. Furthermore, credibility enhancement was independent of recognition; ratings were significantly higher for repeated faces, regardless of whether they were remembered. Although female faces were rated more credible than male faces, there was no gender difference in the degree of credibility enhancement with repetition. Conditional analyses revealed that actual, rather than perceived, repetition formed the basis of credibility enhancement. Future research should compare repetition effects on both credibility and affect as well as the durability of such effects over time.     

Liberalism,Abstract Individualism,and the Problem of Particular Obligations

In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’ presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees.     

A general mechanism for decision-making in the human brain?

A new fMRI study by Heekeren and colleagues suggests that left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) contains a region that integrates sensory evidence supporting perceptual decisions. DLPFC meets two criteria posited by Heekeren et al. for such a region: (1) its activity is correlated in time with the output of sensory areas of the visual cortex measured simultaneously, and (2) as expected of an integrator, its activity is greater on trials for which the sensory evidence is substantial than on trials for which the sensory evidence is weak. Complementary experiments in humans and monkeys now offer a realistic hope of elucidating decision-making networks in the primate brain.     

Inhibition of return at multiple locations in visual search: When you see it and when you don't

Using a novel sequential task, Danziger, Kingstone, and Snyder (1998) provided conclusive evidence that inhibition of return (IOR) can co-occur at multiple non-contiguous locations. They argued that their findings depended crucially on the allocation of attention to cued locations. Specifically, they hypothesized that because subjects could not predict whether an onset event was a target or a non-target, all onset events had to be attended. As a result, non-targets were tagged with inhibition. The present study tested this hypothesis by manipulating whether target onset was predictable or not. In support of Danziger et al., three experiments revealed that multiple IOR was only observed when attention had to be directed to the cued locations. Interestingly, when attention did not need to be allocated to the cued locations, and multiple IOR was abolished, an IOR effect was still observed at the most recently cued location. Two possible accounts for this single IOR effect were presented for future investigation. One account attributes the effect to motor-based inhibition as hypothesized by Klein and Taylor (1994). The alternative account attributes the effect to weak attentional capture by a peripheral cue. Together the data support the view that multiple IOR is an attentional phenomenon and, as hypothesized by Tipper, Weaver, and Watson (1996), its presence or absence is largely under the control of the observer.     

Alcohol Affects Emotion Through Cognition

Determining how cognition and emotion interact is pivotal to an understanding of human behavior and its disorders. Available data suggest that changes in emotional reactivity and behavior associated with drinking are intertwined with alcohol's effects on cognitive processing. In the study reported here, we demonstrated that alcohol dampens anticipatory fear and response inhibition in human participants not by directly suppressing subcortical emotion centers, as posited by traditional tension-reduction theories, but instead by impairing cognitive-processing capacity. During intoxication, reductions in fear response (assessed via startle potentiation) occurred only under dual-stimulus conditions, and coincided with reduced attentional processing of threat cues as evidenced by brain response (assessed via P3 event-related potentials). The results are consistent with higher cortical mediation of alcohol's effects on fear, and illustrate more broadly how disruption of a cognitive process can lead to alterations in emotional reactivity and adaptive behavior.