(E)-Trust and Its Function: Why We Shouldn't Apply Trust and Trustworthiness to Human–AI Relations

With an increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, theorists have analyzed and argued for the promotion of trust in AI and trustworthy AI. Critics have objected that AI does not have the characteristics to be an appropriate subject for trust. However, this argumentation is open to counterarguments. Firstly, rejecting trust in AI denies the trust attitudes that some people experience. Secondly, we can trust other non-human entities, such as animals and institutions, so why can we not trust AI systems? Finally, human–AI trust is criticized based on a conception of human–human trust, which does not recognize the distinctiveness of the human–AI relationship. This article aims to refute these counterarguments based on the genealogical analyses of ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ of Karen Jones and Thomas Simpson, who show that trust and trustworthiness help to overcome vulnerabilities. This function of trust gives reason to use human–human trust as a standard. For this function, it is important that trustees are responsive to trust. While animals and institutions could be responsive, narrow AI systems are unable to be responsive to trust. Therefore, we should not apply trust to AI and instead direct our trust to those who can be responsive to and held responsible for our trust.     

Differentiating the Effects of Informational and Interpersonal Justice in Co‐Worker Interactions for Task Accomplishment

To extend the research on interactions‐based justice and integrate it with the research on trustworthiness, the present article examines the role of informational and interpersonal justice in co‐worker interactions for task accomplishment. Based on social exchange theory and fairness heuristic theory, the two justice dimensions would trigger different types of responses based on the principle of reciprocity and how they manage different types of uncertainties in a work relationship. As a result, they lead to different outcomes in the context of two co‐workers having a disagreement about work. It was hypothesised that informational justice is related to acceptance of the co‐worker's view primarily through perception of ability‐based trustworthiness, whereas interpersonal justice is related to satisfaction with the co‐worker primarily through perception of benevolence‐based trustworthiness. A survey of employees and a simulation study showed that the effect of informational justice on acceptance of the co‐worker's view is mediated more by ability‐based trustworthiness than by benevolence‐based trustworthiness, whereas the reverse is true for the mediation of the effect of interpersonal justice on satisfaction with the co‐worker. Theoretical implications are discussed concerning the differentiation of the two highly correlated justice dimensions, together with practical implications regarding their relative usefulness.     

It’s not just “us” versus “them”: Moving beyond binary perspectives on intergroup processes

ABSTRACT

The social psychology of intergroup relations has emerged largely from studies of how one group of people (e.g., whites) think and feel about another (e.g., blacks). By reducing the social world to binary categories, this approach has provided an effective and efficient methodological framework. However, it has also obscured important features of social relations in historically divided societies. This paper highlights the importance of investigating intergroup relationships involving more than two groups and of exploring not only their psychological but also their political significance. Exemplifying this argument, we discuss the conditions under which members of disadvantaged groups either dissolve into internecine competition or unite to challenge the status quo, highlighting the role of complex forms of social comparison, identification, contact, and third-party support for collective action. Binary conceptualizations of intergroup relations, we conclude, are the product of specific sociohistorical practices rather than a natural starting point for psychological research.