Scepticism, perceptual knowledge, and doxastic responsibility

Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give a more satisfying response to scepticism, we need also to consider the standing of background beliefs. This is required since the recognitional abilities that enable us to have perceptual knowledge are informed by, or presuppose, a picture or conception of the world the correctness of which we have not ascertained. The question is how, in the face of this, to make sense of responsible belief-formation. In addressing this problem I make a suggestion about the standing of certain crucial beliefs linking appearances with membership of kinds.     

Rationality and indeterminate probabilities

We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required. Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with our describing a world that plausibly has indeterminate chances. Rationality requires a certain alignment of your credences with corresponding hypotheses about the chances. Thus, if you hypothesize the chances to be indeterminate, your will inherit their indeterminacy in your corresponding credences. Our third argument is motivated by a dilemma. Epistemic rationality requires you to stay open-minded about contingent matters about which your evidence has not definitively legislated. Practical rationality requires you to be able to act decisively at least sometimes. These requirements can conflict with each other-for thanks to your open-mindedness, some of your options may have undefined expected utility, and if you are choosing among them, decision theory has no advice to give you. Such an option is playing Nover and Hájek??s Pasadena Game, and indeed any option for which there is a positive probability of playing the Pasadena Game. You can serve both masters, epistemic rationality and practical rationality, with an indeterminate credence to the prospect of playing the Pasadena game. You serve epistemic rationality by making your upper probability positive-it ensures that you are open-minded. You serve practical rationality by making your lower probability 0-it provides guidance to your decision-making. No sharp credence could do both.     

A new look at social attention: Orienting to the eyes is not (entirely) under volitional control

People tend to look at other people's eyes, but whether this bias is automatic or volitional is unclear. To discriminate between these two possibilities, we used a "don't look" (DL) paradigm. Participants looked at a series of upright or inverted faces, and were asked either to freely view the faces or to avoid looking at the eyes, or as a control, the mouth. As previously demonstrated, participants showed a bias to attend to both eyes and mouths during free viewing. In the DL condition, participants told to avoid the eyes of upright faces were unable to fully suppress the tendency to fixate on the faces' eyes, whereas participants told to avoid the mouth of upright faces successfully eliminated their bias to overtly attend to that feature. When faces were inverted, participants were equally able to suppress looks to the eyes and mouth. Together, these results suggest that the tendency to look at the eyes reflects orienting that is both volitional and automatic, and that the engagement of holistic or configural face processing mechanisms during upright face viewing has an influence in guiding gaze automatically to the eyes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

In medio stat virtus: theoretical and methodological extremes regarding reciprocity will not explain complex social behaviors

Guala contests the validity of strong reciprocity as a key element in shaping social behavior by contrasting evidence from experimental games to that of natural and historic data. He suggests that in order to understand the evolution of social behavior researchers should focus on natural data and weak reciprocity. We disagree with Guala's proposal to shift the focus of the study from one extreme of the spectrum (strong reciprocity) to the other extreme (weak reciprocity). We argue that the study of the evolution of social behavior must be comparative in nature, and we point out experimental evidence that shows that social behavior is not cooperation determined by a set of fixed factors. We argue for a model that sees social behavior as a dynamic interaction of genetic and environmental factors.     

Promotion orientation explains why future-oriented people exercise and eat healthy: evidence from the two-factor consideration of future consequences-14 scale

The authors extended research linking individual differences in consideration of future consequences (CFC) with health behaviors by (a) testing whether individual differences in regulatory focus would mediate that link and (b) highlighting the value of a revised, two-factor CFC-14 scale with subscales assessing concern with future consequences (CFC-Future) and concern with immediate consequences (CFC-Immediate) proper. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the revised CFC-14 scale supported the presence of two highly reliable factors (CFC-Future and CFC-Immediate; αs from .80 to .84). Moreover, structural equation modeling showed that those high in CFC-Future engage in exercise and healthy eating because they adopt a promotion orientation. Future use of the two-factor CFC-14 scale is encouraged to shed additional light on how concern with future and concern with immediate consequences (proper) differentially impact the way people resolve a host of intertemporal dilemmas (e.g., health, financial, and environmental behavior).     

Exploring programmatic moderators of the effectiveness of marriage and relationship education programs: a meta-analytic study

This study uses meta-analytic methods to explore programmatic moderators or common factors of the effectiveness of marriage and relationship education (MRE) programs. We coded 148 evaluation reports for potential programmatic factors that were associated with stronger intervention effects, although the range of factors we could code was limited by the lack of details in the reports. Overall, we found a positive effect for program dosage: moderate-dosage programs (9-20 contact hours) were associated with stronger effects compared to low-dosage programs (1-8 contact hours). A programmatic emphasis on communication skills was associated with stronger effects on couple communication outcomes, but this difference did not reach statistical significance for the relationship quality/satisfaction outcome. There was no evidence that institutionalized MRE programs (formal manuals, ongoing presence, formal instructor training, multiple evaluations) were associated with stronger effects. Similarly, there was little evidence of differences in program setting (university/laboratory vs. religious). We discuss possible explanations for these findings and implications for program design and evaluation.     

The influence of visual search efficiency on the time-course of identity-based SR-compatibility

Three experiments were conducted to investigate the impact of stimulus-driven control on the time-course of stimulus-response (SR) compatibility. Participants responded to the presence or absence of a singleton arrow that was presented among multiple nontargets. When the singleton arrow was present, observers pressed a button with their right index finger, when it was absent they pressed with their left-index finger. SR-compatibility depended on the relation between the identity of the target and the present response: Even though the identity of the target singleton arrow (whether it was pointing to the right or left) was irrelevant to the task, the direction could be corresponding (right arrow) or noncorresponding (left arrow) with a target present response (the right hand). To examine the time-course of performance target-distractor similarity was varied to increase or decrease visual search efficiency and accordingly response latency. There were three main findings. First, the results of Experiment 1 showed that observers were no faster to respond 'present' when the singleton arrow pointed to the right (corresponding to the right hand) than when it pointed left (noncorresponding to the right hand) in a simple present-absent detection task. Second, only when observers were encouraged to process the identity of the arrow singleton, an effect of an SR-compatibility effect was found which developed over time. Third, the time-course of SR-compatibility was not influenced by visual search efficiency. The results of the present work suggest that visual selection and response selection occur in different stages.     

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.     

Surrogate Motherhood Revisited: Maternal Identity from a Jewish Perspective

A new bill regulating ovum donation in Israel is set to pass its second and third readings in the Israel Parliament in the upcoming months. The new law will expand the number of locally donated ova available, as previously Israeli women were prohibited from donating eggs unless they were undergoing fertility treatment. Parallel to this legislative initiative, there has been a change in rabbinical thinking over who is considered the mother in a case of surrogacy. Previously, the consensus has been that the birth mother is to be considered the mother, but over the last few years there has been a change in thinking and the genetic mother is now considered the mother. The purpose of this paper is to present the ethical and legal issues from a Jewish perspective in determining maternal identity. The dilemma also demonstrates some of the difficulties in applying Talmudic law to modern problems and the various methodologies used to overcome these issues.